Unblocking the road to zero: US-Russian cooperation on missile defenses

Abstract

Missile defenses have been a source of contention in US-Russian relations since the beginning of the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. Almost every nuclear arms reduction treaty has involved tough negotiations over the extent to which missile defenses would be permitted for each side and this year, the New START treaty ratification process made clear that missile defenses will remain a primary source of contention during future rounds of disarmament negotiations. The US Congress is not willing to accept constraints on missile defense capabilities and the Russians do not want any significant increase in US strategic missile defense capacity. The issue seems zero-sum, but there is a way to move beyond these positions—a way that has been much discussed but, so far, little pursued.

The differences between the two positions can be reconciled through a series of gradual steps leading toward US-Russian cooperation on missile defenses. The brief history of missile defenses presented in this article highlights the urgent need for bilateral cooperation that could build trust that the two nations’ missile defense systems not only would not destabilize the strategic balance, but would serve common purposes. Such missile defense architectures would provide the insurance necessary for both sides to move to very low numbers of nuclear weapons and eventually to zero. In conclusion, the authors offer specific ideas about how tangible progress can be made toward cooperation within a few years.

A brief history of US-Russian views on missile defenses

The first official US-Soviet meeting to explore the possibility of strategic nuclear arms control took place in New Jersey in 1967, when President Lyndon B. Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin met for the Glassboro Summit Conference. Not far into the three-day meeting, the Soviet delegation listened with amazement as US officials explained the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—the theory of deterrence based on mutual fears that one side could annihilate the other—and concluded that missile defenses were therefore destabilizing and should be prohibited (Shaply, 1986). The Soviets were astounded, never had they imagined that defensive weapons could be considered dangerous. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the USSR had emphasized air and missile defenses in its security policies and, in 1967, plans were well underway for a missile defense system (equipped with nuclear warheads) to be deployed around Moscow. The US had also stressed air defenses, such as the Nike system, throughout this same time, but had blown hot and cold on missile defenses. Many American officials were doubtful about the potential of available technologies and concerned that any gain in defensive capabilities could readily be offset by increases in offensive weapons (Pike et al., 1998). Determined to conclude limitations on offensive weapons to bolster the detente with the US, and having preserved their only operational defense system by the terms of the draft treaty, the Soviets accepted the American position that missile defenses were destabilizing. In 1972, along with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreement limiting long-range, offensive weapons, both sides signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The treaty limited each nation to two missile defense sites, each with no more than 100 interceptors, and placed a variety of constraints on ABM radars and the development of new types of defenses.

But in the years after the ABM Treaty was signed, the desirability of defenses remained a contentious political issue in the US. A sizable minority believed that effective defenses were feasible technologically and that the MAD doctrine should be replaced by one that based US security squarely on the assumption that air and missile attacks could be countered effectively (Brennan, 1969). This view, in fact, was further strengthened after the 1981 inauguration of President Ronald Reagan, who was a firm believer in the irrationality of the MAD doctrine and saw effective defenses as essential for realizing his vision of a world without nuclear weapons (Anderson and Anderson, 2009). Reagan’s program to develop advanced, space-based missile defenses, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), frightened Soviet leaders. They feared that effective defenses capable of protecting the US from retaliation might tempt the American government to try and destroy the USSR’s offensive forces in a first strike. This was the mirror image of what some US leaders feared in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1986, at their summit in Reykjavik, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan discussed the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons within 10 years. Reagan agreed, so long as the two sides would be free to test missile defense technologies. He even suggested that the two nations’ laboratories could cooperate in developing missile defenses (Drell and Shultz, 2007). Gorbachev, however, did not believe Reagan’s promise of “open laboratories”—famously saying that he could not trust the United States to share missile defense technology at a time when the US would not even share milking machine technology with the Soviet Union—and, thus, no agreement was concluded (Matlock, 2004).

By the end of the Reagan administration in 1989, it was clear that the missile umbrella promised by the SDI could not be realized and missile defense research was relegated to a lower priority. But two developments revitalized it during President Bill Clinton’s second term. First, although the Soviet threat was mitigated by the end of the Cold War, other nations hostile to the United States, particularly North Korea and Iran, seemed to be making rapid progress toward acquiring both nuclear weapon and missile technologies. ¹ Second, the emergence of “hit-to-kill” technologies and advances in tracking systems rekindled the possibility of effective defenses, at least against the relatively small missile forces that might be deployed by the likes of North Korea (Dao, 2002). Beginning in 1997, defense-oriented members of Congress urged President Clinton to pursue these new technologies, even if it meant withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which limited their development. Following George W. Bush’s succession to the presidency, the US exercised the “supreme national interest” clause, withdrew from the ABM Treaty, and greatly increased missile defense spending. By 2004, the US had begun deploying missile defense interceptors in California and Alaska and was upgrading supporting radars in several other locations. President Bush maintained that these systems were intended for, and only capable of, defense against a very small force of missiles (White House, 2007). At the same time, however, the Bush administration explored a range of more capable defense systems. For example, in 2006 the Bush administration announced joint plans with NATO allies to deploy a third missile defense site in Europe, this time to defend against Iranian missiles (Gordon, 2006). The Russians expressed great alarm at each new development. They cautioned that while the announced US missile defense plans had modest capabilities, Washington was clearly moving toward more capable and more extensive deployments. Russian leaders charged that the US could eventually achieve first-strike capability against Russia, utilizing its robust defenses to ward off any Russian retaliation. Russian analysts stressed that this concern was particularly relevant as the two sides were actively reducing the size of their offensive missile forces (Trenin, 2010).

These Russian charges came as the country’s relationship with the United States was deteriorating badly, beginning with the 1993 invasion of Iraq. Then-Russian President Vladimir Putin found it useful politically to appeal to Russian nationalism, suggesting the US had taken advantage of Russia’s weakness in the 1990s to strengthen its strategic position. He also sought to undermine support in the West for NATO expansion into countries that Russia considered within its sphere of influence. His administration found it advantageous to exaggerate the potential threat posed to Russian offensive forces by emerging US defense capabilities, and to thereby accuse the US of destabilizing the strategic balance. By the end of President Bush’s second term in 2008, the missile defense issue had become a major obstacle to improved US-Russian relations.

When President Barack Obama took office the following year and indicated a desire to “reset” US-Russian relations, beginning with the negotiation of a new START agreement limiting offensive forces, the Russians also made clear their desire to limit defenses. This issue was one of several which delayed completion of the START talks. In the end, however, recognizing that incorporating limits on defenses in the START agreement would not be feasible politically for President Obama, the Russians contented themselves with language in the preamble stating that a relationship existed between defenses and offenses. They also issued a unilateral statement to the effect that they retained the right to withdraw from the treaty if the US deployed significantly improved defensive capabilities. Both sides understand that further steps toward negotiated reductions in offensive forces will not be possible until they have a meeting of minds about missile defenses. ²

Previous efforts to develop cooperative missile defenses

One way to address the recurring conflict over missile defense would be for the two sides to negotiate a new treaty limiting strategic defenses. Given the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies to small nations with aggressive agendas, such a limitation might not be in either country’s interest, however. Iran, for example, might be in a position to threaten both Russia and US allies with nuclear-armed missiles within a few years (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2010). Negotiating a new missile defense treaty would be extremely difficult for any US administration, moreover, as missile defense is such a polarizing issue in American politics. American public opinion strongly supports missile defenses and there are many powerful proponents of missile defense in Congress (Aheran, 2008). For example, the statement in the preamble about a relationship between offenses and defenses and Russia’s unilateral assertion of its right to withdraw because of US defense improvements were the primary reasons cited in the Senate debate during the summer of 2010 for opposing the New START agreement. ³

There is also a technical reason why a new missile defense treaty might not be feasible: It is not evident how limitations on strategic defenses could be defined. Neither country would be willing to place limits on its tactical missile defenses—the systems that protect warships, air bases, and deployed ground forces from both cruise and ballistic missiles. Discriminating between strategic and tactical defenses was difficult enough in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was written. Forty years later, both tactical and strategic defenses can utilize common early warning, targeting, and command and control systems, and the two sides are moving toward interceptors, as well as new types of weapons like lasers, that could conceivably be used in either tactical or strategic roles. A new ABM Treaty is simply a non-starter.

The idea that the US and Russia could cooperate on missile defenses as a way to circumvent these difficult political and technical issues has been around since the 1980s. As noted, President Reagan proposed such cooperation in conjunction with Premier Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapons. During the George H. W. Bush administration, the two nations held talks on the possibility of such cooperation and, by all accounts, made surprising progress. Russian participants, particularly, speak almost nostalgically about the rapid progress that was made in those talks.

The talks were initiated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1992, when he proposed bilateral cooperation on a jointly operated global missile defense system to replace the unilateral American SDI, saying, “We are ready to develop, then create, and jointly operate a global defense system, instead of the SDI system” (Bunn, 1992). Seeing such cooperation as a key element in the emerging friendly relationship with the newly non-communist Russia, the Bush administration developed the proposal into a concept called the Global Protection System (GPS), which was later known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Overall, the idea was to begin by providing an opportunity for interested states to cooperate to enhance the capabilities of their own systems and then to move on to more ambitious joint programs (Hadley, 2010). In principle, as discussed by the two sides, the system would have several components: (i) a jointly manned center that would be fed early warning data from each nation’s systems; (ii) nationally controlled interceptors on each country’s territory; and, even, (iii) a jointly built system of space-based interceptors to deal with shorter range threats, such as the Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia the year before, in 1991.

Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed to establish a bilateral High-Level Working Group to develop the idea further in June 1992. This group met three times and established three working committees: a committee that discussed the GPS concept overall, a committee that investigated avenues for possible technological cooperation, and a committee that focused on non-proliferation.

The High-Level Working Group established that both the US and Russia had a level of interest in developing functional missile defense capabilities and that there certainly were opportunities for cooperation. However, the Russian side was more interested in cooperating on early warning and on theater missile defenses (TMD), which could be deployed to protect specific areas deemed at risk from short-range missile attack. The US already had an effective early warning and tracking system and was more interested in cooperating on the actual deployment of active strategic interceptors. Also, while the US showed interest in TMD systems, it believed it was a greater priority to develop countermeasures against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), simply because geography dictates that the US is more vulnerable to ICBM attacks than to shorter range missiles (Hadley, 2010).

A major sticking point became evident when discussions turned to the ABM Treaty. The talks took place at a time when the US was unwilling to withdraw unilaterally from the Treaty (as it did 10 years later), as it was hoping to develop cordial relations with the newly independent Russia. Instead, the American side proposed amending the Treaty to (i) lift constraints on the testing of ABM systems, and (ii) grant each country the right to deploy national missile defenses at six sites with up to150 interceptors each—a huge increase to the limits in the existing treaty ( Arms Control Today, 1992). The Russian side rejected this proposal, but signaled that they might be open to interpreting the existing ABM Treaty as allowing for a truly internationally controlled missile defense system ( Arms Control Today, 1992). Shortly thereafter, when President Clinton came to office and the US administration turned against defenses again, the working group talks faltered, although discussions of some sort of joint or shared warning system persisted for a time.

The possibility of cooperation on missile defenses was reborn during the final years of the Clinton administration. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin announced a new effort to ease fears of accidental missile launches by creating a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). This was to be a center in Moscow that would be staffed by American and Russian personnel and would receive data feeds from Russian and American sources on worldwide missile launches ( New York Times, 1998). The JDEC was said to have the potential to reduce the likelihood of an event like that in 1995, when a scientific rocket, launched over Norway to study the Northern Lights, was interpreted by some in Moscow as an American nuclear attack requiring a Russian nuclear response. Despite years of discussion during the ensuing George W. Bush administration, the JDEC was never established, ostensibly because of disputes over taxes and liabilities (Baker, 2001; Boese, 2006). In truth, it appears that the tense Russian-American relationship during much of this period and the Russian’s perception that the US was offering the JDEC as a fig leaf to cover an unwillingness to discuss more serious forms of cooperation were the true culprits.

Despite the failure to close the JDEC deal, the Russians renewed proposals for cooperation in missile defenses. In response to the NATO proposal to deploy missile interceptors in Eastern Europe in 2006, then-President Putin offered to cooperate with the US to work toward a joint missile defense system (White House, 2008). Putin even went so far as to say that cooperation on a missile defense system would take bilateral relations to “an entirely new level” (Rutenberg, 2007). However, the US saw the proposal as a ploy to undermine the NATO missile defense system and never took it seriously, just as the Russians understood the proposed NATO system as a first step toward more robust defenses that could threaten their retaliatory capabilities.

Greater progress has been possible within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)—and more accurately, by its Theatre Missile Defence Ad Hoc Working Group, which, since its creation in 2004, has embraced the task of working out the technical details of a cooperative missile defense system (NATO-Russia Council, 2010). It has fleshed out a feasibility study for the interoperability of forces and equipment and held several joint exercises between 2004 and 2008, when NATO cancelled them in response to the Russia-Georgia conflict. Progress has been made on the development of common terminology, joint TMD training, and the completion of interoperability studies. The NRC resumed its meetings in March 2009 and has commenced work on a joint air traffic coordination system that many European countries, as well as the US and Canada, are participating in.

Since 2008, the notion of bilateral US-Russia cooperative missile defenses also has been resuscitated. President Obama cancelled the Bush plan for a European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, replacing it with a phased approach to the defense of Europe against missiles originating in the Middle East. Russian leaders say they find this system less threatening, at least in its early phases. Moscow has even suggested that two of its early warning radars, which are well positioned to cover the Middle East from stations in Azerbaijan and southern Russia, might be integrated into this NATO defense system (Chivers, 2007).

Also, an Arms Control and International Security Working Group of the US-Russian Bilateral Presidential Working Group was created by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in July 2009. One of the issues this group has been tasked with discussing is the possibility of cooperating on missile defense capability and establishing a JDEC. While this working group has met several times at high levels, it has yet to achieve notable results (US-Russia Presidential Commission, 2010; White House, 2009). The lack of progress is probably the result of both sides’ wish to avoid complicating the New START ratification process by raising the possibility of changes in US missile defense plans that could provide fodder to opponents of New START. Serious discussions have yet to begin.

Cooperative missile defenses: An agenda

Once New START is ratified, the US and Russia will turn their attention to the possibility of deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals. Coming to a mutual understanding on defenses will not be the only obstacle to such an agreement, but it is certainly a prerequisite. For this reason alone, discussions of ways to cooperate on missile defenses should be given a high priority by both countries’ leaders.

A recurring hurdle to cooperative missile defense is that new missile defense systems are on the cutting edge of military technology. Some elements of defense systems also involve advanced intelligence and surveillance systems. If only for these reasons, it is difficult to develop multilateral approaches, even among allies. Discussing these technologies will be even harder between two nations that are no longer enemies, but not yet friends. The discussions, therefore, should begin with baby steps, building confidence before tackling more ambitious forms of cooperation. It might also simplify matters if the US and Russia discussed early measures of cooperation bilaterally and then broadened them to include other nations. An illustrative agenda might look something like the following:

Common missile database

The two nations already know a great deal about their respective missiles as a result of the cooperative verification measures incorporated in the START agreement. These data could form the beginning of a shared information system, which could then be extended to the characteristics of other nations’ missiles, such as their range and payload. Given that missiles become highly visible when they are tested, a great deal is known about the characteristics of the world’s missiles in unclassified sources. In its early phases, the common database would be based on such information, as the two nations review the various sources available and reach agreement on which data are most accurate. As new missiles are tested by nations, the two countries could update the database to incorporate additional descriptors of their trajectories, etc.

Shared early warning information

Both nations maintain space-based systems capable of detecting missile launches, although the Russian system provided incomplete coverage in recent years. Identical command centers could be established in Russia and the US and be staffed by officers and technicians of both countries. These centers would receive feeds from the two countries’ early warning systems so that they would have a common picture of missile launches around the globe. They could also receive data from the two nations’ early warning radars; in this regard, Russia might contribute more with its radar than its satellite systems. Alternatively, a single center could be established in one city, as was envisioned for the JDEC. In either case, these shared systems would have no response commitment or capability. Those capabilities would be retained by each country’s own command centers. The cooperative warning center or centers would be intended strictly to ensure that each side had the best information available, so as to avoid miscalculations and unnecessary responses. Presidents Obama and Medvedev have already agreed to establish a center of this type, in effect reviving the stalled JDEC project from the Clinton and Bush years. It is long past time to break the 12-year logjam on this issue.

Common warning systems

In 1997, the US and Russia discussed building and operating two joint warning satellites, called the Russian American Observation Satellite (RAMOS), and signed an agreement to create two satellites to share warnings of missile attacks. The hope was that the system would increase transparency and thus lessen the chance of a catastrophic misunderstanding. The two satellites would be placed in low Earth orbit and observe with infrared, visible, and ultraviolet sensors. The proposed system would also have the capability of observing hurricanes and predicting their paths (Samson, 2007). This concept might be explored again in the future, as a first step toward a common defense from missiles originating in the Middle East—a common threat. This satellite could be placed in an orbit that would help patch the deteriorated Russian early launch warning satellite network. The US would benefit, as the satellite would give the Russians greater confidence in their ability to monitor all missile approaches to their territory continuously and would help reduce the risk of a misinterpreted missile launch. Satellite technology is some of the most highly classified information the US holds, but since the idea of a joint satellite was proposed almost two decades ago, the idea may prove feasible, especially if the cooperative satellite is of rudimentary design.

Complementary defense of Europe and European Russia from missiles originating in the Middle East

These discussions should be held in a working group under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Council. They need not include all NATO members, but should not exclude any that wish to be included. This working group would discuss the Russian proposal to provide data from its early warning radars in Azerbaijan and southern Russia for use by NATO’s planned defenses. Russia would not gain a voice in the operations of the NATO system, but would benefit if missiles originating in the Middle East were aimed at, or strayed toward, Russian territory, and yet were vulnerable to interceptors on US Aegis warships deployed in the Black Sea. NATO would gain additional confidence that it would have timely warning of potentially hostile missile launches. The deployment of US warships in the Black Sea on a continuous or nearly continuous basis would represent a change in Russian policy and signify its seriousness about cooperation in missile defenses.

Coordinated or even common defense from missiles originating in the Middle East

Following achievement of the complementary defense outlined above, the working group should design the architecture of a coordinated, or even common, defense system, and then work to implement it. These talks should be expanded to include other nations, like Ukraine, whose geographic position might prove useful for the location of interceptors or radars. The system could be a modification of NATO’s current plans for the later phases of its adaptive defense to incorporate Russian components, or envision a completely different system, such as the drone interceptors proposed by MIT professor Theodore Postol (2009). It would be possible to design and build such a system only if political relations between NATO and Russia improve significantly; in such a case, it would be reasonable to expect Russia to play a role in the operation of the system as well.

Global defense

At this point, thought should be given to erecting a worldwide missile defense system with the cooperation of all technologically advanced nations wishing to participate. The system would be designed to complement negotiated reductions and eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed missiles (and other nuclear weapons), providing a fail-safe hedge against cheating on such an agreement. Such a system could only be established if it included emerging powers like China and India. Otherwise, it might be perceived as if NATO and Russia were establishing a sort of global condominium. The establishment of such a system would realize Reagan and Gorbachev’s shared dream from 1986: a world free of nuclear weapons along with a reduced threat of missile attacks by rogue states.

Conclusion

The fifth and sixth items on this agenda seem far-fetched at present, but, not so long ago, so did the possibility of the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons pose unacceptable dangers to people in all nations. The longstanding political conflict over missile defenses, a relic of the Cold War, cannot be permitted to hinder progress toward the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals. The US and Russia should begin immediately to discuss small and practical steps toward cooperation in defending against nuclear-armed missiles, setting the stage for the more ambitious common efforts that are necessary components of a nuclear weapon-free world.