Abstract
The author aims to analyse the relationships between secularisation and nationalism. In the course of the debate regarding the origin of nationalism, some scholars have argued that nationalism has filled the void left by historical religions. Nationalism could therefore be considered a religion of modernity, or a functional equivalent of historical religions. The author aims to reconsider this issue. First, he explores the sociological origins of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity deriving from Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion. Second, he provides an overview of the different versions of this theory. Finally, he assesses the weaknesses of these approaches and proposes an alternative theoretical framework in which to reconsider the relationships between secularisation and nationalism.
Introduction
In recent decades, social theory has attempted to explain the origin and foundations of nationalism by highlighting the importance of the emergence of States, industrialisation, capitalism, etc. A common focus for explaining these origins is the process of secularisation. This is the result of a common belief that nationalism has filled a void left in the wake of the decline of historical religions. Nationalism could therefore be considered a religion of modernity or a functional equivalent of historical religions.
The present article will examine this theory and its sociological origins and will set out what we consider to be the most important contributions to this theory. This presentation will lead to a critical evaluation and a discussion of the relationship between secularisation and nationalism.
The sociological origins of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity
The sociological origins of the theory which describes nationalism as a religion of modernity or as a functional equivalent of historical religions can be found within a particular theoretical framework, and in its interpretation of one specific historical experience. This framework derives from Durkheimian sociology of religion, and the historical experience is the French Revolution, as recounted and interpreted by intellectual defenders of the Third French Republic such as A Mathiez and E Durkheim. According to their interpretation, the Revolution was an attempt to establish a new civil religion, which defenders of the Third Republic wished to revitalise in order to maintain the unity of the French nation (Tiryakian, 1988).
For Durkheim, the object of this religion was to be the veneration of the individual. In this particular French context, this objective also necessarily involved the veneration of the nation, as French national(ist) ideology was based on the idea of universal individual rights. Durkheim understood this, and sought to find points of compatibility between patriotism and the religion of humanity. It was therefore the French national experience, together with its interpretation within the Durkheimian framework, which created the conditions in which the idea of a religion of humanity, championed by the 19th-century positivists, began to give way to the theory of nationalism as a religion of modern times.
Durkheim believed that the secularisation of Christianity was an inevitable process, and that society therefore required new religions which would fulfil the same function of integration as the historical religions. These new religions could no longer be based on supernatural or divine ideas, because modern societies no longer worshipped ‘the ancient gods [who] grow old or die’, but instead sought to convert the secular into the sacred. Durkheim saw the French Revolution as a crucial moment in history, in which it was easy to find new forms of the sacrality of modernity:
At that time … things which were purely secular in nature were transformed … into sacred things: the Fatherland, Liberty and Reason … All at once we saw society and its ideas directly converted, with no transformation whatsoever, into objects of true veneration. (Durkheim, 1964: 214)
For Durkheim, the Revolution represented something unique in the history of humanity. Society worshipped itself unconditionally, and did not require symbols in which to see itself reflected.
The French Revolution therefore became an object of particular interest within the Durkheimian theory of religion. Here Durkheim found proof that his general theory of religion, based on his studies of totemic religion, was relevant to the modern world. This is the social context which led to the birth of the idea of nationalism as a religion of modernity. It is no coincidence that when such a theory is put forward, Durkheim’s work and his interpretation of the French Revolution offer some weighty arguments: ‘nationalism itself, through its conception of the nation as a sacred communion, with its own doctrines, texts, liturgies, ceremonies, churches, and priests, becomes a novel kind of anthropocentric, intra-historical and political “religion”.’ As Durkheim remarked of French nationalism during the Revolution: ‘A religion tended to become established, which had its dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts’ (Smith, 2000: 811).
The theory of nationalism as a religion of modern times stems from the notion of civil religion. R Nisbet highlights the continuous flow between them when he states that the notion of ‘the religion of nationalism’ appeared precisely when the idea of ‘civil religion’ had apparently disappeared from the political discourse of the 19th century (Nisbet, 1983: 524). The Great War rendered the idea of a civil religion of humanity untenable, and it became even more so in the post World War II period. It was in precisely this post-war context that CJH Hayes wrote his first monograph, in which he defends the notion of nationalism as a religion. Henceforth the nation becomes the primary object of interest for the study of civil religion. This was understood by R Bellah, the great theoretician of civil religion, who defined it as a collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals which sanctified the national community and conferred a transcendental purpose on the political process (Bellah, 1970).
It was in this context that the thesis which saw nationalism as a religion of modernity began to gain ground. This thesis has today become a commonplace in explaining nationalism, and has evolved to accommodate the many contributions made to it: these range from the most generic to the most theoretically informed, from those which consider the theory from the perspective of a generic and formal concept of religion, to those which emphasise the functions served by nationalism in the modern era.
Nationalism as a religion: a cliché for the explanation of nationalism
The theory of nationalism as a religion for the modern era has become common currency. Certain thinkers have used this idea to explain nationalist passions. This is true, for example, of H Seton-Watson:
There is actually a great deal we could say about the conception of a link between the growing fanaticism of nationalities and the decline in religious belief. Nationalism has become a surrogate religion. The nation, as understood by nationalists, has become a substitute for God. (Seton-Watson, 1977: 465)
This ‘great deal to say’, however, far from being the preamble to a comprehensive explanation, has on some occasions become a recurrent formula which is actually fairly self-explanatory. What connections can be made between nationalism and religion in order to claim the former as a substitute for the latter? Nationalism is often compared to religion merely because of its myths and rites, which impact on the emotions and the ‘religious feeling’ of the individuals involved. From there it is a short step to regarding nationalism as a religion or a functional equivalent of religion.
These vague theorisations can frequently be found in studies on nationalism. Two examples of this, whose titles indicate their monographic nature, are the classic work by CJH Hayes (1960), Nationalism, a Religion, and the more recent The God of Modernity by JR Llobera (1994). Both authors dedicate little more than a chapter to setting out theses which are theoretically very limited: their comparison of nationalism and religion is based on an excessively generic and formal concept of religion, and is closely related to a concept outlined by Durkheim (1899) in his article ‘De la définition des phénomènes religieux’, later not only taken up by Mathiez but also implicit in the work of Hayes and Llobera.
To make any headway with the theory of nationalism as a religion for the modern era we will have to abandon this territory and look to the proposals of authors whose work has centred on the functions served by modern nationalism.
Nationalism and social integration
The national(ist) ritual as social cement
Let us return to Durkheim’s legacy, where we find certain authors who consider that the past role of religions as a mechanism for social cohesion is in the modern era fulfilled by political rituals. Among the most noteworthy of these authors is undoubtedly E Shils who, together with M Young, wrote ‘The meaning of Coronation’, an article published originally in 1956, defending this theory. Following in Durkheim’s footsteps, these authors argue that all societies need a moral consensus based on a central system of values and norms which make social integration possible and, according to Durkheimian theory on religion, therefore acquire a sacred status. In spite of the fact that in modern societies there is never consensus, the central norms and values are generally accepted to a degree which makes life viable within such a society.
A consensus of values, however, is not permanently fixed within society and, as pointed out by Durkheim, needs to be periodically revised through rituals which revive a collective sense of social solidarity. Basing their work on this theory, Shils and Young made an analysis of the meaning behind the coronation of Elizabeth II, which took place in 1953, and reached the conclusion that the celebration of the event was a ritual which served to reassert the moral consensus needed to maintain social integration: ‘the coronation of Elizabeth II was the ceremonial occasion for the affirmation of the moral values by which the society lives. It was an act of national communion’ (Shils and Young, 1975: 139).
Nationalism as the religion of modernisation
The 1960s saw a revival of Durkheim’s ideas thanks to the Functionalist School. In accordance with Durkheim, some theoreticians maintained that modern societies need common links which can guarantee social integration. Based on these hypotheses, the functionalists centred their interest on the nation and on nationalism, concepts which they considered to be providers of these communitarian relationships. Nationalism therefore began to be depicted as the religion of modernisation, which served to stabilise the structural imbalance caused by the process of modernisation itself. It was in fact industrialisation and the subsequent loss of traditional ties which would turn nationalism into a fundamental element within modern societies.
Those theoreticians who saw a connection between modernisation and nationalism found ample opportunity for study in the so-called political religions which emerged with the birth of the decolonised States of Africa and Asia. These States needed new mechanisms to unify the ethnic groups in the territories under their sovereignty, as well as to encourage more individual involvement in society in order to facilitate economic modernisation. The political elite of these States had to endow their countries with a single moral, national authority which would transcend ethnic affiliations and at the same time allow for individual involvement in the interests of the State. D Apter, the leading authority on studies into the political religions of these decolonised countries, coined the term to describe their political regimes, as it was through these instruments that the state managed to maintain unity within the community. The State acted as a moral entity, as the centre of a society which provided ‘the sacred[,] … employed in many new nations to develop a system of political legitimacy and to aid in mobilising the community for secular ends’ (Apter, 1963: 77). According to Apter, these emerging political religions proved very attractive, as they satisfied human needs: ‘Immortality, identity, meaning and purpose are among the profound individual needs that both church religion and political religion satisfy … They make possible purpose in the face of death and promote solidarity and cooperation’ (Apter, 1963: 91). Political religion is also presented in this context as a functional equivalent to historical religions, as it allows for the construction of a collective identity and gives meaning to the question of immortality through the idea of continuity from one generation to the next within a national community (Apter, 1963: 89) 1 . As we will see later, these arguments have been used by contemporary researchers to support the claim that nationalism has become the functional equivalent of historical religions.
It is in the heart of what is known as the School of Modernisation where we find one of the most prestigious theoreticians of nationalism, E Gellner, taking the first steps towards his theory. Gellner, although greatly indebted to functionalist ideas, developed a much more comprehensive theory in order to explain the emergence of nationalism.
Nationalism as a functional equivalent of religion in the industrialised era: the work of E Gellner
Gellner is considered the father of the ‘modernists’, for whom the notions of nation and nationalism form part of the modern era. What makes Gellner’s work not only unique but also original is the line of discussion which leads him to support a modernist thesis on the origin of nationalism. His claim that the nation and nationalism are ‘modern inventions’ is not derived from historiographical research, but is a conclusion reached from his wide, almost philosophical, perspective of the development of humanity. This is the framework within which Gellner proposes his theory of nationalism.
Gellner saw nationalism as the logical conclusion to a stage in the history of humanity in which industrial society predominated. It is a mechanism for social cohesion which is exclusive to the modern era. Nationalism is therefore the functional equivalent of the religion of pre-modern societies, in which nationalism could not have existed due to the absence of the conditions necessary for the development of such a mechanism for integration. According to Gellner, the history of humanity has evolved through three types of society, which can be characterised according to their economic structure: hunting and gathering societies, agricultural societies and scientific-industrial societies.
In the context of this study it is important to highlight that one of the characteristics of agricultural societies was the close link between culture, religion and the Church. This relationship broke down with the advent of industrial society as, according to Gellner, industrialisation brought with it the need for a culture which was accessible to the population as a whole, something which only the State could guarantee. Culture was therefore no longer linked to faith and the Church:
… culture needs to be sustained as a culture, and not as the carrier or scarcely noticed accompaniment of a faith. Society can and does worship itself or its own culture directly and not, as Durkheim taught, through the opaque medium of religion. (Gellner, 1983: 135)
Religious symbols lose their validity as a route to the sacred. The totemic and theistic symbols of tribal and agricultural societies are no longer required. In the nationalist era, the sacred is experienced directly and not through symbols. As Durkheim stated in relation to the sacralisation of the French nation during the Revolution, society becomes its own cult object without any need for transfiguration. In an industrial era society worships itself, and therefore also renders national culture sacred.
Nationalism and death
The notion of nationalism as a religion for the modern era has also been defended by those who have recognised in it a new system of meaning which provides answers to those ‘ultimate questions’ which are at the heart of religion. It is often stated that nationalism makes sense of the suffering caused by social relations, death and the desire for immortality. This has led to the proposal that nationalism acts as (the functional equivalent of) a religion of salvation of modern times. The sense nationalism gives to death suffered in its name has even led to the suggestion that nationalism is a sacrificial religion.
Nationalism as (the functional equivalent of) a religion of salvation
B Anderson is the author who has paid the most heed to the idea of nationalism as a new religion of salvation and one which provides insights into the idea of death and the desire for immortality. In his book Imagined Communities, he investigates these issues in connection with his study on the cultural roots of nationalism. According to Anderson, the fact that death and immortality are central issues in nationalism is the key to differentiating nationalism from other contemporary ideologies such as Marxism and Liberalism, and makes it possible to equate it with historical religions: ‘[N]either Marxism nor Liberalism are much concerned with death and immortality. If the nationalist imagining is so concerned, this suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings’ (Anderson, 1991: 10).
As Weber noted, the religions of salvation, such as Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, serve the purpose of giving meaning to existence and the frailty of life. Their persistence through so many centuries of human existence is explained by their ability to provide answers to the issues of human suffering, especially death. They have done so through the creation of highly influential systems of meaning which promise immortality through the transformation of fatality into continuity. Anderson highlights these aspects of historical religions by pointing out that the emergence of nationalism in the 18th century coincided with the decline of religious thinking, which left existential problems such as suffering and death unanswered. In this context, nationalism became a new focal point giving meaning to contingency through the secular transformation of fatality into continuity: ‘It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny’ (Anderson, 1991: 12).
However, Anderson does not go on to analyse the process of secularisation and its relationship with the origin of nationalism. He simply underlines the relationship existing between nationalism and the cultural systems that preceded it:
I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the 18th century was ‘produced’ by the erosion of religious certainties … Nor am I suggesting that somehow nationalism historically ‘supersedes’ religion. What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being. (Anderson, 1991: 12)
The fact that immortality is promised in both nationalism and in the religions of salvation has led to comparisons between them, and has also been the subject of comment on various occasions by AD Smith. Like Anderson, Smith believes that nationalism cannot simply be described as one more modern ideology:
… only in the chain of generations of those who share an historic and quasi-familial bond, can individuals hope to achieve a sense of immortality in eras of purely terrestrial horizons. In this sense, the formation of nations and the rise of ethnic nationalisms appears more like the institutionalisation of a ‘surrogate religion’ than a political ideology. (Smith, 1989: 362)
The above references serve to show the extent to which the theory of nationalism as a modern religion of salvation has been accepted by some of the most reputable names in nationalist theory.
One particularly noteworthy theory is that held by L Greenfeld. She believes that there is a close link between nationalism and the historical religions of salvation, but that this does not derive from an alleged response to the issues of death and desire for immortality. In an article entitled ‘The Modern Religion?’ Greenfeld (1996) argues that nationalism cannot provide an answer to the question of death, as it lacks the sense of faith and transcendental orientation which characterises historical religions. This transcendental orientation, together with a vision of the world which goes beyond the purely physical, gives plausibility to the promise of immortality. If we are seeking elements which serve to corroborate an analogy between nationalism and historical religions, we will have to look beyond the issue of death.
According to Greenfeld, nationalism provides an answer to human suffering, although not to the suffering of the body and its eventual decay, but rather to the suffering that results from social order and relationships which produce rejection, humiliation, dishonour, injustice, etc. Greenfeld, like C Geertz, maintains that both historical religions and nationalism are cultural systems which create a social order whereby these experiences are justified and legitimated, and therefore render bearable the suffering caused by social relations. Greenfeld asserts that nationalism is the functional equivalent of historical religions, the former replacing the latter within a new structure of meaning which allows for the development of individual and collective identities in the modern world (Greenfeld, 1996: 170). In contrast to historical religions, which shaped the social conscience of pre-modern society, ‘nationalism has replaced religion as the main cultural mechanism of social integration’ (Greenfeld, 1996: 171).
Greenfeld can thus identify with those who regard nationalism as a functional equivalent of historical religions insofar as she is aware that in modern societies a shared cultural structure can ensure social integration. In contrast to pre-modern societies, our modern world and its profane order has been endowed with meaning thanks to nationalism and its sacralisation of the secular.
Nationalism’s secular focus, which makes it unlike religion, paradoxically explains why the effects it produces on the human psyche and behaviour are often so similar … With nationalism, the heavens, so to speak, descend to earth; this world, the world of empirical reality and social relations, becomes the sphere of the sacred. (Greenfeld, 1996: 173)
The author goes on to state that ‘if religion were identical with spirituality, then nationalism would truly be the modern religion and more of a religion, at that, than any we have known before’ (Greenfeld, 1996: 173).
Nationalism as a sacrificial religion
Another reason for the positing of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modern times is that nations are venerated because of the deaths produced in their name. There are several versions of this theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity; here we will analyse the works of B Kapferer, and C Marvin and DW Ingle.
Kapferer, like Anderson before him, has carried out an in-depth study into nationalist imagery, and his book compares the nationalist movements of Sri Lanka and Australia. Legends of People, Myths of State begins with the statement ‘Nationalism makes the political religious and places the nation above politics. The nation is created as an object of devotion’ (Kapferer, 1988: 1). As far as Kapferer is concerned, the nation is made sacred through its culture, which is itself worshipped as a religious entity, and it is the religious contemplation of this culture which sparks nationalist passions. For this reason the nationalist religions of both Australia and Sri Lanka should be considered as such, not because of the beliefs and practices of the historical religions which they incorporate, but rather as religions in their own right:
… one modern nationalism is not necessarily more or less religious than another. Australians assert a secular nationalism, Sinhalese an expressly Buddhist nationalism. What I stress is that the religion of nationalism is in nationalism per se and not in the religious ideas it may incorporate. (Kapferer, 1988: 5)
This supposition leads Kapferer to propose a general theory of nationalism and to offer an alternative diagnosis of the process of secularisation:
War and death in war are common themes of modern nationalism … What many scholars recognise as the secularisation of the modern industrial world can be interpreted in another way. Rather it is the transformation of the religious as the sacralisation of the political. (Kapferer, 1988: 136)
Marvin and Ingle, having also considered the religious nature of the notions of sacrifice and death, agree that nationalism is the religion of modernity and base their theory on studies carried out on North American nationalism. According to these authors, nationalism, like other sectarian religions, is by definition a religion of bloody sacrifice. They maintain that the religious character of nationalism is therefore inherently linked to sacrificial violence. More specifically, it is the collective organisation of a killing which changes a nation into ‘a community of blood and not text’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 27).
Marvin and Ingle’s thesis stems from the Durkheimian interpretation of totemism. They justify its application to North American society specifically, and to modern societies in general, by maintaining that these societies are as ‘primitive’ as any studied by Durkheim. The formation and cohesion of all these groups is based on the same violent mechanisms. These authors are therefore in agreement with the Durkheimian theory that religion (the sacred) facilitates the foundation and cohesion of a group which is represented in a totem, and therefore venerated. However, Marvin and Ingle maintain that Durkheim was unable to discover the ultimate principle which conserves the unity of the group and makes sense of the totem: ‘The underlying cost of all society is the violent death of its members. Our deepest secret, the collective group taboo, is the knowledge that society depends on the death of these sacrificial victims at the hands of the group itself’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 21). In other words, what ensures the cohesion of the group and maintains a sense of unity is not the sacrifice of an enemy, but rather the sacrifice of a member of the same group. This explains why ‘the totem is the violently sacrificed body symbolised by the flag. The flag ritually transformed is the god of society renewed’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 11). In other words, ‘the flag is the god of nationalism and its mission is to organise death’ (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 25). These authors highlight the scant attention paid to this national symbol, and the tendency to forget that the flag has become the sacred object on which North American civil religion has been based. This ‘tendency to forget’ is explained by the taboo responsible for maintaining the cohesion of the group. In fact, according to Marvin and Ingle, the sacred object – the flag – hides a truth which must remain hidden if national group cohesion is to remain intact. Under no circumstance must it be revealed that this totem stands for self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group as a whole. If this reality became known and violence were shown to be a basis for social life, then the sacred would no longer be untouchable, and the cohesion of the national group would unravel. It would mean the disclosure of the fact that, on our road to civilisation, basic sacrificial violence has not been cast aside.
Secularisation and nationalism: a critical review
As we have seen, the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity is now widely accepted in social sciences. In fact it would be true to say that it is this theory which is most often applied when considering the relationship between secularisation and nationalism. We have also seen how this theory is based on a functional(ist) perspective whereby in modern secular societies nationalism serves the functions previously carried out by the totemic and theistic religions in traditional and ‘primitive’ societies. If we give credit to these theories, nationalism must be considered a religion of modernity, as it has filled the void left by traditional religions. In an ostensibly secularised world, nationalism has not only facilitated social cohesion but has also met our ‘need’ for a belief in a meaningful world, particularly as regards basic issues such as death, humiliation and injustice. Nationalism has therefore had an important impact on the two areas which both Durkheim and Weber believed fundamental to our understanding of religion.
In spite of – or maybe even because of – the fact that the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity is now commonplace, it is undeniable that this theory, in all its different versions, contains serious flaws. In our opinion, this should lead us to reconsider the relationship between secularisation and nationalism in other theoretical fields. The flaws stem from both the theory itself and the arguments on which the theory is based. In fact, the theory that nationalism has become a religion of modernity is based on functional and/or theological arguments, which in turn derive from certain assumed theories on the religious nature of individuals and of life in society that, in the field of modern social sciences, are no longer sustainable.
The idea that the void left by historical religions generated a need for nationalism as a religion which would address a series of basic functions is clearly a theological argument. This is part of Durkheim’s legacy, whereby the emergence of new religions became necessary and was in fact inevitable in the light of the process of differentiation. This line of argument appeared in the first works on the relationship between secularisation and nationalism within the framework of modernisation theories: ‘Nations must emerge to fulfil the functions and needs once satisfied by the old communities’ (Smith, 1971: 52).
Gellner’s theory is also based on a teleological and functionalist principle which is difficult to uphold. His theory counters simplistic interpretations which explain the sacralisation of nations by assuming that they are the only elements susceptible to receiving the transferences of sacredness occurring as a consequence of secularisation. These interpretations arrive at this argument by a process of elimination, without explaining why nations show a tendency towards sacralisation; whereas Gellner offers a much more coherent theory: in industrial societies nationalism takes the role, or becomes the functional equivalent, of historical religions. According to Gellner, nationalism is functional within an industrial society, and it is this functionality which explains its appearance. However, there are two possible criticisms of this line of thought. The first is that the development of modern social sciences makes it impossible to admit that a functional necessity can satisfy itself and therefore render a necessity a cause. Secondly, the functional analysis proposed by Gellner turns individuals into mere puppets manipulated according to the requirements of an industrial system.
The loss of traditional links does not necessarily lead to an emergence of new secular religions. Greenfeld comments on the theological argument which forms the basis of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity:
Secularisation, it is claimed, left certain essential human needs unfulfilled and made nationalism – the substitute for religion – necessary … Such an inference, however, is erroneous. The fact that nationalism replaced religion as the order-creating system … implies nothing at all about the historical connection between them, and lends no justification to the kind of sociological theology that is the essence of such reasoning. (Greenfeld, 1996: 176)
Greenfeld is critical of this theological reasoning, which she claims derives from Gellner and Anderson. She does, however, share their view that nationalism is the functional equivalent of religion in that ‘nationalism has replaced religion as the primary cultural mechanism for social integration’ (Greenfeld, 1996: 191). Greenfeld thus also contributes to the theoretical framework which forms the basis for the theory of nationalism as a modern religion, or its functional equivalent. In fact, all the aforementioned authors have developed theories which, although differing in detail, are deeply rooted in Durkheimian theory, whereby integration in modern societies is the product of a common culture, of a cultural consensus, built upon a set of shared norms and values which become sacred. As we have already noted, this premise is shared by those theoreticians who interpret national political rituals as mechanisms for social integration and who understand that in societies undergoing a process of modernisation, nationalism becomes a political religion responsible for integrating life in society. This is also the notion, albeit differing in the details, on which Gellner bases his work.
This premise is extremely controversial. It has been scrutinised by the sociology of religion under the microscope of ‘civil religion’. It was K Dobbelaere who realised the implications of such a premise when raising the question: ‘Do modern differentiated societies need “cultural” integration, and what role does religion still play in it?’ (Dobbelaere, 1981: 38). In this regard, R Fenn is one of the theoreticians who have the most keenly questioned the idea that religion, or its functional equivalents in the form of civil religions, provides the basis for the cultural integration of modern societies (Fenn, 1972, 1977). In our opinion, one of the most convincing answers to this question was given by BS Turner in his book on the sociology of religion, where he states that it is
difficult to see how the analysis of religion as a social cement can be fully satisfactory with respect to modern society. Even in its amended form as a ‘civil religion’, the notion of a sacred canopy embracing contemporary society is not wholly convincing. (Turner, 1991: 58)
Turner is conclusive when he extends this argument to nationalism:
Most civil-religion arguments or arguments concerning nationalism are weak theories which point to the presence of certain allegedly common practices and suggest that these have integrative consequences … the civil religion is at best loosely and only periodically connected with the reactivation of a problematic conscience collective, but the precise connections between these common sentiments and the structural arrangements of industrial society are inadequately specified. (Turner, 1991: 59)
In modern societies, social integration is not brought about by cultural cohesion. Religion has lost its capacity to bring together different sacred forms under the single united banner of a moral universe. The process of differentiation has meant the dispersal of the sacred to spheres beyond the control of religion. It is in this sense that we can conclude that modern societies are secular societies.
Alongside the notion that modern societies need a consensus of norms to ensure integration lies another argument which serves as the basis for the theory of nationalism as a modern religion. This argument derives from the conception of nationalism as a device which gives meaning to elementary experiences such as death. If we agree with Anderson and Smith, two leading theoreticians on nationalism, we could conclude that nationalism is a religion because it satisfies our desire for immortality. But is it true that nationalism gives meaning to death? Is a nation a community which provides transcendence?
We should first clarify what is meant by transcendence. We refer to the answers provided by historical religions to matters of the afterlife and the immortality of an individual’s soul. Death acquires meaning because it involves a supernatural reality. As we understand it, in the case of nationalism, the death of an individual involves no transcendence to meet the need for immortality. The nation does not provide any extra meaning to make a militant nationalist feel that his physical death leads to an afterlife or transcendence. Such meaning is only provided by supernatural religions. Moreover, the mere fact of feeling part of a nation does not make it any easier to endow death with meaning. (Militant) nationalists can find meaning in death, suffering, etc. not through their national(ist) ideas, but rather through their religious beliefs. This is one of the reasons why it cannot be stated that nationalism replaces religion. In this respect the differences between the religious community and the ethno-national community are obvious. As D Schnapper points out: ‘A reference to matters transcendental will not hold the same meaning as an inscription in a historic community nor as a political project. The meaning experienced through religion is not that of a “secular religion”’ (Schnapper, 1993: 158). This sociologist therefore concludes that
it is too simplistic to describe nationalism as ‘a substitute or supplement for supernatural, historical religions’ or to state that nationalism has become a surrogate religion … A transcendental relationship is a different experience altogether from a political project, even when the latter takes on an emotional quality: a sociologist should be able to take this into account. (Schnapper, 1993: 158)
We agree with Schnapper. Transcendence linked to the supernatural is a specific characteristic of historical religions, and is closely linked to the question of death. The experience of a national community is not the same as that of a religious community, whose members, in one form or another, are linked to a supernatural power in a transcendental environment which enables them to find meaning in a life that continues beyond the boundaries of physical death. This kind of environment does not form a part of nationalist thinking.
Nationalism therefore does not give meaning to death. However, in certain circumstances, nation and death can be closely related, particularly when death and suffering are the result of the fight for a national(ist) cause. When killing or death takes place in the name of the nation, nationalism can confer meaning on these experiences through the construction of structures of meaning which explain or legitimise them. Weber has already highlighted how essential experiences such as suffering and death create the social conditions necessary for the social production of sacrality. When a national cause creates these experiences, nationalism becomes an important focus of sacralisation. A good example is one we have already discussed: the work of Kapferer on Sri Lankan and Australian nationalisms. But even here it would be wrong to infer that nationalism is a device for satisfying the desire for immortality. In fact, the ‘sacred obligations’ sought by nations can lead to suffering and death, but this does not necessarily mean that nationalism provides an answer to the question of death as the inevitable destiny of human beings.
It is no accident that when Anderson discusses the relationship between nationalism and death he mentions the tombs of the unknown soldiers. 2 We believe that the error committed by Anderson and Smith lies in their confusion of the question of an individual’s immortality with something quite different: the immortality of the nation itself. It is only in this way that we can discuss nations as transcendent communities, not because they make sense of the death of an individual, but rather because they themselves are immortal, eternal. It is for this reason that they can be considered cultural, secular systems capable of providing meaning and creating social order.
The fact that nationalism makes powerful legitimisations of the deaths and suffering which take place in its name should not, however, lead us to conclude, as do Marvin and Ingle, that nationalism is a sacrificial religion. This thesis has value if its application is restricted to North American nationalism, as the latter’s imperialist nature renders sacrifice in the name of the nation necessary, but it cannot be extrapolated to all nationalisms. The bond created by nationalism cannot be explained by its attitude to death. This does not mean that a national bond has not on many occasions been constructed or consolidated thanks to the shedding of sacrificial blood, but this fact cannot explain the essential nature of such a bond.
All this leads us to conclude that nationalism should not be considered a religion of modernity, as it does not perform any of the functions attributed to it. Nationalism does not solve problems of social integration, nor does it give meaning to essential experiences such as death. As for the frequent comparisons made between nationalism and religion, we should in fact be seeking quite the opposite; given that these are devices for giving meaning within two very different types of community, we should be looking at clear, well defined differences between them. In this respect we agree with E Balibar when he states that
attention will turn then, as the attention of political philosophy and sociology have turned for three centuries, towards the analogy of religion, making nationalism and patriotism out to be a religion – if not indeed the religion – of modern times … In reality, the opposite argument is correct. Incontestably, national ideology involves ideal signifiers … on to which may be transferred the sense of the sacred and the affects of love, respect, sacrifice and fear which have cemented religious communities; but that transfer only takes place because another type of community is involved here. (Balibar, 1991: 95)
The relationship between secularisation and nationalism should therefore be classed alongside other theoretical frameworks, other than the various versions of the thesis of nationalism as a modern religion. A nation cannot be considered a community which fulfils the same functions as a religion, nor can its emergence be explained by the need to fill the void left by the abandonment of a religion. This functionalist-evolutionary idea presents the relationship between religion and nationalism in terms of a model which can be considered linear and compensatory; nationalism therefore appears to be a new religion due to the decline of historical religions. If we were to follow this linear, compensatory model to its logical conclusion, we could not then account for the nationalisms that are specifically based on religion. What is the role of nationalism in these cases, if the historical religions are not in decline?
Nationalism cannot thus be considered a religion which questions the very process of secularisation, but rather the opposite: the raison d’etre of nationalism is found in the process of the secularisation of political power. It is here, and not because of any social cohesion or justification of death, that we find the nub of the question. Modernity brought with it the institutionalisation of a new society which required an absolute to replace the old legitimacy and authority of the Church. Secularisation saw the political sphere break away from the religious and create this absolute, which was to become fundamental to political power. H Arendt traces a line linking the traditional religious sanctioning of politics, the secularisation of political power and its sacralisation to the absolute of the nation:
… the incarnation of a divine absolute on earth was first represented by the vicars of Christ himself, by the bishop and pope, who were succeeded by kings who claimed rulership by virtue of a divine rights until eventually, absolute monarchy was followed by the no less absolute sovereignty of the nation. (Arendt, 1963: 195)
It was the French Revolution which marked the beginning of the modern period when sovereignty (and sacrality) would be transferred from the king to the nation.
Once more we see how the Revolution marks a milestone in the relationship between the secularisation and sacralisation of nations. Durkheim understood this, and as we have already discussed, interpreted the Revolution as a historical experience which gave rise to a new civil religion and temporarily served to facilitate social integration through the sacralisation of lay concepts such as fatherland. In the light of this, could we now go on to describe revolutionary cults as examples of the Durkheimian theory of religion and of the sacred? Durkheim certainly believed that the revolutionary experience demonstrated the heuristic value of his theory of religion. However, what the Revolution brought with it was not a change in the forms of religion which integrate society, but rather a change in the sources of power which required sacralisation. La fête révolutionnaire 1789–1799 by M Ozouf provides valuable insights into this topic, and leads us to conclude that the revolutionary process was not a religious experience, but rather stemmed from a need for the sacred, as a crucial element in the institutionalisation of a new society. ‘A society instituting itself must sacralise the very deed of its institutionalisation’ (Ozouf, 1976: 332). The French Revolution in fact transferred the sacrality reserved for the Catholic Church to a new religion of the patria. 3
If the French Revolution can be seen as critical to the understanding of the secularisation of political power and the birth of the nation, Durkheim’s legacy has led to the French Revolution being presented as an illustration of the relationship between secularisation and nationalism by the theoreticians who advocate nationalism as a modern religion. According to this model, the void left by Christianity was filled by the new religion of nationalism, and this explains its emergence. What the French experience demonstrates, however, is a specific case of the sacralisation of a nation which takes place in opposition to a supernatural religion. We therefore find ourselves faced with a nationalism constructed in opposition to religion. However, we must inevitably conclude with Greenfeld that nationalism certainly did not emerge amidst the religious void it aimed to fill: ‘The varied and complex history of the relationship between nationalism and religion cannot be narrowed to a linear sequence. Though a product of independent developments, nationalism emerged in a world seething with religious enthusiasms’ (Greenfeld, 1996: 176). Indeed, we cannot examine the relationship between religion and nationalism by taking a purely linear, evolutionist-functionalist model whose only point of reference is the specific French case. According to Greenfeld, the historical connection between secularisation and nationalism deriving from this model does not stand up when analysing other forms of nationalism.
As we have seen above, the French experience serves as a model to show that the relationship between secularisation and nationalism cannot be generalised. This experience is an ideal example of the transformation of historical religion into secular nationalism, a typical-ideal process that serves as a reference for the narrowest theories on modernisation and secularisation, for which modernity implies the decline of ethnic communities and religion, and its substitution by forms of social integration based on the nation-state and on civic and secular nationalism.
This linear-evolutionist scheme yields before the contributions made by the new sociology of religion, which states that the process of secularisation does not involve the decline of religion, and that religion is not incompatible with modernity. For this reason, and in view of the excessive emphasis given to the French case, we should consider the different kinds of relationship between nationalism and religion existing in the modern era. In agreement with W Spohn, we could apply S Einsestadt’s concept of multiple modernity to show the multiple forms of relationship existing between religion and nationalism, one of which would be the French example, which is itself a European exceptionalist model of secular nationalism (Spohn, 2003; Rieffer, 2003). We could therefore follow in Spohn’s footsteps and distinguish different geographical areas according to their pattern of secularisation. But it would also be possible to show the fundamental difference between those nationalisms which build a nation in opposition to the Church, as in the French example, and those where religion plays a role in national identity. The analysis of the relationship between secularisation and nationalism may be different depending on whether the type of nationalism is religious or secular. In the first case, national identity is constructed around the backbone of religion, while in the second, national identity is constructed from secular traits which have no connection with supernatural religions.
When considering the idea that nationalism emerges to fill a gap left by religion, we find many cases of nationalisms which spring from religious contexts. For this reason, a thesis which states that nationalism substitutes religion can be upheld only in the cases of secular nationalism and not in cases of religious nationalism, as the latter bases its definition of itself on religion.