This article investigates the role of legalism and legal processes in entrenching autocratic rule in post-revolution Egypt. In the aftermath of the spectacular street protests that swept Egypt, the movement for change was channeled into legal challenges handled by the legal system and judicial experts. This judicialization of politics ensured that an emerging autocrat could not only use the judiciary and the legal system to control the process of democratic transition but also reverse it. In examining the rise of autocratic rule in post-revolutionary Egypt, this article illustrates how the legal system, constitutionalism, law-making, and electoral politics became integral pawns in the consolidation of an illiberal agenda. Legalistic strategies, such as rewriting electoral laws, reforming judicial regulations, strengthening presidentialism, rewriting and amending the constitution, and other legislative reforms, enable the rise of autocratic legalism in the country. As the case of Egypt illustrates, autocratic legalism is a dangerous mode of entrenching autocratic rule that uses the legal system to reach power and then abuses the same legal processes to ensure no one can challenge the power capture. Although elections, parliaments, and judiciaries remain in place to maintain a façade of legality, they are increasingly captured by the executive within a context of growing policing, and restrictions on freedoms and rights.
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