The security implications of nanotechnology

Abstract

Although nanotechnology offers much hope, it also has dual-use potential that must be addressed. Past attempts to control chemical and biological weapons are instructive but inadequate.

ALMOST 15 YEARS AGO, ADM. DAVID JEREMIAH, A FORmer acting chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that military applications of nanotechnology—the term for a range of technologies that exploit the often unique properties of matter at size scales generally of 100 nanometers (billionths of a meter) or less in one dimension—”have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power.” 1 The suggestion that nanotechnology will enable a new class of weapons that will alter the geopolitical landscape remains to be realized. Regardless, a number of security puzzles underlying the emergence of nanotechnology have implications for international security, defense policy, and arms control regimes.

A group of experts led by Madeleine Albright recently published their suggestions for a new NATO Strategic Concept, identifying nanotechnology as an area of research to which allies and partners should be “alert for potentially disruptive developments” that could “transform the technological battlefield.” 2 The experts noted that “the most destructive periods of history tend to be those when the means of aggression have gained the upper hand in the art of waging war.” This observation resonates with Admiral Jeremiah's earlier warning about the potential security consequences of one or more nations using nanotechnology for offensive military applications.

Nanotechnology has potential applications across many defensive and offensive weapons areas. It is not a discrete technology; rather, in dealing with matter at the molecular scale, it spans the fields of physics, biology, and chemistry, and it blurs boundaries between electrical engineering and biomedical engineering and virtually all the disciplines in between. The technological barriers to achieving practical technologies from nanoscale building blocks vary significantly depending on application. Some technologies, like targeted drug delivery, have been commercially available for a few years; others, like molecular computing, remain largely in the domain of basic research. Some deployed applications—such as for new propellants and explosives—merely take advantage of the larger surface area afforded by nanomaterials; others, like quantum dots for sensing applications, exploit fundamentally unique properties observed at the nanoscale.

The prospect exists for nanotechnology to generate new weapons and new threats across a number of technical fields and applications. Some will be nano-enabled versions of previous technologies; others may be entirely novel. One area, in particular, is the potential for creation of new chemical and biological weapons or nano-enabled enhancements to current chemical and biological threats. Concurrently, nanotechnology is contributing significantly to the development of new and improved countermeasures against current and emerging chemical and biological threats.

Like the concerns that surrounded other technological advances of the late 20th century, such as synthetic genomics and the cognitive sciences, much of the concern regarding offensive military applications of nanotechnology remains highly speculative. Still, choices can be made today—and policy implemented in the near future—that can maximize the beneficial and minimize the negative effects of nanotechnology on global security. Included in those choices are flexible approaches to nonproliferation and counterproliferation, which are important policy elements to reduce the potential risks posed by emerging technologies. Past methods for other technologies are not adequate to deal with nanotechnology, which is already the subject of broad international research and industrial efforts. Any international regime must be interdisciplinary in focus, cognizant of the multipolar post–Cold War world, and appreciative of the roles of private funders, commercial development, and transnational corporations.

New and unpredicted technologies are emerging at an unprecedented pace around the world. Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique ownership of a piece of new technology is all but impossible. Nanotechnology is a prime example of an enabling and potentially game-changing technology. Today, almost all developed countries are vigorously pursuing nanotechnology developments with well-funded programs in the United States, Japan, China, Russia, Israel, Taiwan, India, Iran, and across Europe. The global nature of this research means that much of the nanotechnology advancement recently achieved, and that is projected for the future, will likely be available to friends and adversaries. Technically robust analysis that is well grounded in historical and strategic implications of prior technologies is needed today more than ever.

Past methods for other technologies are not adequate to deal with nanotechnology, which is already the subject of broad international research and industrial efforts. Any international regime must be interdisciplinary in focus, cognizant of the multipolar post-Cold War world, and appreciative of the roles of private funders, commercial development, and transnational corporations.

Nano investment is big and global. Nanotech research is surging around the world. The United States will invest some $1.6 billion this year in nanotechnology research and development across 25 federal departments, agencies, and offices, coordinated through the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). 3 Since the initiative was launched in 2001, more than $12 billion has been invested in areas ranging from basic research, computing, optics, electronics, alternative energy applications, textiles, new medical treatments and diagnostics, and defensive military applications. Although the scale of U.S. government–funded nanotech research is impressive, the private sector investment is estimated to be three times larger.

Nanotechnology research finds many proponents within the military. The Defense Department investment in nanoscience and nanotechnology aims to discover and exploit the unique phenomena at the nanoscale. Current research and envisioned applications of nanotechnology cut across almost all areas of military interest: electronics; sensors; energy and power, including photovoltaics and solar cells; structural materials; coatings; multi-functional materials; devices; energetics, such as explosives and propellants; detectors; decontamination; and military medicine, including improved delivery of vaccines. In 2008, for the first time in the history of the NNI, the Defense Department funded more nanotechnology research ($375 million, plus an additional $112 million in directed congressional additions) than any other federal agency. Subsequent years have seen a decrease in requests and appropriating of funding for nanoscience and nanotechnology research within Defense.

Approximately half of the funding for nanoscience within Defense is directed toward basic research projects that aim to develop understanding and control of matter at the nanoscale. Roughly 35 percent of the Defense nanoscience investment is in applied research; 15 percent is in advanced technology development. The Defense Department funds both intramural (i.e., Defense laboratories) and extramural projects. Extramural projects include both traditional federal support to universities as well as major defense contractors and small businesses. In addition to core programs of the services, between $12 million and $15 million in funding is specifically directed toward small businesses through Defense's Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer programs, as congressionally mandated.

The Defense Department has in recent years placed more emphasis on manufacturing and environmental, health, and safety aspects of nanotechnology. Along with the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Defense Department is a key partner in the National Nanomanufacturing Network, an alliance of academic, government, and industry partners. Defense has substantially increased funding for manufacturing technology for nanotechnology and nano-enabled materials, devices, and systems, as well as producibility and sustainability of manufacturing processes. In fiscal 2007, the Defense Department's nanotechnology science and technology budget did not include any request for nanomanufacturing; in fiscal 2009, the budget request was $13 million. While small compared to investments in other areas, Defense has consistently invested in research toward understanding the environmental, health, and safety aspects of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. With rare exception, research areas that have not received significant funding are the potential ethical, societal, and strategic political dimensions of nanotechnology, such as the global security questions underlying the security implications surrounding the emergence of nanotechnology.

Washington is not alone in focusing on the world of the very small. Nanotechnology is a product of a globalized world; all industrialized nations, and many developing ones, are pursuing it. Government research funding for nanotechnologies has increased substantially over the last decade, with the European Union and China each investing more than $1 billion per year, up from less than $100 million a decade ago. In 2003–2004, the European Union committed $3.3 billion to nanotechnology and is now estimated to be investing $1.4 billion annually. 4 While officially the European Commission does not fund defense-related research, areas of investment related to sensors and other potential dual-use applications are within investment portfolios. Individual states within the EU have implemented their own nanotechnology initiatives. Germany conducts much of Europe's nanoscience research and provides nearly 40 percent of Europe's nanotechnology funding. 5

In 2001, the Chinese government declared nanotechnology a “critical R&D priority in their Guidance for National Development,” and China initially invested an estimated $300 million to $400 million toward such research. 6 More recent estimates place the Chinese investment in nanotechnology at $1.5 billion–$1.8 billion per year, a figure that exceeds the U.S. investment. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is ranked fourth in the world (behind the University of California–Berkeley, IBM, and MIT) in institutes that focus on nanotechnology. China ranks third in number of publications a year; Chinese scientific publications are prolific and continue to grow. China also held 12 percent of the world's patents as of 2005. 7 These high rankings are indicative of China's dedication to nanotechnology as well as to science and technology; China plans to expand in these industries with the intent of becoming a world leader in nanotechnology R&D.

Nanotechnology is a product of a globalized world; all industrialized nations, and many developing ones, are pursuing it. Government research funding for nanotechnologies has increased substantially over the last decade, with the European Union and China each investing more than $1 billion per year, up from less than $100 million a decade ago.

In April 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced plans to invest almost $1 billion in 2008–2010 as part of Moscow's intensive effort to become a nanotech leader, and in June 2007 Russia established the state corporation Rusnano with $5 billion in initial funding. 8 Japan identified nanotechnology as a main research priority in 2001 and subsequently increased investment to more than $1 billion per year. 9 South Korea and Taiwan also have robust, federally funded nanotechnology programs. 10 Funding numbers on Iran are not readily available, but the country has a nanotechnology strategy that is similar to the U.S. program, including a federal nanotechnology coordinating office. 11

Thinking about nanotech's potential harmful weapons applications. The intersection of nanotechnology and chemical and biological weapons presents at least four broad areas with potential strategic implications. These areas are: (1) nano-enabled delivery methods, (2) novel nanotechnology-based biochemical weapons, (3) nanoparticles and nanomaterials with toxicological or deleterious health properties, and (4) nanotechnology-enabled evasion of medical countermeasures. 12 Included in the first category are traditional agents that may be encapsulated or subject to other nanotechnology-enabled aerosolization, stabilization, or other aspect of weaponization that permits the agent to evade detection or circumvent current physical protective measures, such as personal protective gear-like gas masks. The broad nature of nanoscience and nanotechnology research provides a large knowledge base and a vast number of approaches that could be used for development of novel nanotechnology-based weapons.

Nano-enabled materials and technologies may also be used to evade today's medical countermeasures. Vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics are the current first defense against many biological weapons. Nanotechnology may be used for this application in two different ways. First, nanotechnology can be an enabling tool to develop a weapon that would not be affected by a known countermeasure. Nanotechnology may use inorganic materials to mask biological ones in ways that are beyond the detection capabilities of most systems. Second, nanotechnology could be used to disrupt the immune system through either suppression or overstimulation and prevent it from functioning. Compared to other possibilities, nanotechnology provides a mechanism to introduce, for instance, a bioregulator into cells, which could then cause a cascade of immune responses, among other things. Certain nanoparticles can also trigger an immune response. A weapon developed to disrupt the entire immune system would not require knowledge of what countermeasures are in place. The delivery of interfering RNA for the alteration, activation, or silencing of genes has been tried with limited success using conventional means. Nano-enabled delivery is seen as one possible methodology to overcome that hurdle.

Nano-carriers and capsules can be used to transport molecules across otherwise impermeable cell membranes or the blood-brain barrier. Nano-encapsulated materials can be designed to target certain organ or tissue types. Nano-particles have been designed to bind to cell receptors and enter or release a chemical, protein, piece of DNA or RNA, or other biological material to the cells. It is important to note that unless chemically appended to the exterior surface, in general, the agent itself must also be nano-sized. Many microbes would be too big, but small toxins like ricin or microbe subunits—for example, the lethal factor of B. anthracis—could be encapsulated. The targeted delivery of bioagents with nanoparticles might, in theory, increase the effectiveness and require smaller amounts of the agent than its regular administration. Such techniques could generally allow for the development of more potent bioweapons.

Nano-carrier and encapsulation technologies have already been developed in the pharmaceutical industry for the efficient and targeted delivery of drugs and image contrast agents and are increasingly used in cosmetics, agriculture, food, paint, and other materials applications. Quantities of such nanomaterials produced have risen dramatically in recent years—from gram to ton quantities—and large amounts of some nanomaterials are now available commercially. The price of such materials, which once was a limiting factor, has fallen in parallel to those of oligomers (the short chains of DNA that are used in synthetic biology). Accordingly, the technology is diffusing in industrial quantities across the globe.

A weapon developed to disrupt the entire immune system would not require knowledge of what countermeasures are in place. The delivery of interfering RNA for the alteration, activation, or silencing of genes has been tried with limited success using conventional means. Nano-enabled delivery is seen as one possible methodology to overcome that hurdle.

The science and technology capabilities necessary to realize nanotechnology-enabled threats can be extrapolated from the current state of research. Preventing or inhibiting existing national and global research endeavors is difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, it may be more useful to understand the intended applications as well as their potentially malicious uses to ensure development of appropriate countermeasures. The ability to distinguish defensive nanotechnology efforts from offensive programs is expected to pose a difficult challenge in practice.

Limiting nanotech's potential harmful weapons applications. Limiting the potential negative uses of nanotechnology will, compared to other technologies, require additional or complementary mechanisms. In the case of privately funded research, the level of oversight or transparency is lower compared to that of federally funded research in the United States, in Europe, and in some other public sector–funded work. By comparison, one can look back 35 years ago to the dawn of the transgenic era, in which the Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA led to self-regulation among the scientific community. That group was predominantly composed of molecular biologists and met in 1975 to propose and implement voluntary guidelines to reduce the perceived risks to safety from biotechnology. Given the close community of researchers with tacit knowledge of recombinant DNA techniques, such a situation was possible. The emphasis at the time was very much on biosafety—that is, protecting from accidental release and limiting harm to legitimate researchers. The situation is quite different today—nano-technology is globalized, shared with the private sector, and there is no single technical discipline on which to focus. The design of biological sensors that use de novo single-strand DNA wrapped around carbon nanotubes is an example of two efforts: a joint effort of electrical engineers and computer scientists, and the efforts of a physics and astronomy department research group.

In today's political world, the emphasis is also shared between biosafety and biosecurity. The latter includes policies to limit potential access to agents, materials, or knowledge by individuals who do not have legitimate need or who intend to use such agents, materials, or knowledge for malicious intentions like bioterrorism. Scientists are navigating requirements that include both safety and security. Within the field of chemical and biological defense and homeland security in the United States, a significant fraction of the resources for chemical and biological defense is focused on near-term goals. Although such near-term focus may satisfy immediate needs and metrics, it is unlikely to adequately address an evolving threat or provide revolutionary capabilities. A more comprehensive strategy is to balance revolutionary approaches with near-term solutions and evolutionary improvements to currently deployed systems.

International efforts. The two most relevant international arms control treaties are the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These international agreements apply explicitly to traditional biological and chemical weapons. The CWC extends to nano-enabled weapons with similar purposes. In particular, Article I of the CWC contains a general purpose criterion that prohibits the use, development, production, stockpiling, and transfer of toxic chemicals and their precursors, as well as munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of any chemical agent. The intent of the general purpose criterion was to allow the CWC to remain relevant as new technological developments—which include any nanotechnology-enabled improvements—might arise and, in the case of dual-use chemicals, to exempt application for peaceful purposes from its prohibitions.

Robust international agreements primarily focus on states but also serve to lower the risk of terrorist applications by eliminating legal routes for non-state actors to obtain agents, precursors, or weaponization materials, and by minimizing transfers from state to non-state actors through theft, deception, or other means.

Efforts to strengthen the international regime to control transfers of dual-use materials are also important. International efforts can be compromised by member states of the CWC and the BWC that have not enacted domestic export control legislation and non-member countries with weak export controls. Additionally, the schedules of toxic chemicals and precursors covered by the CWC have not been updated since the treaty entered into force in 1997. The challenge inspection mechanism—the means by which states parties to the CWC can request an investigation of a suspected treaty violation—has not been used. The BWC lacks an inspection regime.

Also important are the export control regimes, such as the Australia Group, through which dual-use items or new materials, such as those related to nanotechnology, can (and have been) be more easily incorporated. Alone, none of these international efforts is adequate in a globalized world.

The United States should consider fostering proactive international scientific cooperation as a means to encourage beneficial use of nanotechnology. One mechanism to accomplish this might involve revisiting and reimaging Cooperative Threat Reduction for the 21 st century, in which a nano-focused program engages not only Russia as partner, but also China, Iran, India, and Pakistan.

A more secure nano-future. Reducing the risk from state-based misuse of nanotechnology for biological or chemical weapons will mean consideration of the highly transnational nature of nanotechnology research and development. Traditional and innovative new approaches to nonproliferation and counterproliferation are important policy elements to reduce the risk of misuse of nanotechnology. Although the United States and the international community are currently attempting to limit the threat of biotechnology, serious discussion and anticipation of the potential future threats of nanotechnology should be initiated now.

Greater engagement by the research community is perennially called for by pundits, policy makers, scientists, and the security community. For example, the report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction recommends that the U.S. intelligence community “work with the Biological Sciences Community” because the “Intelligence Community simply does not have the in-depth technical knowledge about biological weapons that it has about nuclear weapons.” 13 It is unlikely that the intelligence community's expertise on nanotechnology exceeds that of biotechnology. There is also an urgent need for people outside of the experimental research community (including federal and industry program managers) to engage with individuals in the technical security studies community.

The United States should consider fostering proactive international scientific cooperation as a means to encourage beneficial use of nanotechnology. One mechanism to accomplish this might involve revisiting and reimaging Cooperative Threat Reduction for the 21st century, in which a nano-focused program engages not only Russia as partner, but also China, Iran, India, and Pakistan. Revitalizing support for Track 2 diplomacy—between scientists—is another possible avenue. Involvement of private industry at the international level will be crucial. One model could be the regional and global work of the International Council for the Life Sciences, including its efforts with the Organization of the Islamic Conference's Standing Committee on Scientific and Technological Corporation to promote biosecurity in the Muslim research world and in the Middle East. 14

Conclusion. Action is needed to anticipate the threat of nanotechnology for offensive chemical and biological weapons applications. The threat from nanotechnology varies. The required technical knowledge and materials may exceed the capabilities of non-state actors. On the other hand, state-based programs may not face these limitations. The time to develop and establish policy to neutralize potential misuses, whether by states or non-state actors, is now, rather than when such research applications appear inevitable. A better alignment of research priorities and planning guidance for nanotechnology will be needed to innovate and protect against newly emerging and growing threats.

Reducing risks from the misuse of nanotechnology as applied to chemical and biological weapons means recognizing the globalized nature of nanotech research and development. Addressing the threats and opportunities presented by nanotechnology and other emerging technologies will require a strategic vision to foster revolutionary science. To be effective, such a vision will encompass truly multidisciplinary approaches and incorporate comprehensive capability and threat analyses. Improved monitoring, cooperation, and understanding of technical capabilities across the globe will all aid in this effort. Attempts to limit the peaceful, investigatory exploration of science are likely to be detrimental to the interests of international security and economic development.

The ubiquitous nature of nanotechnology—along with biotechnology and information and communications technologies—means its applications are likely to be far reaching. Understanding potential proliferation challenges and threats that may be wielded through application of these technologies is critical. The development of countermeasures to those threats is a national and international security concern, and strong defensive capabilities are also important as a protective measure and as a deterrent. For now, the penultimate limitation is the infancy of the technology, but that restriction will not hold indefinitely. The laws of physics remain the final regulating influence on nanotechnology.