Most research on preference reversal (PR) focuses on the evaluability hypothesis with one or two alternatives. However, people normally encounter more than two options in daily life. In this research, a third option was added to the PR effect choice sets in the traditional joint–separate evaluations mode to create a context effect. Three studies were conducted. Studies 1 and 2 showed that adding a third option to the choice sets changed the PR effect; either the attributes were both important or one was important and the other was not. Study 3 showed that the PR effect reappeared when a third option was added to the choice sets that had no PR effect with just two attributes that were difficult to evaluate independently in traditional evaluations modes. The three studies confirmed that preferences changed in multi-alternative evaluation modes, contradicting Hsee’s (1996) work and showing that the context effect is stronger than that of the attribute’s importance in the PR effect.
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