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Abstract

Extensive research has been conducted in the field of peacebuilding concerning the role of civil society in peace negotiations. However, although research has stressed the importance of coordination among civil society groups, we have limited knowledge concerning the impact civil society coordination can have on the content of a peace agreement. This article addresses this gap by examining how the extent of coordination among civil society groups during peace negotiations influences the reflectiveness of a peace agreement in regard to civil society viewpoints. We argue that a high extent of coordination, where civil society actors coordinate tasks and spearhead viewpoints together, can help facilitate peace agreements that are more reflective of civil society group views. Based on a comparative analysis of Guatemala and El Salvador, the findings show that whereas coordination between different civil society groups was quite extensive in both peace processes, civil society viewpoints were inscribed into the peace agreement to a larger extent in the Guatemalan case. We identify two factors that contribute in shaping how coordination influences the content of peace accords: symmetrical transfer of information, and openness from the negotiation parties to consider suggestions from civil society.

Keywords

civil society civil war coordination peace agreement peace negotiation

Introduction

Extensive research has been conducted in the field of peacebuilding to examine the significance of civil society participation in peace negotiations. For example, it has been highlighted that the inclusion of civil society can increase the transparency of peace negotiations, strengthen democracy, and make peace more durable (Barnes, 2005; Lanz, 2011; Nilsson, 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008). However, surprisingly little is known about the importance of civil society groups’ coordination during peace negotiations. Although coordination generally is seen as important in guaranteeing the effectiveness of civil society efforts (e.g. Barnes, 2005; Paffenholz et al., 2006), we have limited knowledge about the impact of civil society coordination on the content of a peace agreement. To address this gap in previous literature, this study explores the following question: How does the extent of coordination among civil society groups during peace negotiations influence the reflectiveness of a peace agreement in regard to civil society viewpoints?

This study builds on the growing research focusing on the role of civil society during peace negotiations and explores the dynamics that develop when civil society groups coordinate their efforts. We argue that a high extent of coordination, where civil society actors coordinate tasks and spearhead viewpoints together, can help facilitate peace agreements that are more reflective of civil society’s views. This is important as civil society groups are particularly likely to tackle critical underlying causes of conflict that go beyond the immediate interests of the warring parties, which can increase the acceptance of a reached agreement among the wider public (Barnes, 2005, 2009; Saunders, 1999), and we also know that peace accords that include civil society are more likely to see peace endure (Nilsson, 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008).

We explore our argument by comparing civil society groups’ involvement in the peace negotiations during the intrastate armed conflicts in Guatemala and El Salvador. The findings show that whereas coordination between different civil society groups was quite extensive during both the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran peace negotiations, the reflectiveness of the various peace agreements in terms of civil society views differs. Although some civil society groups’ requests were inscribed into the peace agreements in both cases, issues raised by civil society actors in Guatemala did so to a larger extent. Hence, successful coordination between different civil society actors cannot fully explain why some peace agreements better reflect civil society viewpoints.

While coordination enabled civil society groups to bundle their viewpoints in consensus documents and forward them to the negotiation parties, we find that two other factors contributed in shaping the impact of coordination on the content of the agreements. Our empirical analysis shows that the more direct model of civil society participation in Guatemala favored a more symmetrical transfer of information, and there was a greater openness from the negotiation parties to consider the suggestions from civil society, compared with the situation in El Salvador. Since our analysis is limited to two cases, which differ in their inclusion modality, we see it as important for future inquiries to explore how these dynamics apply in other cases. Indeed, our results here suggest that when studying civil society coordination efforts, we need to consider the particular role civil society play in relation to the formal negotiation process.

This study makes two key contributions. First, this inquiry charts new ground by exploring how coordination between civil society groups may help shape the negotiation agenda and, in turn, impact the content of a peace accord. Second, while it is critical that we learn more about such coordination efforts, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on the content of peace accords by providing insights into the process by which civil society viewpoints are incorporated into peace accords.

Previous research

Civil society as a concept is debated, but definitions often share as a common denominator that civil society needs to be regarded as distinct from “. . . the state, family and the market” (Paffenholz, 2014: 70).¹ We define civil society as separate from these other arenas, consisting of a set of voluntary organizations in society, such as women’s groups, human-rights organizations, faith-based actors, youth groups, or trade unions (Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2014). We also acknowledge that in a civil war context, civil society may in some instances not be so “civil” and can sometimes be divided along conflict lines (Belloni, 2008; Krznaric, 1999; Orjuela, 2003). We further note that civil society cannot always be seen as representatives of broader sets of society (Hellmüller, 2020; Mendes, 2019).

In the last decades, there has been a growing literature examining civil society inclusion in peace negotiations and peacebuilding efforts more broadly. This literature includes inquiries into the functions of civil society in peacebuilding, their role in Track II diplomacy, different strategies for inclusion, their role in sustaining peace after peace accords, and how different modes of participation—for example, problem-solving efforts, parallel forums or mass action—may influence the conflict resolution process (Barnes, 2005; Bell and O’Rourke, 2007; Belloni, 2008; Cuhadar and Paffenholz, 2020; Hirblinger and Landau, 2020; Nilsson et al., 2020; Paffenholz, 2010, 2014; Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008). While important advances have been made to examine civil society participation in peace processes, researchers have largely overlooked the issue of coordination among various civil society groups during peace negotiations, particularly in terms of its impact on the content of a peace agreement.

There is a strand of research focusing specifically on coordination, but only limited attention has been paid to coordination between civil society actors during peace talks. The coordination literature has, for example, focused on “civil-military coordination” in the post-conflict context, coordination between track 1 and track 2 actors, and coordination between nongovernmental organizations (Nan and Strimling, 2006: 2). Examples include Garb and Nan (2006) who look at negotiations taking place inside a coordination network of local and international organizations working on peacebuilding initiatives during the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Fisher (2006) studies coordination occurring between various official and unofficial intermediaries partaking in peacemaking operations, whereas Bhattarai (2016) explores conditions that favor third-party coordination in conflict resolution.

Research centering on civil society inclusion in peace negotiations has either implicitly assumed coordination among civil society groups to matter during negotiations or identified it as important but without specifically exploring it empirically. Barnes (2005), for instance, points out that when civil society organizations compete with each other for resources rather than fostering communication, it can undermine coordination and lead to less effective, scattered efforts (p. 22). Similarly, Paffenholz et al. (2006) stress that competitiveness, disorganization, and hostility among civil society groups can hamper coordination, which can cause implementation problems (p. 70). Nilsson et al. (2020) use coordination as a framework to investigate how civil society led mass actions and elite-driven activities interact in the course of a peace process, but their focus is not specifically on how coordinated efforts may shape the content of the peace accord.

In terms of studying the content of peace agreements, there is an increasing body of works which, for example, have explored how certain factors may influence specific stipulations such as political power-sharing and gender-sensitive provisions (Bell and O’Rourke, 2010; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2018; Svensson, 2009; True and Riveros-Morales, 2019). Only a few studies specifically examine why some peace agreements contain provisions that refer to civil society, or include civil society actors (e.g. Nilsson, 2012; Souza, 2019)² and these studies focus on the global patterns and do not explore the process in-depth. There is also important qualitative work studying transfer, for example, within the context of Track II diplomacy and negotiations (Cuhadar, 2009; Jones, 2015), but which only in part analyze the impact on peace accords (e.g. Cuhadar and Paffenholz, 2020). Thus, we have overall limited knowledge regarding the extent to which civil society viewpoints become incorporated into peace accords. We address this gap by examining whether civil society groups are more effective in influencing the outcome of peace negotiations when they are coordinating their efforts.

Theoretical argument

We argue that when civil society organizations are active during peace negotiations, the extent to which civil society actors coordinate their efforts can influence the official negotiations and help shape the information included in the peace agreement.³ More generally, coordination aims to improve the effectiveness of various related efforts (Garb and Nan, 2006: 10), for example, through the sharing of information and resources, joint planning, or working in collaboration (Nan, 2003). Coordination is in our study perceived to be high when various civil society groups synchronize their actions and work together in formulating and forwarding civil society viewpoints to the official negotiations. Hence, a high extent of coordination means that civil society groups move beyond simply sharing information and resources to active collaboration (Nan, 2003; Strimling, 2006: 94; Waters et al., 2006: 42). A distinction is made in the coordination literature between coordination of sequential and simultaneous de-escalation efforts (Fisher, 2006; Kriesberg, 1996; Nilsson et al., 2020). Whereas sequential coordination considers that conflict dynamics change over time and may require different kinds of intermediaries at different stages (Kriesberg, 1996: 345), simultaneous coordination focuses on the coordination of de-escalation efforts that take place at the same time (Kriesberg, 1996: 347). Our focus is on the coordination of such simultaneous civil society efforts.

Coordination among civil society groups can, for instance, flourish within a more formal model of civil society inclusion as was the case during the Afghanistan negotiations in 2001 (Paffenholz et al., 2006), or by civil society actors initiating and upholding coordination more informally, for example, by fostering debates and building networks or alliances (Garb and Nan, 2006; Ricigliano, 2003). Such informal coordination did, for instance, evolve before the Lomé negotiations in Sierra Leone in 1995, when around 60 civil society groups, among others the “Council of Churches” and the “Women’s Movement for Peace,” established a “National Coordinating Committee for Peace” to generate a unified voice for peace (Bright, 2000: 43).

Civil society consists of many different actors, including religious groups, human rights organizations, women’s groups, and trade unions (Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz et al., 2006), and these can oftentimes be seen to represent values and interests of certain sectors of society. Since each civil society group is capturing the interests of the fraction of society they are associated with, each group receives deeper insight into some underlying conflict causes (Barnes, 2005, 2009; Saunders, 1999). Hence, when a variety of civil society groups are spearheading viewpoints together, they are potentially grasping more of the underlying conflict issues.

We propose that when civil society actors unite behind certain viewpoints and jointly advocate for those interests, they should be more effective in making their interests known to the negotiation parties for three main reasons: first, when a multitude of civil society actors coordinate their actions, they can more convincingly argue that they represent different segments of society. Second, the united voice of a multitude of civil society groups could be seen as stronger, in comparison to various separate voices, and is thus less likely to be ignored by the negotiation parties. Third, coordination allows the civil society groups to better navigate the kind of information that should be forwarded to the official negotiations. This will enable civil society groups to prevent communicating interests that are conflicting with each other. Consequently, negotiation parties are targeted more effectively, and overloading the parties with information can be prevented (Kriesberg, 1996).

In sum, when civil society actors engaged in the peace negotiations are synchronizing their actions and are spearheading interests together, they should, for the reasons outlined above, increase their chances of getting their viewpoints across to the negotiation parties, which, in turn, is likely to be reflected in the outcome of the negotiations. Based on this, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: A high extent of coordination among civil society groups during peace negotiations is more likely to result in a peace agreement that is reflective of civil society viewpoints.

Cases and methods

We evaluate our theoretical argument by examining two cases: Guatemala (1994–1996) and El Salvador (1990–1992). We have chosen these cases, as the two countries share important similarities, for example, in regard to history, culture, political development, and both have experienced civil wars during similar time periods (Nilsson, 2018: 136). The cases are also similar in that the countries have seen intrastate armed conflicts fought over government power. Relying on the definition by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), intrastate armed conflict is here understood to be a conflict between a government of a state and one or more rebel actors that leads to a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Moreover, the peace process in each country ended in full peace agreements (Pettersson et al., 2019), and an external mediator was the official mediator during both peace negotiations. Both cases have seen civil society involvement during the peace negotiations (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008: 26–27), whereas the extent of civil society coordination as well as the influence on the content of the peace accords are explored in the empirical analysis.

The main analysis focuses on the peace negotiations but considers important events of the pre-negotiation phase. For the empirical investigation, we rely on a variety of secondary sources, including reports generated by organizations such as Berghof Foundation and Conciliation Resources as well as books and journal articles. We use the method of “structured focused comparison,” whereby we prepare a set of questions that captures the objective of the study, which then guides the examination of each of our cases (George and Bennett, 2005: 67).

We evaluate the extent of coordination among civil society groups based on the breadth of coordination, more specifically we use the following set of questions to assess coordination:

To what extent did civil society groups create new joint organizations or networks?

To what degree did civil society groups synchronize their actions, for example, by splitting responsibilities, and/or roles?

Did civil society groups agree on a set of joint viewpoints? If yes, did civil society groups produce joint outcomes such as a written declaration, or public statement?

The dependent variable is evaluated based on all the accords that make up the final peace agreement. The reflectiveness of civil society viewpoints in the peace agreement is determined by comparing the content of the agreements with the agenda that civil society groups were advocating for. As civil society groups’ viewpoints can at times be unclear or unspecified, the agreements will be further reviewed in terms of the positions dedicated to civil society in the implementation phase. The reflectiveness of the agreement is perceived to be high when civil society viewpoints are incorporated into the agreement to a high extent and opportunities for civil society participation in the implementation phase are underscored. For this analysis we rely on qualitative content analysis where we examine the respective peace agreements in detail (Krippendorff, 2013; Manheim and Rich, 1995).

We begin by identifying relevant civil society agenda themes and specific viewpoints based on secondary sources. We then analyze the peace agreements in light of these viewpoints and seek to assess the extent to which those claims were found in the specific stipulations of the peace accords. We developed a coding scale ranging from very low to very high, which serves to capture the reflectiveness of peace agreements regarding civil society viewpoints (see Table 1 in Supplemental appendix). We first code each of the sub-themes and then, for Guatemala and El Salvador, respectively, we arrive at an overall evaluation of the reflectiveness of peace agreements regarding civil society viewpoints. We outline the full coding procedure in the Supplemental appendix.

Guatemala

The peace agreement signed in 1996 ended the 36-year-long armed conflict between the government forces and the guerrilla movement “Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity” (URNG).⁴ In 1991, the secret direct talks between the government and URNG led to the signing of an 11-point agenda for peace negotiations called “Mexico Accord.” However, the talks reached an impasse and did not resume until 1994 when the United Nations (UN) took over as the official mediator. The renewed peace negotiations resulted in a series of peace accords, and ended with the signing of the “Agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace” in 1996 (Krznaric, 1999).

Coordination among civil society groups during the Guatemalan peace negotiations

When the government of Guatemala and the URNG decided in 1994 to revive the peace negotiations under UN auspice, it was decided that the meetings would take place in private between the negotiation parties. As a direct consequence, civil society groups had no observer status, not to mention any direct representation in the official negotiations (Alvarez, 2002a: 49).

Civil society groups received, however, a more formal role through the establishment of the “Civil Society Assembly” (ASC)⁵ laid out in the “Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the URNG” (United Nations, 1994). It is detailed in the agreement that the ASC is open to all non-governmental sectors that can prove their “legitimacy, representative character and lawfulness.” Thereby the agreement highlights that the responsibilities of the ASC were threefold: first, the ASC was commissioned to write consensus documents regarding points 2–7 recorded in the Mexico Accord. Second, the ASC was to present the documents to the negotiation parties. The documents were understood as recommendations and not as binding. Third, the ASC had the opportunity to affirm the accords once the negotiation parties signed them but had no veto power. Ponciano (1996) points out that it was discouraging for the civil society groups to know that the consensus documents were not of binding character and that the accords would be valid regardless of whether the ASC endorsed them (p. 89).

By referring to the Oslo consultations, the Framework Agreement named at least six sectors that should participate in the ASC, which included among others: religious groups, trade unions, and political parties⁶ (Alvarez, 2002a: 50). After some debate, five additional sectors became part of the ASC, among them were women’s organizations and human rights groups. This extension of the ASC, however, led to the withdrawal of the “Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Coordinating Committee” (CACIF)⁷ (Alvarez, 2002a: 50). CACIF started to interact with the negotiation parties independently from the ASC and was successful in blocking any major socio-economic and agrarian reform proposals forwarded by the ASC and UN (Alvarez, 2002a: 50; Krznaric, 1999: 7, 12).

Up until the creation of the women’s sector in the ASC, which allowed for the participation of 32 women’s organizations, they had been excluded from the peace process (IHEID, 2017: 4). Surrounded by mainly male-dominated organizations, their voices were rather isolated in the beginning. Still, over the course of the year, their viewpoints became key discussion points of the ASC (Alvarez, 2002a: 51). While the President of the ASC presented the assembly’s official proposals to the negotiation parties, the women sector additionally established an informal channel by forwarding their sectoral proposals to Luz Mendez, a female delegate of the URNG diplomatic team (IHEID, 2017: 6–7).

The indigenous sector represented around 60% of the population, which included a total of 200 different groups. These groups created the so-called “Coordination of Organizations of Mayan People of Guatemala” (COPMAGUA) (Alvarez, 2002a: 50).

The timetable of the official negotiations made it necessary that the ASC worked efficient. Thus, the ASC put in place a clear structure that divided tasks and responsibilities among the over 100 organizations. All 10 sectors independently crafted position papers, and each sector chose 10 delegates who represented their sector in the ASC. In addition, topical commissions, composed of two delegates from each sector, focused on the themes the ASC was commissioned to create consensus documents on. Each commission produced a first preliminary draft on the topic. Thereafter, all delegates engaged in an ASC plenary session until consensus was reached. Once consensus existed, the documents were forwarded to the official track 1 negotiations that took place simultaneously (Alvarez, 2002a: 51; Krznaric, 1999: 6).

The negotiation parties suggested Guatemalan Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño as the president of the ASC (Alvarez, 2002b). Together with the organizing committee, Quezada started his presidency in the ASC by optimizing its work methods to working in sectors. He was well respected and able to achieve the necessary consensus among organizations on many conflicting issues (Krznaric, 1999: 5). In addition, he traded information with the UN mediator Arnault to guarantee that the ASC’s work was coordinated with the official negotiations (Alvarez, 2002a: 50). When Quezada stepped done as president in January 1995, the ASC lost its focus and became more disorganized for a while (Krznaric, 1999: 11–12). Moreover, different opinions about the future role of the ASC led to the withdrawal of sectors. The ASC lost its impact and eventually dissolved. Hence, the ASC never played any role in the implementation of the peace agreement (Alvarez, 2002a: 53).

The above discussion shows that the extent of coordination among civil society groups within the framework of the ASC was high during the peace negotiations. The inclusion of over 100 organizations in 10 different sectors shows that the ASC incorporated a large variety of civil society groups’ viewpoints. The high extent of coordination between the various groups is further highlighted by the joint consensus proposals. To achieve such proposals, coordination took place across groups with different sectoral focus and between groups with a similar focus.

Civil society agenda and the content of the peace agreement in Guatemala

We now turn to our qualitative content analysis examining the reflectiveness of the peace agreements in regard to civil society’s viewpoints. For the selection of the most prominent civil society agenda themes and corresponding viewpoints we mainly rely on secondary literature. Concerning the social and economic demands expressed by Guatemalan civil society, we additionally lean on the specific ASC consensus document.⁸ In what follows we first highlight the main civil society themes and viewpoints⁹ used for the analysis of the peace agreements and then present our results from the qualitative content analysis (see Supplemental appendix for further details).

The most prominent civil society groups’ agenda points stressed in the literature concern indigenous people and socio-economic aspects. In regard to the “Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous People” (United Nations, 1995) COPMAGU demanded among others constitutional recognition, stronger participation in state institutions, a strengthening of the Mayan culture with its languages, better access to mass media, and land reform. After conversations with the remaining sectors of the ASC, measures were added to the proposal aiming to secure the equality of indigenous women (Sieder, 1997: 68–69).

In terms of social and economic aspects, the ASC wanted, on one hand, economic injustices and historical grievances and, on the other, a structural reform regarding land ownership highlighted in the agreement (Murga, 1997: 74, 78). In addition, the ASC requested in the consensus paper “Aspectos socioeconomicos y situación agrarian” more employment opportunities including fair salaries, the strengthening of rural economic activity, and the improvement of the social situation. Specific demands included support for small and medium sized businesses, diverse forms of landownership and strengthening the healthcare and education system (Princeton University Digital Library, n.d.).

A further civil society theme concerns the strengthening of civil power by redefining the role of the military to be an external one and including civil society in the government policy making (Krznaric, 1999: 7). Finally, women stood up for more general topics such as justice, reconciliation, and land reforms, as well as gender-related topics such as gender equality and the rights and protection of women (IHEID, 2017: 6).

Based on the qualitative content analysis we find the peace agreement to be most reflective in terms of viewpoints regarding indigenous people. The analysis also shows that women successfully advocated for gender-related viewpoints and that comprehensive action steps are highlighted to improve the overall social situation of the Guatemalan people. In line with other studies (Alvarez, 2002a; Krznaric, 1999; Murga, 1997), we find the two most contested civil society themes in the agreement to regard economic aspects and the strengthening of civil power. Although multiple paragraphs highlight decentralization, comprehensive action steps to include citizens in the decision-making process are limited and while the role of the military is redefined as an external one, certain conditions still enable the military to take on a support role in internal affairs. Some viewpoints regarding economic aspects such as improving employment and developing a transportation plan are comprehensively addressed in the agreement, whereas paragraphs focusing on the strengthening of small and medium sized businesses and structural changes regarding land ownership remain vague. Brett (2017) similarly highlights that the causes of conflict: “land distribution and control, fiscal inequality, rural development, horizontal inequalities” (p. 57), were not sufficiently mentioned in the peace agreement. However, even though land ownership is not dealt with comprehensively, there are still paragraphs highlighting unemployment and the strengthening of economic activity.

Overall, we find that many civil society agenda themes are highlighted in various sections of the peace agreement and for many viewpoints comprehensive action steps are outlined. The civil society agenda themes receive the following scores: “strengthening the role of indigenous people” (very high); “improving socio-economic aspects” (high), “strengthening civil power” (moderate) “improving the role of women” (high). In addition, the accords highlight multiple commissions with civil society participation to be active in the implementation phase. However, no commission with civil society participation was established to observe the envisioned socio-economic changes. Based on the sub-scores for each theme and taking the role of civil society in the implementation phase into account, the overall reflectiveness of the peace agreement regarding civil society viewpoints is assessed as high. This is also in line with Alvarez (2002a: 51–52) and Paffenholz (2015: 866) who stress that a large number of the ASC proposals were included in the official peace agreement.

Finally, it should be recognized that while the ASC advocated for a variety of civil society agenda themes, the people who were not closely affiliated with the included sectors, remained largely disconnected from the peace process (Alvarez, 2002a: 53). As informing the wider public regarding the developments in the ASC constituted a significant shortcoming of the ASC, it raises some doubts on whether the ASC was able to represent the interests of the wider public. Hence, the link to the broader public could have been better. This withstanding, the overall reflectiveness of the agreement regarding civil society viewpoints was considered to be high in the Guatemalan case.

El Salvador

The 12-year-long civil war that started in 1980, was fought particularly between the “Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front” (FMLN)¹⁰ and the military forces of the government. By the end of 1989, both conflict parties agreed on the UN to be the official mediator for the privately held peace negotiations. The peace negotiations began with a process leading to the Geneva Accords in 1990, and the signing of the “Chapultepec Peace Agreement” (United Nations, 1992) officially ended the civil war (López et al., 2015).

Coordination among civil society groups during the El Salvadoran peace negotiations

Civil society groups were not included in the official negotiations mediated by the UN. Nevertheless, civil society groups engaged in efforts aimed at influencing the official negotiations. Particularly the “Permanent Committee of the National Dialogue” (CPDN)¹¹ took on an active role in the peace negotiations. The CPDN included 83 diverging civil society entities, including indigenous and women’s groups, labor organizations, and universities (López et al., 2015: 14).

The origin of CPDN can be traced back to 1988 when Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas held a “National Debate for Peace” (DNP).¹² Rivera and his team sent out an invitation and questionnaire to 102 civil society groups (Guardado, 2012: 231–232). In the end, between 59 and 63 civil society organizations participated in the national debate for peace on 3 and 4 September 1988 (Brett, 2008: 736; Guardado, 2012: 233; Ponciano, 1996: 157). Preceding the debate, Rivera received 53 written statements from the organizations regarding perceived conflict causes and possible solutions. Rivera and his team used these statements as the basis for the formulation of 164 proposals that would be discussed during the debate. After the debate, a final document was crafted that included 147 recommendations. Rivera handed over the document to both president Duarte and the FMLN leaders (Guardado, 2012: 233–234).

Some civil society groups decided to uphold the cooperation and established the CPDN. Rivera himself was not part of it. CPDN pursued political dialogue as the sole conflict resolution tool. The committee considered itself to be of pacifistic character, civil and impartial, and campaigned among others for economic development and democratization (Guardado, 2012: 237).

Before the official peace negotiations, the leaders of CPDN, Palacios and Gómez, traveled to Panama to convince the FMLN to participate in the peace negotiations and to consider the final document of the DNP (Guardado, 2012: 238). Furthermore, Palacios presented the viewpoints of the CPDN and a list of all the civil society organizations that signed the final proposal of the DNP to a subcommittee of the US House of Representatives, urging the United States to help end the El Salvadoran violence (United States House of Representatives, 1990). During the official negotiations, the CPDN organized marches and conferences throughout the country. Furthermore, CPDN met the negotiation parties to make sure that the parties considered the interests of the CPDN during the negotiations. CPDN was especially in close contact with the FMLN (López et al., 2015: 14).

Taken together, although civil society groups remained excluded from the official negotiations, and no formal consultation body was put in place, coordination among civil society groups was high both within the DNP and the CPDN. The DNP constituted the first large-scale coordination endeavor of civil society groups. Thereby, the coordination was explicitly initiated and facilitated by the Archbishop. With a total of at least 59 civil society organizations, coordination ended up taking place between a wide range of groups. The finalization of a joint document is a further indicator that the extent of coordination was high and the inclusion of 147 proposals underscores that the document was comprehensive. With 83 participating civil society groups, the CPDN even outgrew the civil society coordination efforts during the DNP. The organization of marches, participation in forums, and the meetings with the negotiation parties highlight that the CPDN was active in various ways simultaneously.

Civil society agenda and the reflectiveness of the peace agreement in El Salvador

We now carry out our analysis of the reflectiveness of the peace agreement regarding civil society viewpoints in the case of El Salvador. Once again, we first highlight the main civil society themes and viewpoints used for the analysis and then present our results.

Some of the most crucial statements of the DNP consensus document included the DNP’s endorsement of the Esquipulas II agreement and a demand for the termination of the armed conflict through dialogue (Guardado, 2012: 233). Further issues emphasized by civil society organizations include the importance of the political solution not being dictated by foreign powers, a restructure of the national education plan, respect for human rights, lifting civil power above military power, and economic and social development through a reorientation of programs (Ponciano, 1996: 183). Moreover, the DNP’s recommendations insisted on an instantaneous ceasefire, the end of guerilla interference with transportation and public utility services and a government legislation that repairs the persistent injustices faced by the poor (Brett, 2008: 736).

The CPDN later advocated for the content of the DNP and requested in a public declaration more respect for human rights, reforms regarding voting rights, freedom of opinion and demilitarization. Furthermore, CPDN asked for social justice and demanded an end to the superiority of economic power over political power (Guardado, 2012: 238). Additional proposals can be divided based on their thematic contribution. In terms of the military, the CPDN asked among others for a ceasefire, the dismantling of death squads, the termination of repression and terrorism practices and a modernization of the judicial system (Ponciano, 1996: 186). Concerning the economy, CPDN requested structural reforms to solve the agrarian question, the strengthening of small and medium sized companies and economic policy containing price control measures and promotion of basic goods and services. Finally, in regard to social aspects CPDN demanded a new labor policy to improve working conditions and the provision of fair salaries, more attention to health and housing issues, a cultural and educational reform, and social programs tailored to youth, war-disabled, elderly, and single mothers (Ponciano, 1996: 186).

Based on the qualitative content analysis we find the peace agreements very reflective of human rights issues. Multiple paragraphs highlight the importance of more respect for human rights and comprehensive action steps are outlined through the establishment of the National Counsel for the Defence of Human Rights and a UN verification mission. Human rights are, however, an issue that may be advocated for also by other actors than civil society. Naturally, when the agenda of the negotiation parties and civil society overlaps it becomes harder to determine whether civil society impacted the agreements.

Furthermore, two civil society agenda themes, namely, government reforms and limiting military power, are moderately reflected in the peace agreements. Comprehensive actions steps to address the modernization of the judicial system, demilitarization, and lifting civil power above military power are outlined. Judicial sector reforms were, however, also part of FMLN’s negotiation agenda (López et al., 2015: 11).

Moreover, the reform of voting rights and the priority of political over economic power were not discussed. Neither did the agreements expand on the termination of terrorism. Likewise, civil society demands concerning the economic situation have only to a low extent been reflected in the agreements and when present remain mostly vague. The agreements insufficiently lay out a structural reform concerning the agrarian situation and give preference to former combatants in the mentioned land-transfer programs. Finally, the reflectiveness of the agreements regarding social conditions is extremely low. The majority of viewpoints are not addressed in the agreements and paragraphs focusing on health, housing issues and social programs contain only vague action steps. Although not specifically identified as a civil society agenda theme, we find it worth highlighting that no gender sensitive language can be found in the El Salvadoran accords.

Overall, we find that most civil society agenda themes are only in part reflected, and the addressed viewpoints often lack comprehensive action steps. The civil society agenda themes receive the following scores: “human rights” (very high); “changing the economic situation” (low); “improving social conditions” (very low); “governmental reforms” (moderate), and “limiting military power” (moderate). In addition, although multiple commissions are envisioned to oversee the implementation of the agreements, the participation of civil society is extremely limited. Representatives from civil society are not even included in the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), the commission who is meant to ensure that civil society gets to participate in the developments resulting from the agreements. Thus, based on the sub-scores for each theme and taking the role of civil society in the implementation phase into account, we evaluate the reflectiveness of the peace agreements in regard to civil society agenda themes and viewpoints as low.

Comparative analysis and conclusions

Coordination among various civil society groups was high in both Guatemala and El Salvador. In both cases did coordination include a large variety of groups, where viewpoints were spearheaded together and across various sectors, and the coordination led to joint written proposals. The Catholic Church played a crucial role in facilitating coordination in both instances. In Guatemala coordination was weakened among civil society groups after the facilitator stepped down from his position in the ASC, whereas in El Salvador coordination remained even when the facilitator of the DNP did not join the CPDN.¹³ This calls for future research on the role of facilitators during coordination.

The analysis reveals that in Guatemala the ASC helped shape multiple accords and several of the issues that civil society advocated for were incorporated in the peace agreements. Moreover, multiple avenues for civil society participation in the implementation phases were outlined. In El Salvador only a few of the DNP’s and later CPDN’s interests can be found reflected in the agreements, and the agreements created a smaller platform for civil society participation in the implementation phase. In both cases, socio-economic reforms did not adequately capture civil society group interests. Their suggestions had been resisted by the economic elites. Yet, when comparing the agreements directly, the Guatemalan “Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation” (United Nations, 1996) stands out as the one outlining more comprehensive action steps. Furthermore, in terms of gender-sensitive language, the Guatemalan accords emphasize the importance of women to a greater degree than the El Salvadoran agreements.

In short, although civil society groups established similar coordination endeavors in El Salvador and Guatemala, the reflectiveness of the various peace agreements in terms of civil society views differs. Although some civil society groups’ requests were inscribed into the peace agreements in both cases, it appears that issues raised by civil society actors in the case of Guatemala did so to a larger extent. It should, however, be noted that even though the peace agreement did reflect many of the viewpoints of civil society, the ASC was not very successful in terms of informing the wider public, which raises some questions regarding representation and their link to the wider public.

Deriving from the above analysis we cannot conclude that coordination fully explains the reflectiveness of the peace agreement’s content in terms of civil society viewpoints. Our analysis identifies two factors that contributed in shaping the impact of coordination on the content of the agreements. First of all, the modalities of civil society groups’ inclusion in Guatemala and El Salvador indicate that the negotiation parties varied in their openness to receive inputs from civil society groups. In both cases, civil society groups were not given a seat at the table. Yet, by establishing an official civil society forum during the Guatemalan peace negotiations, the negotiation parties created a vessel that made it easier for civil society groups to coordinate efforts and forward information while signaling openness to listen to civil society groups’ viewpoints. In El Salvador civil society groups were neither able to participate in official negotiations, nor was there any official forum established that would have favored civil society groups’ coordination. This made it harder for the coordinating civil society groups to forward their viewpoints to the negotiation parties and underscores that the openness of the negotiation parties to adhere to civil society groups’ inputs seems more limited in the case of El Salvador.

Second, while civil society groups in Guatemala made sure to forward the consensus documents to all negotiation parties, in El Salvador the CPDN had more contact with FMLN than it did with the government. Thus, the transfer of viewpoints by the CPDN to the negotiation parties can be regarded as asymmetrical. These findings are in line with what Cuhadar (2009) highlights, namely, for an effective transfer of outcomes the extent to which negotiation parties are open to outsider information matters and transfer should preferably take place symmetrical (see also Cuhadar and Paffenholz, 2020). Hence, while our analysis suggests that coordination among civil society actors can prove useful in several important ways, for example, by facilitating greater unity around the proposals that are brought forward, whether civil society viewpoints get incorporated into peace accords also seem to, at least in part, depend on these other factors. In this context it is also important to recognize that it becomes more difficult to fully assess the impact of civil society coordination when the agenda of the negotiation parties and civil society overlaps, and future research should probe this issue in greater detail.

To conclude, our study has sought to address a key gap in previous literature by exploring whether civil society groups are more effective in influencing the outcome of peace negotiations when they are coordinating their efforts. The findings reveal that coordination created momentum during the peace negotiations. In Guatemala and El Salvador, coordination enabled a large extent of civil society groups to bundle their viewpoints in consensus documents and forward them to the negotiation parties. Furthermore, the case of Guatemala brought to the forefront that not only civil society actors, but also other nongovernmental actors such as political parties can play a role in coordination endeavors and deserve further attention (see also Ross, 2019). Yet, despite similar coordination efforts, the peace agreements differ in their reflectiveness of civil society viewpoints. The empirical analysis shows that a high extent of coordination was linked to an asymmetrical transfer process and little openness of the negotiation parties in El Salvador, which might explain why the reflectiveness of civil society interests in the peace accords was lower in that case.

On a general level, our study shows the value of better understanding the interaction that civil society groups cultivate among themselves and how this can shape the outcome of negotiations. Future research should explore to what extent these dynamics apply also in other cases. Another related area where more research is needed concerns the way coordination efforts may differ depending on the specific inclusion modality (e.g. parallel forums, observer status), and if the dynamics play out the same when civil society actors coordinate across different inclusion modalities. Our study also points toward the value of better understanding the degree to which peace agreements not only reflect the warring parties’ interests and considerations but incorporate viewpoints from broader segments of society.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-cac-10.1177_00108367221077638 – Supplemental material for Better together? Civil society coordination during peace negotiations

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-cac-10.1177_00108367221077638 for Better together? Civil society coordination during peace negotiations by Nathanael Eschmann and Desirée Nilsson in Cooperation and Conflict

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

In addition, we would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for excellent comments and suggestions.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The authors are grateful for financial support from the Swedish Research Council (grant no. 2014-3847), and also want to thank Luís Martínez Lorenzo and Tania Estrada for their help with translation.

ORCID iD

Desirée Nilsson

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author biographies

Nathanael Eschmann has a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University. He has previously worked as a research assistant at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. His research interest is the resolution of intractable armed conflicts with a focus on inclusive peace processes, mediation, and reconciliation. [ Email: nathanael.eschmann@gmail.com]

Desirée Nilsson is Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. Her primary research interest is conflict resolution in civil wars with a particular focus on multiparty dynamics, including topics such as inclusive peace processes, rebel fragmentation, and peacekeeping operations. She has published in journals such as International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, and Journal of Peace Research. [ Email: desiree.nilsson@pcr.uu.se]

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