International Studies

This article updates the arguments about the South Asian regional security complex (RSC) given in Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) Regions and Powers (RaP). In terms of the South Asian RSC itself, there have been lots of events, but little in the way of structural change from the analysis in RaP. In terms of South Asia’s regional context, the picture is mixed. In relation to the Gulf, there has been a minimal structural change. However, in relation to East Asia, there are more signs of interaction between the South and East Asian regional security complexes, mainly hinging on the rise of China. This is not yet sufficient to talk of the two having merged, but a wider Asian supercomplex is clearly emergent and becoming stronger. In terms of South Asia’s position in the global system, India’s claim for great power status is now plausible, though the role of the United States in both East and South Asia remains similar. But, the global level itself is probably moving towards a scenario in which a system, containing several great powers and no superpowers, becomes more regionalized. This trend has deep roots, and the key question for India is what balance it wants to establish through its engagement with its own region, the wider East Asian region, and at the global level.

The transition in Afghanistan is manifestly beset by multiple challenges, yet behind obvious issues such as insecurity and corruption lie a range of deeper problems related to the way in which the Afghan political system has developed. Trust deficits, real conflicts of interest, and parallel and potentially conflicting systems of authority, have affected both the mass population—many of whom feel disconnected and disenfranchised—and political elites, which remain severely divided. The combination of a presidential system with a highly centralized formal state structure had fostered patrimonialism at the expense of institutional development. Unless and until these problems are addressed, the likelihood that any Afghan government will be able to take the lead in confronting the country’s problems remains low.

The security sector in Afghanistan has received intense international assistance and the investment of many billions of dollars in the nearly ten years since the fall of the Taliban regime, yet the country is still unable to maintain security and stability. While there are many obstacles to reform in the Afghan context itself, not the least being the present insurgency, the international community has made many mistakes that have prevented success. The police is perhaps more important than the military in peace-building, but it is the weakest of all the security forces. There have been three phases of police reform as the international community has tried to find the best approach, but the one factor that has not changed and is the greatest impediment to reform is the insistence on using a ‘military model’ for changing the police, and to use the police more than the army for fighting the insurgency. Now, there is another plan: to prepare the Afghan national security forces to assume leadership and responsibility for security in the country by 2014. Is this another international failure in the making?