How do firms ensure secure exchange when the rule of law is weak and contracting institutions privilege the politically connected? In developing countries, firms may use social, formal, or political heuristics when selecting business partners, but how these factors jointly impact exchange remains understudied. In this article, I develop these theoretical mechanisms and test their impact with a conjoint experiment administered to 2389 formal and informal firms in Senegal. I find evidence in support of all three theories: To varying degrees, social, state, and political factors simultaneously impact firms’ sense of deal security and likelihood of exchange. The results demonstrate the substantial influence of formal predictors of exchange even in an overwhelmingly informal business environment, and also establish the countervailing effects of political connections on trade. These findings suggest that firms in developing countries must contend with an intricate political calculus to ensure their growth.
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