Environmental Values

This paper demonstrates how a Political Economy of Wealth – an analytical framework inspired from Ricardo's and Marx's theories of value – strengthens the analytical force of Socio-Ecological Economics in the context of the controversy over the value of nature. The Political Economy of Wealth helps (1) to overcome some theoretical limitations encountered in Socio-Ecological Economics, (2) to develop a critical perspective on neoclassical theory of environmental values, as well as a new justification of value incommensurability, and (3) to move toward a new research agenda that aims to study interactions between the economy and the environment from a socio-historical perspective.

The creation of new wetlands along rivers as an instrument to mitigate flood risks in times of climate change seduces us to approach the landscape from a ‘managerial’ perspective and threatens a more place-oriented approach. How to provide ecological restoration with a broad cultural context that can help prevent these new landscapes from becoming non-places, devoid of meaning and with no real connection to our habitable world. In this paper, I discuss three possible alternative interpretations of the meaning of places and place attachment in these ‘new nature’ projects, and show how all three imply a different view on human identity and history.

A large part of environmental politics is interested in protecting place authenticity against the ‘disenchanting’ effect produced by the advent of modernity. It adopts a rhetoric of nostalgia by regretting the loss of primeval relations between humans and nature, and endorses an essentialist, foundationalist and exclusivist definition of locality and the locals.

In order to overcome the problematic political consequences of this (widely accepted) classic approach, the paper proposes to differently outline modernity, by adopting a heterogeneous geography standpoint and postmodern hybrid networks theory. As a consequence, place is regarded in terms of heterogeneity, porosity and non-exclusivism; authenticity is reshaped in terms of throwntogetherness; and environmental politics is reconsidered in the structuration of a thing-oriented democracy.

It is sometimes claimed that an ethical relationship with nature is analogous to Aristotelian friendship. Aristotle claims that friends are valuable principally in virtue of providing reflections of ourselves; yet extant accounts of environmental friendship do not explain how nonhuman organisms can satisfy this role. Recent work in neo-Aristotelian metaethics delineates a theory of value that underscores the similarities between the biological evaluations we make of living things and the moral evaluations we make of ourselves. I argue that these similarities help us make sense of the claim that nonhuman organisms can be reflections of ourselves and thus the object of a relationship akin to friendship. I conclude by suggesting that Aristotle's conception of goodwill may be even more appropriate than friendship as a model for a virtuous relationship with nature.

In this paper we make an argument for limiting veterinary expenditure on companion animals. The argument combines two principles: the obligation to give and the self-consciousness requirement. In line with the former, we ought to give money to organisations helping to alleviate preventable suffering and death in developing countries; the latter states that it is only intrinsically wrong to painlessly kill an individual that is self-conscious. Combined, the two principles inform an argument along the following lines: rather than spending inordinate amounts of money on veterinary care when a companion animal is sick or injured, it is better to give the money to an aid organisation and painlessly kill the animal.