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Abstract

A historical perspective reveals some unanticipated possibilities for the next 20 years

MANY NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD THAT LACK A nuclear power capacity have declared themselves interested in pursuing nuclear energy; in fact, the tally of such nations often surpasses 50. Though this is only a part of what is often referred to as the “nuclear renaissance,” it is one worth scrutinizing. How many of these states will actually come close to achieving the level of nuclear power capacity that they currently plan? To answer this, it is useful to look beyond plans, which mostly are provided by governments, as they do not necessarily comport with reality. Analysts Bernard Gourley and Adam N. Stulberg recognized this when several case studies led them to conclude that, “of the more than 40-plus countries that have expressed an interest in obtaining nuclear energy, only a few have the odds in their favor.” 1

To explore this question even more deeply, an empirical model offered a chance to look forward to 2030. 2 The model's projections were compared to a state's current nuclear power plans, as represented by estimates determined from data provided by the World Nuclear Association (WNA). 3 This comparison offered a way to identify those individual states whose nuclear plans warrant closer inspection, and may be helpful in understanding the finer points of determining factors associated with nuclear energy programs possibly expanding to new countries.

The empirical model revealed some basis for skepticism about the nuclear renaissance, and also suggested several factors that might have a significant impact, in some way, on how it might unfold:

Aspiring nuclear power states, especially those from the developing world, may be significantly influenced by their perception of the reliability of nuclear assistance from the existing nuclear power states.

In the future, small- and medium-sized reactors may be more attractive to some of the aspirant states than the large plants that are common today.

Nuclear power states that say they intend to shut down their reactors may decide otherwise.

There is some indication that in the future poorer states might find more of an interest in nuclear energy than in the past, while wealthier states might find less of an interest.

Nuclear aspirations and assurances. In order to obtain a sense of the comparison between plans and projections, it is useful to consider a limited number of states that do not currently have nuclear power but are considered as reasonable candidates. For this purpose, 23 such states were considered. They were the 14 nations—Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Poland, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Vietnam—that the WNA lists as having “future reactors envisaged in specific plans and proposals and expected to be operating by 2030,” and nine additional such states: Algeria, Australia, Chile, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Philippines, Venezuela, and Yemen. 4 For the sake of completeness, 86 countries—31 of which are current nuclear power states—were also studied, thereby providing a broader context from which to view how the totality of the nuclear renaissance might unfold.

As Gourley and Stulberg noted, most of the countries that were early to obtain a nuclear energy capacity “were either high-income democratic countries with market economies or Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact members.” 5 The empirical model showed a significant correlation between the “nuclear reliance” (the fraction of electricity generated from nuclear energy) of a state and its status as either a democracy or a historic ally of one of the permanent five (P-5) members of the U.N. Security Council. It is a reasonable presumption that this correlation reflects the high degree of encouragement such states believe they have, relative to the access to nuclear materials and technology most readily available through one of the P-5 member states.

In projecting historical trends to 2030, it is unclear whether this encouragement will continue to be similarly selective or extended to a larger group of states (e.g., all states deemed to be in compliance with the nonproliferation requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).

To consider the future of the nuclear renaissance within the aforementioned 23 aspirant countries, two scenarios were considered: one in which P-5 members continue to provide a state with the same encouragement it had in the past to develop a nuclear power program (“selective encouragement”); and one in which P-5 members encourage all states to receive the same benefits (as their historic allies) in developing nuclear energy (“universal encouragement”).

Though the Philippines has been assessed as an “attractive candidate for a nuclear energy program,” public support for nuclear power is uncertain there, where the failed Bataan Nuclear Power Plant became a major national liability; after 10 years of construction, amounting to a $2.3 billion price tag, political and public pressures put an end to the project in 1986.

Those who will and those who won't. Though governments and industry can formulate nuclear plans, the question considered here is the degree to which a particular state's nuclear energy plans, as reported by WNA, match the projections of the empirical model. If a state's plans are similar to the projection (i.e., they agree well), a state is likely to follow through on its nuclear energy plans. Plans that greatly exceed the projections may be difficult to achieve; and plans that fall far short of the projection may encounter pressures from within the state to pursue nuclear energy.

Right-sized plans. Under either of the scenarios regarding encouragement, 17 of the aforementioned 23 states—74 percent—had plans that agreed well with the capability as quantified by the appropriate projections. 6 For example: Australia has no plans for nuclear power by 2030 and is projected to have no such power by that time, under either of the two scenarios considered. For a less trivial example, Italy plans a 2030 nuclear capacity equivalent to seventeen 1,000 megawatt-electric (MWe) nuclear power plants, while it is projected to have the equivalent of ten such plants; this is considered to be good agreement between projection and plans. For both of these examples the projection is independent of the particular scenario, because these two countries presumably are assured access to nuclear materials and technology under either. Algeria is an example of a state having plans that agree well with both the WNA data and Gourley and Stulberg's findings in that it currently plans no nuclear power plants by 2030. However, the projections differ for the two scenarios concerning P-5 states' encouragement: Without any encouragement, it is unlikely Algeria will plan nuclear power plants; with encouragement, the country is likely to have one such plant by 2030.

Potential overachievers. Under the scenario of selective encouragement, the comparison revealed five states (Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand, UAE, and Vietnam) having nuclear plans that significantly exceed the corresponding projection. 7 For example, Thailand plans the equivalent of six 1,000 MWe plants, whereas it projects—without encouragement—to about two such plants. But under the scenario of universal encouragement, only two of the 23 states—UAE and Vietnam—have plans that significantly exceed the corresponding projection. Even with assured access to international nuclear materials and technology, these states are projected to have the capacity equivalent of approximately one such nuclear power plant by 2030, which is significantly short of their extremely ambitious nuclear plans—to build the capacity equivalent of twenty and ten 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants before 2030, respectively.

Potential underachievers. Under the scenario of selective encouragement, only one state—the Philippines—plans to have significantly less nuclear capacity (zero) by 2030 than its projected capability (more than two). Though the Philippines has been assessed as an “attractive candidate for a nuclear energy program,” public support for nuclear power is uncertain there, where the failed Bataan Nuclear Power Plant became a major national liability; after 10 years of construction, amounting to a $2.3 billion price tag, political and public pressures put an end to the project in 1986. 8 Despite this, the plant has recently been considered for rehabilitation. Should universal encouragement prevail, then three additional states—Iran, Malaysia, and Venezuela—would be added to this list. For these states, the lack of planning to pursue nuclear energy might signal either innate conservatism or a degree of uncertainty regarding the support they might expect from the nuclear-developed states. Under the current circumstances, it seems unlikely that Iran would expect further significant international nuclear assistance. Malaysia has moved slowly toward a nuclear energy program and in May 2010 announced its intent to build a nuclear power plant by 2021. Venezuela, for its part, has reportedly been “seeking Russia's help to develop nuclear energy.” 9

Extreme underachievers and overachievers?. The empirical model is based on a data base of national characteristics for the states deemed most likely candidates for nuclear power—that is, 86 states that, in 2006, either had a population of more than 20 million people or a gross domestic product (GDP) above $20 billion. 10 (These 86 countries include all 31, save for Armenia, that currently have nuclear power.) Within this broader pool of “nuclear candidate” states, a handful were identified as having “extremely weak” plans relative to their projections under the scenario of universal encouragement. 11 Those states were the Netherlands, Norway, Malaysia, Belgium, Germany, and Spain. The first two have little or no nuclear capacity and currently officially intend to maintain that. 12

Malaysia has been discussed above. The three remaining states currently have a significant nuclear capacity but officially plan to reduce that capacity drastically by 2030—even to eliminate it entirely. These plans are in contrast to those in many other countries, including the United States, where the lifetimes of larger nuclear reactors are being considered for extensions of a decade or more beyond what was originally envisioned. If such extensions were to occur in Belgium, Germany, and Spain, thereby keeping their 2030 nuclear capacities equal to their current capacities, then those capacities would be much closer to their values as projected. This suggests that these states might encounter considerable internal resistance in executing their plans to shut down the bulk of their operating nuclear power plants and could back out of their commitments to do so.

The intensity of aspirant states' nuclear plans may hinge, perhaps crucially in some cases, upon whether they believe the nuclear-developed states will allow them access to nuclear materials and support. The developed states, especially the united States, seem of two minds regarding such encouragement.

And in fact, that seems to be what is happening. In late 2009 in Belgium, “a commission recommended a 10-year life extension for three of the oldest nuclear power reactors, to 2025, and a 20-year life extension for the other four.” 13 Somewhat similarly, after Germany's last election, it “abandoned a commitment to setting a time limit of 2021 for phasing out nuclear power.” 14 Even in Spain there have been reports of government willingness “to talk on extending the life span of nuclear power plants beyond 40 years.” The model considers societal pressures, such as those above; these reports indicate that such pressures have some effect on a country's future with nuclear power.

Making sense of nuclear encouragement. The intensity of aspirant states' nuclear plans may hinge, perhaps crucially in some cases, upon whether they believe the nuclear-developed states will allow them access to nuclear materials and support. The developed states, especially the United States, seem of two minds regarding such encouragement. There is the viewpoint, especially prevalent among those primarily concerned with proliferation of nuclear weapons, that the more widespread the use of civil nuclear energy, the greater the risk that the associated materials will be acquired by non-state actors, or that the associated technological know-how ultimately will be employed, at least by some states, to develop nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, proponents of nuclear power are more likely to focus on the contention that the United States cannot, except perhaps in a few isolated cases (e.g., Cuba), unilaterally deny states access to civil nuclear energy. Realistically, the United States has two choices: Assist in access and have a positive influence, or deny access and risk driving states to seek nuclear weapons in order to protect and defend their perceived right to nuclear energy.

A shift in reactor preferences. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that “there is continuing interest in Member States in the development and application of small and medium sized reactors.” 15 The data support this statement: Among the broader 86-state data base of nuclear candidates, projections that consider both selective and universal P-5 encouragement indicated that 38 states that currently do not have nuclear power plants have some projected nuclear capacity by 2030—but less than that provided by a 1,000 MWe nuclear power plant. 16 Such states appear to be reasonable candidates for small (less than 300 MWe) or medium (300–700 MWe) plants.

Furthermore, the number of states that might be viable candidates for small- and medium-sized reactors is significantly greater under the scenario of universal encouragement than otherwise (29 versus 19). This suggests that encouraging access to the international market for nuclear materials and technology could significantly enhance the market for small- and medium-sized reactors.

There are significant challenges in providing small- and medium-sized reactors to meet this apparent need. The first is overcoming the “economy of scale” (lower capital cost for megawatts per unit for plants of larger capacity) consideration that has historically provided the motivation for the evolution toward nuclear power plants of larger capacity. For smaller reactors, the corresponding “diseconomy of downscaling” (higher capital cost per megawatt for smaller-capacity plants) must be overcome to be economically competitive (to both larger reactors and non-nuclear technologies). Innovative plant designs have been proposed, but whether these will provide economically competitive downscaling is unknown. 17 One oft-suggested approach is to mass-produce smaller units; however, it is not clear that the number of potential international customer states alone would adequately support mass production. 18

Due to the inherently dual-use nature of nuclear energy, proliferation worries are likely to weigh heavily in the degree of assurance that nuclear-developed states give to aspiring nuclear energy states. Novel proliferation-resistant designs of small- or medium-sized reactors have been developed, at least at the conceptual level, but more needs to be done. 19 Nuclear-developed countries would likely give a greater degree of assurance to nuclear aspirants if proliferation-resistant technologies were readily available.

Rich state, poor state, nuclear power state. There are reasons to expect that nuclear reliance increases with measures of national wealth; therefore, it was somewhat surprising that such metrics (e.g., GDP, per capita GDP) were found to be statistically insignificant in the empirical model on which the projections were based.

As previously mentioned, six states (Belgium, Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, and Spain) were identified as having “extremely weak” nuclear plans relative to projections of their capability (with P-5 encouragement) for nuclear power programs. These states tend to be relatively wealthy (although Malaysia is an outlier). 20 Five states (India, Pakistan, UAE, Ukraine, and Vietnam) were identified as similarly having “extremely strong” nuclear power plans, even relative to their projected nuclear power capacity, with P-5 encouragement. 21 In sharp contrast to the states having extremely weak plans, these states tend to be relatively poor (with the UAE as an outlier). 22

With the exception of Malaysia, all states displaying “extremely weak” plans had 2006 per capita GDPs (based on purchasing power parity) in the upper 25 percent of the 86 countries considered. Similarly, with the exception of the UAE, all states (among the 86) displaying “extremely strong” plans had respective per capita GDPs below the 50 percent level; with the additional exception of Ukraine, all are in the bottom 25 percent. (The nuclear energy plans of the UAE are by any account extremely aggressive, and it is possible that Ukraine has an exceptionally strong motivation to pursue nuclear energy because of its dependence on Russian natural gas.) 23

These data suggest a noteworthy relationship between wealth and the pursuit of nuclear energy programs: Very wealthy states seem to tend to employ their wealth to avoid relying on nuclear energy; for example, Norway, with a 2006 per capita GDP of $38,450, has no nuclear power reactors, and the estimated plans based on WNA data suggest that will continue through 2030. On the other hand, less wealthy (but not extremely poor) states tend to pursue nuclear energy, perhaps as a strategy to improve their circumstances. For example, Pakistan, with a 2006 per capita GDP of $2,230, is estimated to plan the equivalent of approximately three 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants by 2030, as contrasted to a projection of zero, even with P-5 encouragement. Very poor states cannot yet afford nuclear energy at all, even though that might change if economically competitive small reactors became available.

The take-away. As we look toward 2030, the nuclear plans of most states agree relatively well with projections based on historical trends, provided those projections are adapted to the encouragement and technical assistance that might be expected from the international community. There are a few exceptions, however, concerning those states whose aggressive plans exceed the projections—and also those whose plans are less aggressive. The former tend to be developing countries, and the latter tend to be well developed. There also is a sizable group of states not presently planning a nuclear capacity by 2030, but that project to possibly do so if reactors smaller than the present 1,000 MWe plants become economically viable.

As demonstrated, government-speak does not account for the surprises that historical trends can illuminate. It is prudent for policy makers and industry leaders alike to understand these historical trends—and sometimes surprising scenarios—to move forward. If the nuclear renaissance is indeed a race, it may yet be that some of the current hares with robust nuclear energy plans will falter and be exceeded by tortoises with a current nominal low level of nuclear intent.

Footnotes

Bernard Gourley and Adam N. Stulberg, “Nuclear Energy Development: Assessing Aspirant Countries,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, vol. 65, no. 6, p. 20–29.

For the empirical model, see Paul Nelson and Christopher Sprecher, “Are Sensitive Technologies Enablers of Civil Nuclear Power? An Empirical Study,” Atoms for Peace, vol. 3, no. 2 (2010), pp. 93–112. Extended quantitative discussions and methodological descriptions are available in Paul Nelson, “An Empirical Assessment of Elements of the Future of Civil Nuclear Energy,” Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute, Texas A&M University, Report No. NSSPI-10–001, January 4, 2010, available at .

Estimates of the net nuclear intent of states for 2030 were generated as follows: The baseline was taken as World Nuclear Association data (for 2008, from WNA, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements,” December 1, 2009, available at ) for nuclear electricity generation. These data were denominated in “nominal nuclear power plants” (NNPPs) = equivalent electrical production from 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants operating at 80 percent capacity factor. The WNA data on plants under construction, planned, and proposed were then similarly converted into NNPPs by applying an assumed 80 percent capacity factor to the reported capacities. The corresponding sums for a given state were then added to the 2008 baseline. Finally, anticipated plant closures by 2030 were similarly converted to an equivalent in NNPPs and subtracted. The result, in NNPPs, was taken as the estimated net nuclear intent of the corresponding state for 2030. The resulting figures are given, for the 23-state sample introduced below, in Table 1 of Nelson, “An Empirical Assessment of Elements of the Future of Civil Nuclear Energy,” p. 3.

The list of 14 countries with “future reactors” is from WNA, “World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements.” Several states of some interest (e.g., Albania, Armenia, Jordan, Mongolia, and Namibia) are omitted from the additional states because of unavailability of data required to apply the empirical model.

Gourley and Stulberg, “Nuclear Energy Development,” p. 20.

“Good” agreement was taken as within either 50 percent or the capacity equivalent of two 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants.

Precisely, “significantly exceed” means the plans exceed the projection by more than both 50 percent and the capacity equivalent of two or more 1,000 nuclear power plants. Gourley and Stulberg judge all of these five states as likely to be successful in establishing a civil nuclear program. My results do not disagree with that per se, but they do suggest this success might be strongly contingent on encouragement from currently nuclear-capable states.

The assessment as an “attractive candidate” is from Gourley and Stulberg, “Nuclear Energy Development.”

Tim Padgett, “Chávez to Iran: How About Some Uranium?” Time, October 8, 2009, available at .

Afghanistan and Uganda, though qualifying under the GDP criterion, were omitted because some of the required data were not readily available.

“Extremely weak”: planned nuclear reliances less than projections (under the scenario of universal assurance) by more than both 75 percent and the capacity equivalent of three or more 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants.

At the time the empirical model was first developed, Italy would have been included with Netherlands and Norway.

Sonal Patel, “Belgium, Germany Edge toward Nuclear Future,” Power, December 1, 2009, available at .

Ibid.

“Common Technologies and Issues for Small and Medium Sized Reactors,” IAEA, Nuclear Power Technology Development, available at . The IAEA classifies “small” reactors as having capacity less than 300 MWe and “medium” reactors as having a 300–700 MWe capacity.

These states were Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa, Croatia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, North Korea, Peru, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Yemen. Here boldface type indicates states projected by the projection with selective encouragement to have a nuclear capacity of less than 1,000 MWe; italics correspond to states similarly estimated only by the projection with universal encouragement, and Roman font indicates states estimated by both projections. Only 13 of these states are among the 23 states more or less explicitly aspiring to nuclear energy considered in the preceding section. This suggests existence of a potentially significant latent market for nuclear energy.

For details underlying much of this discussion see Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Small and Medium Sized Reactors: Development Status and Deployment Potential/IAEA Activities in Support of SMR Development and Deployment,” IAEA, September 30, 2008, available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Downloads/files/SMRs_GC52Briefing.pdf. For an extensive list of small reactor designs see WNA, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors,” February 26, 2010, available at .

For example see Akio Minato and Neil W. Brown, “Business Opportunities for Small Reactors-A Collaborative Study by CRIEPI and LLNL,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Report No. UCRL-TR-216546, September 22, 2005.

Ibid. For an extensive list of small reactor designs, some of which focus on proliferation resistance as a design feature, see WNA, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors.”

Wealth in this case is measured by 2006 per capita gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (GDP_ppp). The mean GDP_ppp among these six states was $27,488, as compared with a maximum of $39,640 and a third quartile value of $24,882. GDP_ppp would have been even higher among the states displaying extremely weak intent, except for the effect of Malaysia as an extreme outlier on the low side; Malaysia had a GDP_ppp of $10,280, compared to the next-lowest value of $25,050 (Spain) among these six states.

“Extremely strong”: planned nuclear reliances more than projections (under the scenario of universal assurance) by more than both 75 percent and the capacity equivalent of three or more 1,000 MWe nuclear power plants.

The mean GDP_ppp of these states was $7,614, as compared to median, first quartile, and smallest values of $9,140; $4,235; and $670 (Tanzania), respectively. The mean value would have been even lower, except for the presence of the UAE as an extreme outlier on the high side. The UAE had a GDP_ppp of $24,060, as compared with $6,390 for Ukraine, the next largest among the five states showing extremely ambitious plans to develop nuclear energy.

For a broader view of the UAE's ambitious energy program see Christopher M. Davidson, Abu Dhabi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), especially ch. 4. On Ukraine's energy dependence see Don Wolcott and Michael J. Economides, “Gazprom—Gas Company or Russia's Battering Ram?” Global Politician, December 19, 2009, available at .

Reassessing the nuclear renaissance

Abstract

Footnotes