Civil–Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War”
Restricted accessResearch articleFirst published online October, 2007
Civil–Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War”
This response to Coletta's “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War” argues that too much significance is attributed to Shinseki's remarks. The larger question is whether military leaders should speak up when their civilian leadership's plan is grossly inadequate. Second, the response considers questions about the middle levels of power. The authors suggest that the principal–agent argument is Shinseki's defense and the ultimate principals are the American public. Third, a table is offered as a means of comparing and contrasting the Huntington–Janowitz positions with new theoretical focuses. Fourth, the conclusion suggests that concerns touched on in the tables (the obligation to speak up, the public space, the implications of economic development, and the changing nature of warfare) overshadow the Shinseki issue and that social action theory and type construction methodology are of service in addressing civil–military relations.
Damon Coletta , “ Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War ,” Armed Forces & Society34, 1 (2007): 109-121 .
2.
Peter D. Feaver offers a conservatively safe perspective developed from the economic sphere concerning civil—military relations as analogous to the relationship between the principals (owners/management/ capital) and the agents (workers/labor). The agents are “shirking” when they are looking out for their own interests as opposed to fulfilling the interests of their principals. Many would consider that the executive branch is “principal,” whereas others may define it more broadly to include the legislative branch, and others might argue that the ultimate principals are the American people. Peter D. Feaver , Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 2003).
3.
CNN.com , “ Top General: Remarks on Gays Were `Personal Moral Views ,'” March 14, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/03/13/gays.military/ (posted 2:36 a.m. EDT); Aamer Madhani , “ Top General Calls Homosexuality `Immoral ,'” Chicago Tribune, March 12, 2007, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-070312pace,1,1786748,print.story?coll=&ctrack=1&cset=true ; see also “ General Regrets Remarks on Homosexuality—Pace Says He Focused Too Much on His Own `Moral Views,' Won't Apologize ,” MSNBC staff and news service reports, March 13, 2007.
4.
Richard T. Cooper , “ General Casts War in Religious Terms ,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2003, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/1016-01.htm
5.
Statement by General Eric K. Shinseki , Chief of Staff United States Army, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on the Posture of the United States Army First Session , 108th Congress , February 25, 2003 (record version), http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/February/Shinseki.pdf; see FDCH Political Transcripts, February 25, 2003, Tuesday, “Committee Members Holds a Hearing on the DOD Budget,” one of seven documents. Searching through this, one finds on page 14 that Shinseki indicates he would have to rely on the combatant commander's exact requirements. Senator Levin interrupts and asks for a range. Shinseki replied with the statement about several hundred thousands to quell the ethnic tensions, etc. Incidentally, that hearing had an open and closed session. One can blindly speculate that Shinseki perhaps also testified in the closed session; if he did, perhaps he discussed serious reservations and thus was the good agent protecting his principal, the administration that has acted (in our opinion) as the shirking agent for the ultimate principals involved here—people of the United States.
6.
An impromptu Google search, “was Shinseki a prophet,” turned up http://raven.utc.edu/cgi-bin/ WA.EXE?A2=ind0601c&L=hp3000-1&D=0&H=1&T=0&P=9331
7.
The factors of production for this hubris included one part groupthink, one part cherry-picked intelligence, one part planted news stories, and one part sacrifice of its Secretary of State and the career of a Central Intelligence operative. The process of production included the harassment and micromanagement of members of their own party, and virtually all its agents—career professionals in virtually every department and agency—who were vetted for neoconservative correctness, and the persecution and dismissal of as many of those as possible who failed their incredibly narrow loyalty tests. This all played out as a gross failure in the reconstruction effort in Iraq. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran , Imperial Life in the Emerald City— Inside Iraq's Green Zone ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 2006). As one commander commented at a Fort McNair conference regarding the Army National Guard in May 2004, “the Administration sent the `B' team.” Finally, the sirens of reality are apparently calling on General Petraeus to seek a closer connection between public affairs and information operations. See Julian E. Barnes , “ Top Iraq General Seeks Tighter Control of Info—Critics: Change Opens Way for Propaganda ,” Concord Monitor, April 19, 2007, A6 . For a most recent discussion of the importance of news management supportive of the military goals (and perhaps tighter control and thus seemingly what appears to be Petraeus's goal vis-à-vis news accounts and yet poses difficult questions), see Eviathar H. Ben-Zedeff , “ Lessons of News Management in the Gulf Wars ,” The Institute of Communications Studies, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=34&paper=1901
8.
Grasping, articulating, and balancing all the rules, implications, and recommendations of Goldwater-Nichols would constitute more than a career or two. This is a huge data mine for civil—military relations and military transformation. A copy of the act is available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/ 99433pt1.pdf. There exist numerous studies on the progress, impact, and consequences of Goldwater-Nichols. For just a few, see Dennis J. Quinn, ed., “ The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act a Ten-Year Retrospective ” ( Washington, DC: National Defense University Press , 1999); see also Christopher M. Bourne , “ Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act ,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1998); see Clark A. Murdock , “ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, BGN—Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report ,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 2004); Clark A. Murdock and Michele A. Flournoy , “ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report ,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 2005). See http://www.hqda.army.mil/library/goldwater.htm for a selected bibliography. One should be careful before using it for such a specific purpose and in such a manner as Coletta. Also, Coletta made a specific reference to many in the Army feeling the civil—military bargain as under pressure. We could not specifically find that in the referenced article, though we suppose it can be construed in general terms. It seemed to the authors that the article by Thomas Mahnken and James Fitzsimonds had more to say about Army and Marine officers' being more cynical about how technology would change their world than the general concern Coletta describes. We surmise that is probably because in warfare, the “ground truth” and the “air truth” are rather different truths. It was concluded from that article that the Air Force had far more to worry about. We may have drones in the air, but thus far, we still need humans in boots on the ground. Finally, thinking about this engendered a jump to a question about shirking in the Air Force. Was the organization, work, and in-fighting of the “black hole” group within the Air Force during the early stages of the Gulf War shirking or a form of intra—Air Force shirking? Thomas Mahnken and James Fitzsimonds , “ Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes toward Transformation ,” International Security28, 2 (Fall 2003): 112-48 ; see Mark D. Mandeles , T. Hone , and S. Terry , Managing “Command and Control” in the Persian Gulf War ( Westport, CT: Praeger , 1996).
9.
Stepping back and looking at numbers for a moment, one can find that the area of Kosovo is approximately 4,200 square miles, a little more than twice the size of Rhode Island. Iraq covers approximately 170,000 square miles, forty times the size of Kosovo—that's a lot of Rhode Islands. The population of Kosovo is roughly 2.2 million, while the population of Iraq is some 26.7 million—twelve times that of Kosovo. A simple calculation (using Coletta's figures) indicates that we had some 40,000 troops as the initial peacekeeping force in Kosovo. In Iraq, we have approximately 130,000 troops, a little more than three and a quarter times the size of the Kosovo force—that is (approximately), one soldier for every fifty-five people in Kosovo and one for every 200 in Iraq.
10.
Could it be that Franks knew better but was asked and agreed to take on the task as they (those in the administration) framed and defined it—and that framing and definition was horribly wrong?
11.
Vincent Ferraro , “ Another Motive for Iraq War: Stabilizing Oil Market ,” Hartford Courant, August 12, 2003, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/courant.htm ; see also Ed Vulliamy , Paul Webster , and Nick Paton Walsh , “ Scramble to Carve up Iraqi Oil Reserves Lies behind US Diplomacy—Maneuvers Shaped by Horse Trading between America, Russia and France over Control of Untapped Oilfields ,” The Observer, October 6, 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,805530,00.html . At the end of 2003, the French, German, and Russians were barred from bidding on $18.6 billion worth of reconstruction contracts in Iraq. And most recently, a claim has been made that it may be Iraq that holds the world's largest oil reserves, some 300 billion barrels. See http://www.libertypost.org/cgi-bin/readart.cgi?ArtNum=183184 ; see also “ Iraq Warns France of High Price to Pay for UN Vote ,” Agence France Presse , December 5, 1999, http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/1999/msg00786.html ; see also Carrie Satterlee , “ Facts on Who Benefits from Keeping Saddam Hussein in Power ,” Web Memo #217, The Heritage Foundation , February 28, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm217.cfm. Finally, see also Jean-David Levitte , “ First `Freedom Fries,' Now Oil-for-Food Lies: Give France a Break ,”Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2004, http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2004/levitte_latimes040704.asp
12.
Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro , Allies at War ( New York: McGraw-Hill , 2004), 87-91. These authors refute the oil contracts argument and present the view that for France, Germany, and Russia, national self-perceptions, an unwillingness to submit to Washington's unilateral viewpoints, and the lack of perceiving an immediate threat from Iraq (and a greater capacity to live with and/or under threat than the United States) informed their preference for sanctions over regime change.
13.
Coletta refers to Conrad Crane and Andrew Terrill , “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario” ( Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute , 2003), 33. We doubt that this report was the only definitive study but rather assumed it was one among perhaps several. In any case, the views are those of the authors. One author called Dr. Terrill's office at Carlisle to ask the extent of General Shinseki's actual knowledge of this report, but Dr. Terrill was on a trip and never called back.
14.
Cane and Terrill , “Reconstructing Iraq,” 33.
15.
See David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker , “Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War” ( Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute , December 2005).
16.
Of course, there must have been other voices of protest; we assume they were either reigned in or “disappeared” from their positions as the administration salted the Pentagon with schedule “C” appointments deep into the bureaucracy.
17.
Lloyd J. Matthews , “ Conference Report: Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century ” (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 2004 ), 2. At the same conference, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner remarked that wrangling within the Department of Defense over selection of team members impeded reconstruction. Steven Metz amplified Garner's view by pointing out that the administration has found out that a victory strategy requires a self-transformation that allows for a cross-governmental effort that is truly integrative. See Matthews , “Conference Report,” 20, for Metz's remark and p. 35 for Daniel Brumberg's comment.
18.
If Coletta was in the room, he should have said so, if not—who “leaked”? And if he was the “leakee,” is he not guilty of an illegal exchange of intelligence or at least a violation of Senate rules with a “leaker”? The obvious point, which is exactly our point, is that no one knows what was said—especially the American public—the ultimate principals in Feaver's terms.
19.
Where was Shinseki to turn? There is an assumption made by Coletta here—that even in the dialogue of that moment in the hearing, when Senator Levin asked Shinseki about Iraq, the implications of anything he said would be apparent to him (Shinseki) immediately. This is a stretch that Coletta seems not to consider as such.
20.
Irving L. Janis , Groupthink ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin , 1982). The most recent addition to the growing criticism comes from a new book by the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet. Essentially, he claims that the administration (particularly Dick Cheney) pushed the country to war without a thorough debate. See Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti , “ Ex-CIA Chief, in Book, Assails Cheney on Iraq ,” The New York Times, April 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/washington/27intel.html?th&emc=th
21.
Peter Feaver , Armed Servants , 83-84 . See also Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi , Choosing Your Battles, American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press ). See p. 66 , where Feaver notes that when civilian leaders dismiss military advice (for argument's sake, Shinseki's advice), then “competing civilian elites will be ready and willing to attack the leadership”—if the policy fails. Feaver footnotes Kenneth Schultz , “ Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War ,” International Organization53, 2 (1999): 233-66 . So were the Democrats waiting to attack? Probably so. Older readers might remember the streetcar phrase that was attributed to President Johnson's National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy: “Pleiku's [airfield in South Vietnam, attack on which became the casus belli for expansion of the U.S. role] are like streetcars; there's one along every ten minutes.” See David Halberstam , The Best and the Brightest ( Greenwich, CT: Fawcett , 1973), 533 . “Streetcars go in both directions more often than not—they certainly can get you into a conflict; perhaps they can get one out as well.” Did Shinseki provide a “streetcar”? Yes, but three-plus years had to go by. The Congress gave the President at least complicit support. It was after multiple failures that they attacked. Shinseki's testimony three years earlier was just one streetcar among many. There have been so many streetcars for the President's opponents in Iraq that the significance of Shinseki's testimony has been blown out of proportion.
22.
Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins , The Future of the Army Profession ( Boston: McGraw-Hill , 2002). See also James Burk , “ Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations ,” Armed Forces & Society29, 1 (2002): 1-29 . We employed the term neo in front of liberal because of the changes that have been applied to that word. Today, it is the party of the Republicans that champions the Huntington liberal model and seeks to shrink the public space via their efforts to privatize virtually everything. The Democratic Party at least sporadically and nominally champions the Republican (Janowitz) model, calling for maintenance and growth of public space. For an example of the latter (Republican—Janowitz school), see Charles Moskos , A Call to Civic Service—A Twentieth Century Fund Book ( New York: Free Press , 1988). A layperson's personal account of this is found in Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer , AWOL—The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from Military Service and How It Hurts Our Country ( New York: HarperCollins , 2006).
23.
The issue of civil—military relations and the role and powers of the executive and legislative branches has a long history of contention. Furthermore, this fight for “power” involves so much more. The signing statements issue is an example of this executive branch conflict with Congress. President Bush has more signing statements (approximately 750) than all previous presidents. In 2006, a task force of the American Bar Association criticized Bush's proclivity toward signing statements; see http://www.abanet .org/media/releases/news072406.html. A lay discussion of this issue can be found together with numerous external links on http://en.wikipedia.org/wikii/Signing_statement.
24.
See Paul Krugman's editorial article about privatization undermining Medicare, “ The Plot against Medicare ,” The New York Times, April 20, 2007. See also George Selgin , “ Currency Privatization as a Substitute for Currency Boards and Dollarization ,” The Cato Journal25, 1 (Winter 2005): 141-51 . Although he makes note that he is referring to what other nations should do, not particularly what our nation should do, we could not help but wonder if such a scheme were implemented, how far away we would all be from Citibank bucks, or Halliburton or Chevron bucks. When everything is privatized, is there any public space left? Thus, policy that affects us all is designed by a very few, and often in secret; Vice President Cheney's meetings with the energy barons is an excellent example. Public energy policy is now “secret”—to protect the public, we have to surmise. See Dana Milbank and Justin Blum , “ Document Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force ,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2005, A1. See also Don Van Natta Jr. , “ Cheney Argues Energy Meetings Should Remain Secret ,” The New York Times, September 27, 2002, http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/09.30C.cheney.argue.p.htm . Those who lament the lack of public concern about Iraq and other issues should consider whether and how much this is a developing characteristic of the American public. It is a direct “externality” of the neoconservative assault on the public space. The neoconservatives have engineered this as a zero-sum game, and they are winning— to the detriment of the American culture. We are becoming a population of know-nothing consumers. See Paul R. Camacho , “ Necons Fear to Wake Zombies at the Mall ,” Concord Monitor , April 24, 2006, B4 . The letter was written in response to the appearance of conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer's article, “ Don't Cheer Ex-Generals' Revolt ,” which appeared in the Concord Monitor, April 21, 2006, B5 . It is not at all clear that the random choices of the marketplace result in a greater public good—at least not in the current era. See Barry Schwartz , ” America Would Rather Be Shopping—Consumerism Is Devouring Citizenship and Undermining Democracy Experts Say ,” Concord Monitor, April 15, 2007, D5 . Schwartz reviews two books—one argues that children are being corrupted and adults infantilized and the other concerns the corporate “battle” for our society's youngest consumers. These themes (“infantilization,” cultural deterioration, etc.) are still vibrant in the critique of television. One of the earlier and interesting cross-over (scholarly-lay) publications in this area is Jerry Mander , Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television ( New York: William Morrow , 1976).
25.
Randolph E. Schmid , “ Bush Signing Statement May Allow Mail Opening without Warrants,” Associated Press , January 4, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2007/01/04/bush_signing_statement_may_allow_mail_opening_without_warrants/
26.
Should the military personnel that testified against the incorporation of gays in the military in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the 1990s have asked for a closed session? Were they shirking? We can only conclude that shirking is in the eye of the beholder. The “facts” of history appear to be relative to what, where, and when—and for whom—they are being employed. Certainly, Carl Becker's essay has to be one of the classics in the discussion of the uses of history. See Carl L. Becker, “What Are Historical Facts,” in The Philosophy of History in Our Time. Edited by Hans Meyerhoff , 120-37. ( Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor , 1958.)
27.
It seems peculiar to us that during the past several years, the subject of economics was on the official program of the Strategic Studies Institute's Annual Strategy Conference only once. And that discussion concerned a speculation gaming discussion about the potential and plausible outcomes of a “currency” war with China. We would argue that there needs to be much more discussion about the nature and impact of World Bank/International Monetary Fund policies as well as private sector investment in the arc of instability. For example, what is the real net effect of “enclave investments” in Africa? What are some of its social and political externalities? Could it be that one outcome is social frustration and strain that engenders instability?
28.
This table is merely a static classification scheme. Its creator (Camacho) has been working on a social action model considering actors and the structural hurdles they face. It could apply to several aspects of civil—military relations. The point is that type construction/model-building and action systems (systems theory) should be used more than they are.
29.
Scott Lindlaw , “ House to Probe War Misinformation ,” Concord Monitor, April 11, 2007, A2. Both authors want to think that it was the bad principals that demanded our good military agents engage in this unprofessional behavior and that the idea did not originate with those agents. Yet even if this was the case, we are still frustrated that they did not speak up, which would have protected not only our military and its professional capabilities but also the ultimate principals—the American public. Obviously, the American public was the target of this disinformation; the story would be virtually meaningless to the enemy.
30.
Was former General Karpinski the scapegoat? See Steve Watson , Paul Watson , and Alex Jones , “ Former Abu Ghraib General: Torture Is Continuing; Order Came from Very Top ,” Prisonplanet.com , October 25, 2005, http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/october2005/251005karpinski.htm. Both authors know of no former enlisted man who could imagine those abuses occurring without immediate superior officers' knowledge. See also Neil A. Lewis , “ In New Book Ex-Chaplain at Guantanamo Tells of Abuses ,” The New York Times, October 3, 2005, http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/100305Q.shtml. Major General Geoffrey Miller also became immersed in the issue. A list of references as sources is available at the end of the entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georffrey_Miller_(general) . We will never know what this “actionable intelligence” is, though it involves our security, and therefore we have presumably no need to know, and knowing might jeopardize the “actionable ability.”
31.
See Jonathan Karl , “ Officers Likely to Be Charged in Haditha Killings Sources Say ,” ABC News, June 1, 2006, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1642110/posts (posted 8:15 p.m. PDT by NormsRevenge).
32.
Senator Michael Gravel , The Pentagon Papers , 4 Vols. ( Boston: Beacon , 1971). All branches of government serving the ultimate principals shirk. In that case, things are relative, as historian Carl Becker indicates. One of the authors has voted for Congress to be our shirkers, because there are a lot more of them, thus making the discovery of shirking more probable. Furthermore, because there are more of them and they (particularly Representatives) are more accessible to the people, there is a higher possibility that constituent pressure will get them to “un-shirk” the situation! Some researchers could work at this and include the type of probability/decision trees that Feaver used . Also, see Douglas E. Hunter , Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis—Methodological Issues ( Boulder, CO: Westview , 1984) for a plethora of probability tree examination in the military context. Certainly, there is a large bibliography of research by experienced officers on the successes and failures of our adventure in Vietnam. For works by Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society members and former members in this area, see William L. Hauser , America's Army in Crisis ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1973). See also Richard Gabriel and Paul L. Savage , Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army ( New York : Hill & Wang , 1978). See also “ Special Symposium on the Vietnam Experience ,” Armed Forces & Society2, 3 (Spring 1976): 339-472 . Also, Hauser developed an interesting parallel between Iraq and Vietnam. See William Locke Hauser , “ How Not to Lose in Iraq—A Commentary on Dr. Alice Hill's “Fear and Loathing in Falluja ,” Armed Forces & Society32, 4 (July 2006): 640-44 . We also direct the reader to Admiral Henry E. Eccles , “ The Vietnam Hurricane ” ( Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association , July/August 1973 ). It is a scathing reproach to self-serving staff reports and intelligence creation at the highest levels of command.
33.
See J. Goldstein , B. Marshall , and J. Schwartz , The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-Up: Beyond the Reach of Law? ( New York: Harper and Row , 1976).
34.
If we had allowed Keynesian-style macroeconomic policies in Iraq—seriously focused on full-employment projects and immediately engaged the population in the repair and improvement of their own neighborhoods, generating neighborhood stakes—we might have mitigated public frustration. More generally, the hybrid strategy of clear, hold, and build in the insurgent active towns, cities, and provinces in any conflict needs to be complemented by a strategy of build, welcome, and defend in the semisecure and secure areas. The authors consider an appreciation for the economic impact of foreign investment on local, province, and regional areas essential to the military planning mix. See James Ferguson , Global Shadows— Africa in the Neoliberal World Order ( Durham, NC: Duke University Press , 2006). See also William Reno , “ The Real (War) Economy of Angola,” in Angola's War Economy , edited by J. Cilliers and C. Dietrich , 219-35 ( Pretoria , South Africa: Institute for Security Studies , 2000). For an extremely detailed exposition of the connection between economic investment, resource plunder, and private military corporations, see Abdel-Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi , eds., Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma ( London: Pluto Press , 1999). For an exposition of the issue closer to home, see the forthcoming volume by Kevin P. Gallagher and Lyuba Zarsky , The Enclave Economy—Foreign Investment and Sustainable Development in Mexico's Silicon Valley ( Cambridge, MA: MIT Press , 2007).
35.
Mark R. Lewis , “ Army Transformation and the Junior Officer Exodus ,” Armed Forces & Society31, 1 (Fall 2004): 63-93 . Lewis argues that platoon leaders were “triply frustrated.” He was (1) micromanaged as a platoon commander, (2) pulled out of his platoon too quickly to fill a higher slot, and (3) further micromanaged there because of his inexperience. These officers were promoted but were frustrated as young captains and left, and the cycle repeated itself. The reader should also see Lt. Col. Paul Yingling , “ A Failure in Generalship ,” Armed Forces Journal (May 2007), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198 . See also one of the remarks of RADM Paul Gaffney , USN, in the Conference Proceedings, Conference on Professional Military Education for “The 21st Century Warrior,”Navel Postgraduate School , January 15-16, 1998, Monterey, CA: “We need thinkers whom the system does not suppress.” See also Leonard Wong , Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow's Leaders Today ( Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute , April 2002).
36.
The literature is rich with material in this area. For the purpose at hand, we suggest the following to the reader. For systems theory, see Talcott Parsons , The Structure of Social Action ( New York: Free Press , 1968); The Social System ( New York: Free Press of Glencoe , 1951). See Peter M. Blau , Approaches to the Study of Social Structure ( New York: Free Press , 1975); Exchange and Power in Social Life ( New York: John Wiley , 1964).
37.
For interest-group literature, especially valuable for its suggested propositions (form as opposed to the specific subject/content) concerning the salience of interests and action, see Charles M. Bonjean , T. N. Clark , and R. L. Lineberry , eds., Community Politics: A Behavioral Approach ( New York: Free Press , 1971). For propositions in the very broad context of social change, see Jerald Hage and M. Aiken , Social Change in Complex Organizations ( New York: Random House , 1970). For an example of very explicit propositions in a particular context, see Randall B. Ripley , “ Policy-Making: A Conceptual Scheme,” in Policy-Making in the Federal Executive Branch, edited by G. E. Franklin , 1-20 ( New York: Free Press , 1975).
38.
For type construction, see John C. McKinney , Constructive Typology and Social Theory ( New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1966); see also Howard Becker , Through Values to Social Interpretation— Essays on Social Contexts Actions Types and Prospects ( Durham, NC: Duke University Press , 1950); for an older approach tied to statistical endeavors, see Robert F. Winch , “ Heuristic and Empirical Typologies— A Job For Factor Analysis ,” American Sociological Review12, 1 (February 1947): 68-75 . See also Suzan Hekman , Weber—The Ideal Type and Contemporary Social Theory ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press , 1983).
39.
Finally, there is a similarly large and constantly growing volume of literature on the application of artificial intelligence techniques in connection with expert systems and knowledge management in the social science arena. For a standard general overview, see Hojjat Adeli , Knowledge Engineering , 2 Vols. ( New York: McGraw-Hill , 1990). For an example of specific application to the social sciences, see H. Peter Oley , “ Knowledge-Based Systems: Another Data Approach for Social Scientists ?” Social Science Computer Review11, 1 (Spring 1993): 84-94 . See also “ Special Issue on the Simulation of Social Agents ,” Social Science Computer Review19, 3 (Fall 2001). For a focus on gaming, see Gee Kim Yeo , “ A Framework for Developing Game Systems ,” Simulation and Gaming22, 3 (September 1991): 308-27 .
