Preference-Shaping: An Empirical Test

Abstract

According to Downs, parties are forced to accommodate the preferences of the voters in order to win elections. However, Dunleavy and Ward argue that it is also possible for a party to use preference-shaping strategies to bring the preferences of the voters in line with the party's position. Using structural equation modelling, preference-shaping theory is tested in relation to the effect of sales of council houses and shares in privatised companies on the electorate's attitudes to economic policies under the 1979–92 Conservative governments in Britain. The analyses provide little support for preference-shaping theory, which seems in need of respecification if it is to be maintained.

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