Political Studies

The sequence of US presidential elections from 1964 to 1972 is generally regarded as heralding a fundamental political realignment, during which time civil rights became as important a cleavage as economic rights. In certain respects, this realignment mirrored the transformation of politics that occurred in the period before the Civil War. Formal models of voting (based on assumptions of rational voters, and plurality-maximizing candidates) have typically been unable to provide an account of such realignments. In this paper, we propose that US politics necessarily involves two dimensions of policy. Whatever positions US presidential candidates adopt, there will always be two groups of disaffected voters. Such voters may be mobilized by third party candidates, and may eventually be absorbed into one or other of the two dominant party coalitions. The policy compromise, or change, required of the successful presidential candidate then triggers the political realignment. A formal activist-voter model is presented, as a first step in understanding such a dynamic equilibrium between parties and voters.

According to Downs, parties are forced to accommodate the preferences of the voters in order to win elections. However, Dunleavy and Ward argue that it is also possible for a party to use preference-shaping strategies to bring the preferences of the voters in line with the party's position. Using structural equation modelling, preference-shaping theory is tested in relation to the effect of sales of council houses and shares in privatised companies on the electorate's attitudes to economic policies under the 1979–92 Conservative governments in Britain. The analyses provide little support for preference-shaping theory, which seems in need of respecification if it is to be maintained.

While the construction of a rational case for pension reform is often straightforward, the political implementation of such reform can be somewhat more difficult. In large part, this can be attributed to sceptical public opinion. The precise role played by public opinion in constraining the political feasibility of pension reform is, however, unclear. The purpose of this paper is to distil the ways in which public attitudes influence pension reform. This is done through examining survey data from Greece, where progress with the implementation of pension reform has been particularly modest. Political opposition to pension reform appears to be rooted in a general lack of public appreciation of the case for reform combined with the desire to protect interest group privileges. Public ignorance and insecurity breed attitudes not conducive to reform. Public attitudes do not simply act as a given constraint on reform but are a product of the structure of the pension system and the reform process itself. In this path-dependent process, implementation of a reform agenda of rationalisation is more difficult from the starting point of a severely fragmented and distorted system.

Scholars have sought to establish a link between sustainability and deliberative democracy. Some suggest that citizens' juries can realise this link, especially since they encourage a deeper form of democratic participation. However, we argue that there remain important problems. We therefore propose an open citizens' jury model as an alternative, based on key principles drawn from democratic theory.

Central to the debates on governance is the extent to which this process erodes state power. This article looks at the control of education policy since 1997. Education has not been immune from the developing process of governance. Moreover, Labour government education policies have accelerated this process: there has been greater fragmentation of policy-making, with a proliferation of cross-sectoral and multi-level participation. However, in this case, central government has not only retained control over policy-making but has been able to achieve its policy goals more effectively. Two case studies: ‘New Labour and the Local Education Authorities’ and ‘New Labour and the Funding of Education’, demonstrate the advantages for the centre in voluntarily governing through governance.

After entering government in 1997, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) acquired a reputation for acquiescence. This article attempts to answer two related questions. Was this an accurate picture of the PLP under Blair? And if so, what explained it? The number of back-bench revolts was certainly low. Excluding the short parliaments of 1964 and February 1974, we have to go back to 1955 to find a parliament with fewer rebellions by government back benchers than the one elected in 1997 – but those rebellions that did occur were sizeable. Rebellion was also widespread amongst the PLP: 133 MPs rebelled at some point in the Parliament. There are four explanations for this compliant pattern of behaviour, in order of increasing importance: the issues on the legislative agenda; the composition of the PLP; the government's behaviour; and a desire on the part of most of the PLP to appear united.

Cosmopolitan international relations theorists envisage a process of expanding cosmopolitan democracy and global governance, in which for the first time there is the possibility of global issues being addressed on the basis of new forms of democracy, derived from the universal rights of global citizens. They suggest that, rather than focus attention on the territorially limited rights of the citizen at the level of the nation-state, more emphasis should be placed on extending democracy and human rights to the international sphere. This paper raises problems with extending the concept of rights beyond the bounds of the sovereign state, without a mechanism of making these new rights accountable to their subject. The emerging gap, between holders of cosmopolitan rights and those with duties, tends to create dependency rather than to empower. So while the new rights remain tenuous, there is a danger that the cosmopolitan framework can legitimise the abrogation of the existing rights of democracy and self-government preserved in the UN Charter framework.

Israel's efforts to quell violence during the recent conflict with the Palestinians include targeted assassinations of militia leaders. The international community permits the use of lethal force in only two cases, law enforcement and just war, and assassination cannot be justified in either. In the context of law enforcement, assassination remains prohibited as a form of extra-legal execution, regardless of Israel's status as an occupying power. In the context of just war, assassination violates the proscription against perfidious and treacherous means of warfare. In the current conflict, assassination cannot be accomplished without collaborators, a practice that not only is prohibited by convention but seriously undermines Palestinian society. As a result, assassination provokes violent retaliation and corrodes the basis necessary to renew peace negotiations. Nevertheless, assassination may be defensible as a last resort in some cases. These include tyrannicide, killing a murderous and brutal leader to protect innocent civilians, together with instances of ‘ticking bombs’ – that is, immediate and otherwise unavoidable grievous threats to noncombatants. In each case a modified argument from necessity offers grounds for the defensible, although limited, use of assassination.

Liberal egalitarians should support a right to secession while seeking to discourage secessions. The coherence of these apparently opposed stances depends upon three important distinctions that are under-explored in existing secession literature: between the right to secede and the choiceworthiness of secessions; between moral considerations relevant in advising would-be secessionists and those relevant in advising leaders of existing states; and between the legitimacy of a secession and the means that might be legitimately employed in advancing or resisting it. There is a strong but conditional right to secession rooted in the principle of associational freedom, but there are good reasons usually not to exercise it. Would-be secessionists should normally be advised against secession, but leaders of existing states should be advised to grant secessions that satisfy certain conditions. Only certain means are legitimate in resisting even secessions that fail to satisfy these conditions. If necessary the conditions that secessionists are expected to satisfy should be relaxed, provided relaxation takes place in a morally appropriate sequence.

How can we understand Rousseau's use of entrenched fundamental law? Given that absolute sovereignty is of paramount importance to Rousseau, and given that he rejects the possibility of binding the future, fundamental law might be viewed as a paradoxical restraint on the sovereign. However, through a consideration of their substantive form, and of the procedural mechanisms of enactment and abrogation, these laws are shown to serve an ‘enabling’ purpose. For Rousseau, fundamental law does not constrain the sovereign will, but is constitutive of the sovereign or transforms its operation with respect to morality and justice. Fundamental law should be understood to enhance the capacity of the sovereign; this reading also explains the most familiar limitation that does not take the form of a fundamental law, the double-generality requirement.

This paper returns to J. S. Mill to draw out democratic conceptions of education and equality that challenge still-current conceptions of intractable human inequalities. Mill acknowledges that individuals differ in abilities. Nonetheless, he develops a broad conception of ‘education for freedom’ and insists that only ‘wretched social arrangements’ prevent virtually all people from exercising capacities for self-government in citizenship, marriage, and industry. In the same breath, he qualifies his democratic egalitarianism with reference to a sub-class of working people whose ‘low moral qualities’ leave them unfit for such self-government. Modern liberal states largely dismiss Mill's more radical democratic impulse. Meanwhile, they reiterate and refine his exclusionary one through new practices for constructing and managing inequalities – for example, IQ tests, educational ‘tracking’, and social science categories like the ‘underclass’. I reconsider this divided legacy of Mill's egalitarianism as a basis for rethinking the limits of today's ‘meritocratic’ egalitarianism.

In ‘An Archaeology of Political Discourse?’ I examined the possibility of, and conditions for, rendering Foucault's archaeological method appropriate for ideologico-political analysis. Shane Mulligan takes issue with three aspects of my account, namely, the application of archaeology to the ideological realm, the translation of concepts, and the issue of political subjectivity. The first part of my reply tackles his initial objection and the next addresses the other two criticisms.