Following calls for a clear analytical distinction between populism and the specific ideological projects to which it is attached, the present article examines how populist and anti-immigrant attitudes relate to feelings of fear and anger about perceived threats facing the country. It posits that, although the association of these two discrete negative emotions with anti-immigration attitudes should be related to individuals’ ideological identification and the type of threat, populist attitudes, by virtue of their ubiquitous character, should be strongly associated with feelings of anger regardless of ideology or threat type. Drawing on data from an online survey in Spain, I find that anti-immigration attitudes are associated with anger among right-wing individuals and with fear among those on the center and the left, and more strongly associated with emotions linked to cultural threats. By contrast, results indicate that populist attitudes go hand in hand with feelings of anger across ideological groups and type of threat.
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