Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: Inferential deficit or experimental artifact?

Abstract

Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study–test trials using both strategies, participants’ predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study–test trials—they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the strategy effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation—noncompliance with strategy instructions—was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.