Abstract
Liberal egalitarians should support a right to secession while seeking to discourage secessions. The coherence of these apparently opposed stances depends upon three important distinctions that are under-explored in existing secession literature: between the right to secede and the choiceworthiness of secessions; between moral considerations relevant in advising would-be secessionists and those relevant in advising leaders of existing states; and between the legitimacy of a secession and the means that might be legitimately employed in advancing or resisting it. There is a strong but conditional right to secession rooted in the principle of associational freedom, but there are good reasons usually not to exercise it. Would-be secessionists should normally be advised against secession, but leaders of existing states should be advised to grant secessions that satisfy certain conditions. Only certain means are legitimate in resisting even secessions that fail to satisfy these conditions. If necessary the conditions that secessionists are expected to satisfy should be relaxed, provided relaxation takes place in a morally appropriate sequence.
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