The hypothesis that terrorism often emerges when mass collective action declines and radicals take up arms to compensate for the weakness of a mass movement has been around for some time; however, it has never been tested systematically. In this article the authors investigate the relationship between terrorist violence and mass protest in the context of the Spanish transition to democracy. This period is known for its pacts and negotiations between political elites, but in fact, it was accompanied by high levels of terrorist violence and popular mobilization. To test the hypothesis, the authors have created two data sets, one on victims of terrorism and another on participation in demonstrations. The data clearly confirm that terrorism erupted in Spain when participation in demonstrations started to decline. This result sheds new light on the nonstructural conditions associated with the onset of terrorist violence.
See Stephen Holmes, "Al Qaeda, September 11, 2001," in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. D. Gambetta (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 168; Gilles Kepel, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), "Introduction;" Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 42.
2.
Ruth Margolies Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion. An Analysis of Two Intifadas ( Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2004), 41-3.
3.
Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 1830-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 282, 287.
4.
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, "Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence," Annual Review of Political Science12 (2009): 31-49.
5.
James D.e Nardo, Power in Numbers. The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), chap. 9.
6.
Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, "Unwanted Children: Political Violence and the Cycle of Protest in Italy, 1966-1973," European Journal of Political Research14 (1986): 607-32.
7.
Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975 ( Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1989), 306, italics in the original.
8.
Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 53, italics in the original.
9.
Mark R.Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 290.
10.
Of all the authors mentioned, only Sidney Tarrow, in Democracy and Disorder, and Mark R. Beissinger, in Nationalist Mobilization, use systematic, quantitative data. However, Beissinger studies ethnic conflict rather than terrorism, and Tarrow stops in 1975, which is unfortunate, because the cycle of terrorist violence in Italy took place between 1977 and 1980.
11.
Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions," Comparative Politics 29 (1997): 305-22. As she writes in this article, "Scholars have placed so much emphasis on the comparatively peaceful nature of Spain’s transition that it is easy to forget its violent elements" (p. 309). Among the scholars who have emphasized the importance of mass mobilization in democratization processes, two of them stand out: Elisabeth Jean Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
12.
The importance of social movements and collective action in the Spanish case has been emphasized by some authors. See Ramón Adell, "Transición política en la calle: manifestaciones políticas de grupos y masas. Madrid, 1976-1987" (PhD diss., Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1989); Ruth Berins Collier, Paths Toward Democracy, 126-32; Rafel Durán, Contención y transgresión: las movilizaciones sociales y el estado en las transiciones española y portuguesa (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000); Robert Fishman, Working-Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Ferrán Gallego, El mito de la transición. La crisis del franquismo y los orígenes de la democracia (1973-1977) (Barcelona: Crítica, 2008); José María Maravall, La política de la transición (Madrid: Taurus, 1981); José María Marín Arce, "La transición sindical y la conflictividad laboral," in La transición a la democracia y el reinado de Juan Carlos I, ed. J. Tussell (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2003); Manuel Pérez Ledesma, "«Nuevos» y «viejos» movimientos sociales en la transición," in La transición, treinta años después, ed. C. Molinero (Barcelona: Península, 2006); Álvaro Soto, "Conflictividad social y transición sindical," in Historia de la transición 1975-1986, ed. J. Tusell (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996); and Monica Threlfall, "Reassessing the Role of Civil Society Organization in the Transition to Democracy in Spain," Democratization 15 (2008): 930-51.
13.
See Ferrán Gallego, El mito de la transición, 708-14; José María Maravall, La política de la transición, chap. 1.
14.
Of the 361 mortal victims, 360 were killed by Basque (355), Catalan (4), and Canary Island (1) separatist organizations, the other having died at the hands of a phantom organization called FRAVA (Basque-Aragonese Antifascist Revolutionary Front).
15.
Some authors have also held that political violence allowed for the irruption of the traumatic memories of the Spanish Civil War. The desire to avoid the repetition of the fratricidal conflict favored the consensual negotiations of the new rules of the game. See Paloma Aguilar, Políticas de la Memoria y Memorias de la Política (Madrid: Alianza, 2008).
16.
Portugal has a rate of 26.0 demonstrators per thousand people; Spain, 25.4; and Greece, 21.0. The Western European average (excluding countries with less than a million inhabitants) is 7.7. For details about how the rate was calculated, see the appendix. These data seem to confirm that "struggle both precedes and accompanies democratization," Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44.
17.
Jordi Maluquer and Montserrat Llonch, "Trabajo y relaciones laborales," in Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX-XX, ed. A. Carreras and X. Tafunell (Madrid: Fundación BBVA. 2005), Table 15.17.
18.
The last Basque political prisoner was released in December 1977. For a detailed account of this process, see Paloma Aguilar, Políticas de la Memoria.
19.
Rosario Jabardo , "La extrema derecha española, 1976-1996: estrategias de movilización y estructura de oportunidad política ," Sistema135 ( 1996): 105-22.
20.
We have used a nonstandard measure of strike activity (the rate of workers who participated in strikes) simply to facilitate the graphical representation. This measure has a .82 correlation with the more standard measure of strike volume (number of days lost per thousand workers). Nothing changes if strike volume is employed.
21.
We have not found any statistical relationship between strikes and violence, but we have found a surprisingly strong association in the time series of strikes and inflation (not shown here, available on request). Nonetheless, there seems to be a positive, significant correlation (.39) for the thirty-two quarters between strike activity and revolutionary terrorist killings (basically by the GRAPO). This is not so surprising given that one of GRAPO’s main goals was to mobilize workers.
22.
The annual number of people killed by the state (including both civilians and terrorists, but excluding common criminals) is: thirty (1975), twenty (1976), twenty-two (1977), twenty-one (1978), and thirty (1979).
23.
The Generalidad de Cataluña (autonomous government of Catalonia) was provisionally restored on September 29, 1977; the Basque Country was granted its preautonomy regime on January 4, 1978; and on March 17, Valencia was also granted its own preautonomy governing body.
24.
José MaríaMaravall, La política de la transición, 30.
25.
A similar argument is posited by Irene Martín, "Significados y orígenes del interés por la política en dos nuevas democracias: España y Grecia" (PhD diss., Instituto Juan March, 2004), 267-70.
26.
It is important to remember the social and political impact of what became known as "los sucesos de Málaga y Tenerife" ("the Málaga and Tenerife incidents"). In December 1977, during the course of popular demonstrations, two young men died at the hands of the forces of law and order. These deaths triggered a series of extremely tense and violent protests, which undoubtedly helped persuade left-wing parties to adopt demobilization strategies, as they feared that a continuation of such large-scale public disturbances might trigger a coup d’état.
27.
"The PSOE and the PCE agree on the need to reduce the tensions that could give rise to popular mobilizations, and even to restrict them if necessary, as a way to implement the Moncloa Accords concerning this issue," El País, December 10, 1977. This news came shortly after the Málaga incidents (December 4-6), but just before those of Tenerife (December 12-14), and is very likely to have reinforced the announced demobilization strategy.
28.
For a more detailed analysis, see Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "Explaining Temporal Variation in the Lethality of ETA," Revista Internacional de Sociología 67 (forthcoming).
29.
Mario Onaindía, a former ETA militant who agreed to participate in the first democratic election, describes in the following way an amnesty demonstration that was called by the most radical elements in the midst of the Constitutional debate (i.e., many months after the Amnesty Law): "The result of the pro-amnesty week was the opposite of those that took place before June 15 [date of the first democratic election]: there was no massive mobilization; instead it was the armed organization that acted," and he cites several murders committed by ETA during this week. Mario Onaindía, El aventurero cuerdo. Memorias (1977-1981) (Madrid: Espasa, 2004), 261-62.
30.
See Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, ETA contra el Estado. Las Estrategias del Terrorismo (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2001) and "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA," Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007): 289-306.
31.
Quoted in Josu Landa, ed., Euskal Herria y la Libertad (Tafalla: Txalaparta, 1995), CD-ROM. It contains a highly detailed (and biased) history of ETA and radical nationalism, with several thousand pages of text.
32.
See Iker Casanova and Paul Asensio, Argala (Tafalla: Txalaparta, 2002), 282-83; and Francisco Letamendía, Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de ETA (San Sebastián: R & B Editores, 1994), vol. II, 54-9.
33.
James Joll, The Anarchists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 102-03; Richard Bach Jensen, "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe," Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2004): 116-53.
34.
See Ronald Hingley, The Nihilists (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1967), chap. 5; Lindsay Clutterbuck, "The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?" Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2004): 154-81.
35.
The data come from the B’Tselem report 1987-1997. A Decade of Human Rights Violations (1998), available at www.btselem.org.
36.
About the internal dynamics of the Intifada, and how it brought about the emergence of a violent, isolated hard core, see Hillel Frisch, "Between Diffusion and Territorial Consolidation in Rebellion: Striking at the Hard Core of the Intifada," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 4 (1991), 39-62.
37.
Beitler, The Path to Mass Rebellion, 124-25.
38.
According to some estimates, attacks with firearms represent only 5 percent of all actions carried out during the Intifada, see Efraim Inbar, "Israel’s Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada," Armed Forces and Society18, no. 1 (1991): 29-50.
39.
See, for instance, Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization 56 (2002): 263-96; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
40.
Khaled Hroub , Hamas: Political Thought and Practice ( Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000), 243; Kepel, Jihad, 326.
41.
Sophie Baby, "Violence et politique dans la transition démocratique espagnole, 1975-1982" (PhD diss., Paris I University-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2007). In this historical account of the evolution of political violence during the Spanish transition, the aggregate figures on fatalities are very close to our own. The thesis does not address mobilization. Baby has also collected data on all violent incidents. Her data set is not currently available.
42.
Juan Avilés, "El terrorismo en la transición democrática española," in La transición a la democracia y el reinado de Juan Carlos I, ed. Javier Tusell (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2003), 631-55; Fernando Reinares, "Sociogénesis y evolución del terrorismo en España," in España. Sociedad y política, ed. S. Giner (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1990); and Álvaro Soto, "Conflictividad social y transición sindical." An extreme-right organization, under a collective name, published a biased, day-to-day chronology with a useful list (albeit with numerous inaccuracies and omissions) of victims of nonstate political violence: see Equipo D., 1973/1983: La década del terror (datos para una causa general) (Madrid: Dyrsa, 1984).
43.
The data set is more fully presented and exploited in José María Calleja and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, La derrota de ETA. De la primera víctima a la última (Madrid: Adhara, 2006.)
44.
Stephen M. Caliendo, Mark P. Gibney, and Angela Payne, "All the News That’s Fit to Print? New York Times Coverage of Human-Rights Violations," International Journal of Press/Politics 4, no. 4 (1999): 48-69; Christian Davenport, "Exploring the Implications of Source Selection in the Case of the Guatemalan State Terror, 1977-1995," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 427-50.
45.
Charles L. Taylor and David A. Jodice, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
46.
Adell, "Transición política en la calle."
47.
Cayo Sastre also collected data from El País, but he only counted the number of demonstrations, without estimating attendance. We have also found many mistakes in his data set. See his Transición y desmovilización política en España (1975-1978) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1997).
48.
Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, 288, also uses graphical analysis to show that ethnic violence increased following the decay of mass mobilization.
49.
As far as we know, no one has calculated the standard indicator of strike volume for the Spanish transition. Soto uses a mistaken formula in "Conflictividad social y transición sindical."
