In defense of the argument made in "Courage in the Service of Virtue," in effect that courageous military advice better serves the republic when it accounts for political competition facing civilian principals, the author answers the complaint that his analysis accorded too much deference to the executive and ignored Congress and the people the real principals of American civil–military relations. The principal–agent model has more than one useful application, and executive authority over the U.S. military is both more fragile and more important for democratic control than the critics imply.
Paul Camacho and William Hauser, “Civil-Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to `Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War,'” Armed Forces & Society34, 1 (2007): 122—37. My article, “ Courage in the Service of Virtue,” appeared in Armed Forces & Society34, 1 (2007): 109—121.
2.
Gregory Newbold, “ Why Iraq Was a Mistake,” Time, April 17, 2006, 42—43.
3.
Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil—Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press , 2003). See Feaver on the president's role in deciding when and how to use force (P. 67), monitoring from the executive (Pp. 122—28), a look at cold war use of force (Pp. 132—52), the post— cold war civil—military climate (chap. 6), and post—cold war use of force (chap. 7). Representative analyses include military interaction with Congress in 1967 against President Johnson's limited bombing plan in Vietnam (P. 173) and General Colin Powell's interaction with the New York Times in September and October 1992, offering an all-or-nothing rationale against President Bush's limited force option of a no-fly zone in Bosnia (Pp. 260—62).
4.
Also see Sharon Weiner, “Resource Allocation in the Post—Cold War Pentagon,” Security Studies5, 4 (1996): 125—42; Andrew Bacevich, “ Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver,” Armed Forces & Society24, 3 (1998): 447—53; Michael Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), chap. 3 (22—38) and the appendix (135—39); and Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime ( New York: Free Press, 2002).
5.
The extent of congressional deference to the executive during crisis has become more controversial after the cold war and after congressional performance in the Iraq crisis, but the longstanding norm is clear. Deborah Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military Is Averse to Responding to Post—Cold War Low-Level Threats,” Security Studies6, 2 (1996—1997): 51—90; Louis Fisher, “What Is the Appropriate Role of Congress in National Security Policy?” in Readings in Presidential Politics, ed. George Edwards III (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006). Feaver discusses the trend of congressional deference to the executive branch on national security matters in Armed Servants (Pp. 165—66).
6.
Suzanne Nielsen, “ The Army Officer as Servant,” Military Review3, 1 ( 2003): 17.
7.
Feaver, Armed Servants, 66. Feaver discusses the MacArthur case in Armed Servants, 128—29.
8.
Paul Camacho and William Hauser, “Civil—Military Relations—Who Are the Real Principals? A Response to `Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki's Testimony before the Iraq War,” Armed Forces & Society34, 1 (October 2007): 122-37, n. 21; Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi , Choosing Your Battles: American Civil—Military Relations and the Use of Force (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 66; Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review92, 4 (1998): 829—44; Kenneth Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization53, 2 ( 1999): 233—66 (especially P. 237); Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
9.
Feaver, Armed Servants , 238—39.
10.
Richard Kohn , “Out of Control,” National Interest35 (Spring): 3—31; Bacevich, “Absent History,” 447—53. Feaver reviews the debate over the historical significance of rising civil—military friction in Armed Servants, chap. 6 (especially Pp. 182—89).
11.
See Senator Jeff Sessions's (R-AL) first remarks in FDCH Political Transcripts, “Committee Members Holds a Hearing on the DOD Budget—U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee,” February 25, 2003. In the same hearing, compare testimony on Iraq to the careful exchange between General Shinseki and Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) on military preparations for the rising threat in northeastern Afghanistan and for a new U.S. role in the Philippines.
12.
Feaver recognizes this open question in Armed Servants (e.g., P. 62).
13.
Camacho and Hauser, “Civil—Military Relations,” 3.
