Abstract
Racial inequality is remarkably resilient in organizational and labor market contexts despite efforts to resolve it, which raises significant questions about the mechanisms underlying its persistence. We argue that organizational efforts that increase the inclusion of underrepresented racial groups in the short term may conceal an emergent mechanism that paradoxically results in exclusion over time. The emergent mechanism stems from an acute misalignment between the scope of allocation in the matching process and the scope of valuation in the evaluation process, which ultimately increases voluntary and involuntary turnover among underrepresented racial groups. We examine this paradox through a revelatory case in higher education. Drawing on comprehensive administrative and research performance data from a large (R1) U.S. public university, we find that Black assistant professors are significantly more likely than their White colleagues to be allocated to non-standard positions, i.e., formally appointed in two academic departments with shared compensation. Our results demonstrate that such non-standard appointments are associated with a significant decline in research productivity, which remains central during the evaluation process. The end result is that jointly appointed assistant professors—among whom Blacks are disproportionately represented—experience lower likelihoods of retention.
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