Involving the public in nuclear terrorism preparedness: Reflections on the Washington Nuclear Summit

Abstract

The global challenge of nuclear and radiological terrorism demands a global response—and public involvement.

IN APRIL, THE 2010 NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT IN Washington, D.C., was a defining moment in mobilizing the world community toward achieving strong nuclear security as a principal means to preventing nuclear terrorism. Even if terrorists never obtain nuclear weapons, the nuclear power infrastructure represents a potentially attractive target of theft, sabotage, or other malicious acts, given its radiological and chemical content and potential to supply materials for building radiological weapons. Attacks could target fuel production, reactors, waste handling and storage facilities, and reprocessing plants. Given the public's fear of radiation, attacks could lead to panic even if little or no damage was done. With 436 nuclear power reactors currently in operation worldwide, about 40 under construction, and more than 110 in the planning stage, public engagement and preparedness must be increased. Now is the time to assess the role of the public in the overall campaign to strengthen nuclear security, as well as recommend several specific steps to better prepare and involve the public—a goal recognized at least implicitly by the summit.

Radiation and Public Fear. Radiation is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, making it impossible to detect without special instrumentation. Its elusive nature tends to stimulate fear. A worst-case accident at a nuclear power plant holds the theoretical potential to cause death, injury, and widespread contamination, as the 1986 Chernobyl disaster demonstrated. It is no wonder that, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks—which brought the realization that nuclear power plants could be next—the first decade of the twenty-first century saw new commercial campaigns to promote over-the-counter anti-radiation drugs. One of them—a potassium iodide pill released in 2002 under the name “No-Rad”—carried on its box an ominous warning that the threat of nuclear terrorism was now greater than ever. During such incidents, according to the warning, radioactive particles can become airborne or can enter water supplies, “affecting areas as far as 200 miles away, thus putting more than 75% of the U.S. population at risk.”

While the statement is technically true—that is, if all nuclear plants were to simultaneously be stricken by worst-case accidents—this promotional pitch for a conventional remedy for exposure to radioactive iodine (iodine accumulates in the thyroid; if the non-radioactive potassium iodide gets there first, the radioactive iodine can't accumulate and will pass from the body) highlights a dilemma of risk communication. Is it prudent to expose the public to worst-case scenarios and use elements of fear as risk communication strategy? As one expert has put it, it is our own fault that “we contribute to nuclear terror ourselves through our own deep-rooted anxieties…. We are addicted to public discussion of every imaginable vulnerability…. Our politicians mobilize public support through dire warnings; they assault our sensibilities with relentless messages of fear.” 1

Such fears can be exacerbated by ambiguity, hype, and miscommunication. Consider the events of November 2004 in the Saratov region of Russia, when, in the absence of any official reports, the news media used unverified and inaccurate information from a personal website about a minor accident at the Balakovo Nuclear Power Plant. Hundreds of local residents rushed to local drug stores and cleared the shelves of iodine. Emergency officials and nuclear authorities offered little information, however, on how to correctly use the drug. As a result, about a dozen people suffered overdoses; all recovered.

Given this alarming public reaction to a minor accident, what would be the impact of a real or perceived act of nuclear terrorism? The accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are well documented, but major security breaches that could provide such information have not happened. However, here is what we can reasonably expect. First, terrorist attacks are criminal acts, and, until the perpetrators are apprehended, the public will likely be in a state of fear and tension. Second, terrorist attacks have the potential to increase significantly the impact of an accident by disabling routine safety features. Perpetrators might take advantage of vulnerabilities of the safety systems that were engineered to prevent accidents, not malicious acts. Third, terrorists not only have the ability to change tactics as an attack unfolds, but also to conduct concurrent and multiple attacks. These complicating factors require clearly defined and effectively maintained partnerships among all stakeholders, including the public. Rather than being driven by fear into the position of a helpless bystander, the public must play a supporting role in ensuring nuclear security, especially as the nuclear sector continues to expand its presence across the globe.

Rather than being driven by fear into the position of a helpless bystander, the public must play a supporting role in ensuring nuclear security, especially as the nuclear sector continues to expand its presence across the globe.

The Public: A Diverse Stakeholder. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit emphasized the human dimension as a critical contributing factor to better nuclear security. Its work plan urged the 47 participating states to promote cooperation among “international organizations, governments, industries, academia and other stakeholders.” However, the summit provided little specific guidance for the public's meaningful involvement; hopefully, the summit planned for 2012, to be hosted by South Korea, will be more explicit. Meanwhile, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which came into force in July 2007, provides a solid if implicit international legal basis to treat the public as a stakeholder, because it spells out the impact of attacks on the public. Under this convention, an offense is defined as an act that targets “a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material” with the intent to cause death, serious bodily injury, substantial damage to property, or substantial damage to the environment.

Public stakeholders include:

1. Nongovernmental and academic communities. These communities are in a position to offer their expertise and resources to focus government and industry efforts on the issues of improving security at nuclear facilities and managing the risk of nuclear terrorism. They enjoy the trust of the public at large and exert influence on public opinion. One example is the Fissile Materials Working Group, which was established in 2009, involves more than a dozen U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations, and has a mandate to shape the agenda of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. The group successfully held its own parallel summit prior to the official event to promote its goals and disseminate relevant information through the media.

2. Grassroots organizations. These organizations can lobby for their countries' effective participation in international agreements and arrangements, such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which includes 81 nations developing nuclear security principles. Such organizations can also advocate speedy ratification of international instruments by national governments.

3. Religious organizations. These groups occupy a high moral ground to condemn nuclear terrorism and can help local communities prepare for incidents. In addition, they can reduce the immediate and long-term physical and psychological impact of a terrorist incident. A good example is the World Council of Churches, which speaks on behalf of more than 300 member churches worldwide and is on record qualifying nuclear terrorism as a crime against humanity to be condemned on ethical and theological grounds.

4. The independent media. The media play a vital role in keeping the public informed and have the responsibility to communicate accurate and verifiable information. Terrorists will attempt to use the media to influence a population, so members of the media must perform a careful balancing act between providing news about the terrorists and educating the public about actual safety hazards. These roles will intensify during an attack, when warnings and civil notice must be disseminated quickly. 2

Public Involvement. To communicate effectively about security-related issues, government officials and nuclear facility operators must understand and respect the public's very real worries about radiological safety and security. The public understands and is largely concerned that terrorists may be intent on breaching the safety features built into nuclear installations. The public typically questions whether security systems are adequate and develops an active interest in making security robust enough to keep safety features reliably operational. Accordingly, meaningful risk communication strategy and follow-up interrelated actions can pursue several distinct objectives.

1. Educate the public about risk and preparedness. Members of the public tend to base their views of risk on personal experience, but few individuals have experienced anything that can provide meaningful guidance in reacting to nuclear terrorism. Experts treat risk as synonymous with probability of harm, but their criteria are often misunderstood by laypersons.

   Inspiring public support requires a realistic portrayal of risk that is accurate and strikes a balance between hyping the threat to spur people to action and trivializing it to provide reassurances. Preparedness provides a way for the public to translate risk awareness into action. Preparedness can consist of a range of activities, including developing and practicing contingency plans, such as communication, evacuation, or sheltering. Preparedness serves as a bridge between risk education in advance of an event and taking protective actions during a crisis.

   Further complicating the job of preparing the public is the fact that much (if not all) of the information available to the general public is also available to potential terrorists. Terrorists may actually use information about preparedness programs (including risk assessments and response capabilities) to help decide which segments of the infrastructure are most vulnerable and to maximize the impact of an attack. This dynamic adds to the complexity of risk communication. Government and industry must understand the tradeoffs in deciding what types of information should be made available and in what detail. To this end, the International Atomic Energy Agency should consider the development of a guide on public sharing of nuclear-related information as part of the agency's Nuclear Security Series. Such a guide could provide a much-needed balance between confidentiality and transparency.

   Inspiring public support requires a realistic portrayal of risk that is accurate and strikes a balance between hyping the threat to spur people to action and trivializing it to provide reassurances.

2. Encourage a well-informed and well-motivated public to contribute to a healthy nuclear security culture. One striking feature of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington was its emphasis on the human element as a critical contributing factor to better nuclear security. Its communiqué acknowledged the need to promote a security culture through technology development, education, and training. The summit work plan is replete with references to culture as a major guiding principle for technical experts, nuclear operators, architect/engineering firms, technology exporters, and other stakeholders.

   But the public, too, plays a supporting role. It is important to understand that most members of the workforce at a nuclear plant are part of the community adjacent to the site. They have families there and socialize with local citizens on a regular basis. Hence, a strong commitment to nuclear security on the part of the local community heightens the public visibility of security-related issues, indirectly improving the motivation of the staff that operates that site.

3. Develop public vigilance and encourage citizens to cooperate more closely with law enforcement. There have been several ongoing projects in the United States and elsewhere that can serve as models. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department has been successfully implementing iWatch, its community-involved counterterrorism campaign. It offers members of the public a course in the types of activity the department deems suspicious and encourages people to report questionable incidents. In June 2010, city and community leaders announced the expansion of the campaign into the Los Angeles Airport with fliers and posters alerting travelers to the program. 3

   In the nuclear field, this vigilance will manifest itself in reports of unauthorized efforts to gain access to sensitive infrastructure sites. An engaged public will report suspicious people or activities near the site; for example, this is a practice already routinely encouraged by India's law enforcement agents in the communities located close to nuclear power plants. In Russia's Rostov region, which is adjacent to the terrorism-prone Caucasus, local authorities rely on semi-military Cossack detachments to provide additional protection to the Volga-Don Nuclear Power Plant. In other countries, a small portion of local citizens could be trained to perform such functions on a voluntary basis, particularly in sparsely populated and difficult to monitor areas.

   To be sure, such programs need to avoid encouraging vigilante-style responses by members of the public who might otherwise rush to the scene of a terrorist incident and attempt counterterrorist actions. Still, there is a niche for a security-conscious public to fill. Training of local citizens, if deemed necessary, must be a well-scrutinized, stably funded, and widely publicized campaign.

4. Reduce the immediate and long-term physical and psychological impact of a terrorist incident by warding off panic, boosting morale, maintaining credibility, and providing guidance. This is especially important while counterterrorist actions are under way or other terrorist acts are likely. These postincident arrangements consist of steps that individuals and communities can take to save lives and to reduce losses. The ultimate test is their effectiveness in a real crisis when traditional societal institutions unravel, as occurred in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Such actions include different forms of sheltering, evacuation, and quarantine, as well as using individual protective equipment and medical countermeasures.

   Several segments of the population may experience more serious psychological effects from nuclear terrorism than others. 4 They include children, pregnant women, elderly people, and others. For ethnic minorities, the psychological response to terrorism is not only individually based, but also influenced by poverty and latent racism. These ethno-cultural realities may play major roles in how minority citizens perceive and respond to terrorist attacks—especially if impacts are felt in lower-income neighborhoods nearest a targeted industrial site. Similarly, the majority of communities may perceive an attack differently when the victims—or the participants—are illegal immigrants or members of minority groups. Blaming and creating scapegoats of particular groups, which may occur during the aftermath of any mass victimization, including a radiological event, can undermine a community's integrity and its capacity to control the situation and care for its members.

5. Integrate nuclear terrorism into comprehensive community disaster response plans. Despite the obvious and important differences between different kinds of terrorism, all require similar measures at the community level throughout the prevention, preparedness, emergency response, and post-disaster periods. Community education and training, resilience building, vulnerability and risk assessment, communication, and hazard-control mechanisms are common. Including nuclear terrorism in this aggregate model can carry benefits including placing radiation and the fears associated with it on the same level as dangers that are equally life-threatening but more easily intelligible.

6. Maintain effective lines of communication with victims' groups that are often formed in the aftermath of major disasters. Victims groups arose in the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. They are also found in many other countries that have experienced domestic terrorism, including Israel and Ireland. These groups strategically package their goals and agenda in order to gain access to the media, government, and lawmakers and use changes in policies and laws to prevent attacks from recurring. Though numerically small, these groups exert considerable clout. In the United States, they were remarkably successful in pressuring the U.S. Congress to establish a commission to investigate the 9/11 attacks, getting the White House to approve it, and then ensuring that the commission's most important recommendations were enacted into law. 5

Conclusion. We must create a more knowledgeable, proactive, and resilient population in the face of terrorist adversaries. The vast majority of Americans rated terrorism in a May 2010 Gallup poll as the most serious threat to the well-being of the United States (40 percent—extremely serious; 39 percent—very serious; 21 percent—somewhat serious). This recognition creates a favorable environment several segments of the population may experience more serious psychological effects from nuclear terrorism than others. they include children, pregnant women, elderly people, and others. For ethnic minorities, the psychological response to terrorism is not only individually based, but also influenced by poverty and latent racism. for getting the public involved in better structured and more comprehensive efforts to prevent and resist nuclear terrorism.

While a large swath of the public may not pay much attention or retain the information, some people will. This core group could then influence the behavioral and psychological response of others—at home, in the office, or at school—making it worthwhile to invest time and resources in educating the public. A resilient citizenry will be more than bystanders in the effort to deal with terrorist acts and less prone to fear and anxiety before and during crisis situations. 6 Resilience building and other public-related campaigns, however, cost time and money, and they have to be sustainable over the long term. This approach is consistent with the U.N. International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, which aims to “enable all communities to become resilient to the effects of natural hazards, technological and environmental disasters.”

The global challenge of nuclear and radiological terrorism demands a global response. This must include the involvement of civic society to develop public resilience, preparedness, and participation to help deny terrorists their goals. A more empowered and awakened citizenry can contribute to an effective campaign against nuclear terrorism. The public must no longer be looked upon only as potential attack victims or panicked masses, but rather as a vital contributing factor for better nuclear security.