In recent years, researchers have become increasingly interested in the credibility of public companies’ earnings forecasts. However, so far most of the research has been done in the fields of finance and accounting, with little heed to the communicative aspects affecting the credibility of these messages. With the help of Toulmin’s (1958/2003) claim-data-warrant model, this article aims to tackle the question of how important the warrant, that is, the logical link between forecast claims and the data offered to support them, is as a measure in the credibility assessment. The article takes a case study approach, focusing on two earnings forecasts released under similar economic conditions by two companies operating in the same field. The forecast with strong warrants was successful, whereas the other with weak warrants led to a profit warning. Based on the findings, the strength of the warrant might be seen as a reliable indicator of forecast credibility.
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