The North Korea-Myanmar Relationship: A Historical Perspective

Abstract

While interest in the friendship between North Korea and Myanmar has intensified in recent months, theirs is a partnership that dates back to the early 1960s.

In the last several months, a lot of attention has been given to the relationship between North Korea and Myanmar–especially among U.S. officials–and whether or not Pyongyang might be aiding Naypyidaw to develop a nuclear capacity. In July 2009, during a press briefing following an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed Washington's anxieties about the burgeoning partnership: “I spoke at length yesterday in Bangkok about the concerns that are being expressed about cooperation between North Korea and [Myanmar] in the pursuit of offensive weapons, perhaps even including nuclear weapons at some point.” 1

Speculation about the North Korean-Myanmarese connection intensified in August 2009 when the Sydney Morning Herald, citing two Myanmarese defectors, reported that Pyongyang was helping Naypyidaw build a secret nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing facilities. 2 One of the defectors was a Myanmarese Army officer who claimed he was part of a secret nuclear battalion, and the other was a former trading company executive in charge of contracts with North Korea and Russia. They even maintained that, if everything proceeded as planned, Myanmar would be able to produce one nuclear bomb per year starting in 2014. While experts have largely dismissed the defectors' claims, they have not been able to reconcile other tangible evidence that indicates a highly questionable relationship between the two regimes.

It does make sense that North Korea and Myanmar would seek each other out. They are, after all, a lot alike. They both have been severely sanctioned by the United Nations and United States. And they both count China, which has blocked other U.N. Security Council actions aimed at them, as their only real ally. Additionally, they both share a fear of U.S. attack that has only grown greater since Washington's 2003 invasion of Iraq. Moreover, both Pyongyang and Naypyidaw believe they are in the midst of an anti-imperialist struggle. So the two nations have sufficient strategic and practical motivations for continued cooperation–whether nuclear or non-nuclear in nature.

The history of the North Korea-Myanmar relationship. After Myanmar, then called Burma, achieved independence from Britain in 1948, the two Asian nations were far from close. In fact, during the Korean War, the former British colony adhered to U.N. Security Council Resolution 84, which recommended that its member states support South Korea “to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” 3 But once the military took control of Myanmar in 1962, the relationship began to flourish, with North Korea's Kim Il-sung and Myanmar's Ne Win forging direct links. Due to close relations throughout the 1960s, the North exported many industrial and cultural goods to its ally to the west (including North Korean movies). 4 The relationship suffered in the mid-1970s after Myanmar established full diplomatic relations with South Korea and had difficulty balancing the North's and South's requests for diplomatic support and trade. But ties with Pyongyang always remained stronger than those with Seoul–e.g., in the 1960s and 1970s, the North Korean Embassy in Rangoon (now Yangon) had twice as many diplomats as its South Korean counterpart. 5

Ne Win made an official visit to Pyongyang in 1977, and the North's ruling Korean Workers' Party (KWP) became the first Communist party to form friendly relations with his ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party. In 1980, a Myanmarese delegation attended the Sixth Congress of the KWP, during which Kim Jong-il was named his father's successor. 6 These favorable diplomatic relations ended abruptly, however, when North Korean agents set off a bomb in an attempt to kill South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan while he was visiting Rangoon in 1983. 7 But by the mid-1990s, the two countries were growing close once again. Ever since, Pyongyang has exported ammunition, machine guns, and ship-to-ship missiles to Myanmar, while Naypyidaw has sent North Korea rice, rubber, and gold. 8 Today, Myanmar is among the top recipients of North Korean exports. 9

In 2003, the two regimes appear to have begun questionable trade, possibly including nuclear technology and know-how. That year, North Korean technicians off-loaded big crates and heavy construction equipment from trains at a station in Myanmar near Natmauk, the site where the junta supposedly planned to build a nuclear research reactor. 10 (It has not disclosed the site officially.) Around the same time, Myanmar's military started dealing with the Namchongang Trading Company, a known conduit for North Korean missiles and nuclear materials, and the Daesong Economic Group, an alleged exporter of sensitive North Korean missile technologies. 11 In November 2006, the MV Bong Hoafan, a North Korean cargo vessel anchored at Thilawa, 32 kilometers (20 miles) south of Yangon. 12 The Myanmarese government said that it did not find any suspicious materials on the vessel, but South Korean government sources believe the ship delivered self-propelled guns. 13 And throughout the mid-2000s, the North Koreans helped dig about 800 large tunnels across Myanmar–most likely to protect the regime from chemical or nuclear attack. In total, North Korea has provided Myanmar with about $9 billion in tunneling equipment and construction. 14

It makes sense that North Korea and Myanmar would seek each other out. They are, after all, a lot alike. They both have been severely sanctioned by the United Nations and United States. And they both count China, which has blocked other U.N. Security Council actions aimed at them, as their only real ally.

Similarly, in recent years many Myanmarese delegations have visited Pyongyang, probably in hopes of procuring air-defense weaponry and/or artillery production facilities. In April 2007, the Kang Nam 1, a freighter long-suspected of transporting North Korean weapons, docked at Thilawa. 15 According to Myanmarese officials, the ship had sought shelter from a storm, but the government banned local reporters from accessing the boat. That same year claims were made by the press that Pyongyang sold ship-to-ship, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles, including short-range, Scud-type ballistic missiles, to the Myanmarese government. 16 In November 2008, Gen. Thura Shwe Mann, the junta's third-in-command, visited North Korea and met with Army Chief Gen. Kim Gyok-sik to sign a memorandum of understanding covering North Korean military training and the construction of underground bunkers and arms shelters. 17

Two regimes with a lot in common. As is well known, North Korea is in the throes of a dire economic crisis. Per capita income is no more than $1,100, on par with Nicaragua and Cameroon. 18 Its economic collapse began in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union and the governments of Pyongyang's allies in Eastern Europe crumbled; the subsequent famine claimed about one million lives. To boost its economy, in 2002 Pyongyang allowed some market activities and managerial autonomy of state-owned enterprises. But not long after, fearing that it would lose its political monopoly, the regime reversed course and reinstated strong economic controls.

The country's current food shortage is more severe than at any time since the mid-1990s. 19 It has been exacerbated by a decline in international food aid, severe flooding in the summer of 2007, and Seoul's decision to end its annual food assistance. Due to these ongoing crises and international sanctions such as U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which prevent non-humanitarian aid and allow U.N. member states to inspect suspicious ships to or from the country, Pyongyang has become dependent on China for one-third of its trade. 20 (China is unenthusiastic about sanctions since it wants to keep the North as a close ally to prevent its collapse.) Such poverty has caused concern that Pyongyang may sell its nuclear technology to earn cash. The North's possible role in helping Syria construct a secret nuclear reactor has given further credence to such fears. 21 At the very least, it is searching for new strategic partners, and Myanmar would seem to be a good one.

For its part, Myanmar is almost as impoverished as North Korea with a per capita income of $1,200. 22 And while the country has abundant oil and gas resources, the junta has had difficulty managing rising inflation and fiscal deficits. Most international aid halted in 1988 when the government began to oppress the democracy movement. Washington imposed economic sanctions in August 2003–three months after the junta attacked Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader whose party won the 1990 general election that the military regime refused to recognize. (More than 100 people were killed in the ambush.) A brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests in September 2007 further weakened the country's economy by damaging its tourism industry, which employed about 500,000 people. 23 In response to the crackdown, the European Union imposed new sanctions that banned investment and trade in the country's precious stones, gems, and timber, three of the country's few means of securing hard currency. Consequently, its currency reserves have bottomed out, its technological development has ground to a halt, and its higher-education system has almost collapsed.

For some time now, the junta has been under severe pressure to democratize–most strongly from Washington, which has long pushed for Aung San Suu Kyi's release. After then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice identified Myanmar as an outpost of tyranny in 2005 (comparing it to North Korea, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, and Zimbabwe), the junta moved the country's capital from Yangon, which is vulnerable to naval attacks, 320 kilometers (200 miles) inland to Naypyidaw, a nascent city nestled in mountainous jungle. 24 The junta's paranoia of a U.S. invasion is so great that when Cyclone Nargis ravaged the country in 2008 and claimed tens of thousands of lives, it did not allow U.S. ships loaded with relief supplies to enter its territorial waters. 25

After Pyongyang's first nuclear test in October 2006, the North Korean regime posted signs in the capital's streets to declare its achievement and to reinforce national pride and confidence in the leadership. The Myanmarese junta may believe that it could use a nuclear capability in the same way.

Despite the government's grip on power, achieving unity in Myanmar is not easy. The country consists of 135 ethnic groups that have historically been at odds. To reinforce the concept of a unified nation-state with a unified national identity, the junta changed the country's name in 1989 from Burma (the designation of a majority ethnic group) to Myanmar (meaning “strong and fast”). And in Naypyidaw, the junta has built monuments honoring three medieval warrior kings–Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya–who struggled to unify the country. Solidarity could be further achieved by impressive scientific and technical gains–such as constructing some sort of nuclear program.

That's one way in which North Korea has galvanized its people. After Pyongyang's first nuclear test in October 2006, the North Korean regime posted signs in the capital's streets to declare its achievement and to reinforce national pride and confidence in the leadership. 26 The Myanmarese junta may believe that it could use a nuclear capability in the same way. It could also use a nuclear program as a means to extort international aid–another tried-and-true North Korean strategy. Pyongyang, via brinkmanship, reached agreements in October 1994 and September 2005 with regional neighbors and the United States to give up its nuclear program in return for security guarantees and economic aid. Obviously, Naypyidaw could benefit from a similar arrangement that could both bolster its national security and solve some of its economic woes.

Moving toward engagement. While it is highly unlikely that Myanmar is as close to a nuclear weapon capability as defectors claim, it is necessary to continue to closely watch the relationship between Pyongyang and Naypyidaw. Further sanctions, however, would probably do more harm than good. First, the North Korean and Myanmarese economies have already been as damaged as they can be by sanctions, and second, China will probably continue to prop them up as best it can. Thus, engagement may be the best policy choice in the future.

The United States could coordinate such a policy and involve other states in the region (e.g., South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, India, and members of ASEAN). For its part, Washington has already begun talking to Myanmar at least on a preliminary basis. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in October 2009, revealed that senior Obama administration officials had met with Myanmar representatives in New York last September. “These were substantive talks that lasted approximately two hours. We laid out our views clearly, and I stressed to U Thaung [the Myanmarese minister for science and technology and former ambassador to the United States] that this dialogue is an opportunity for [Myanmar] if the authorities are ready to move forward. This was an introductory meeting. It will take more than a single conversation to resolve our differences.” It is good to hear that Campbell believes forging a U.S.-Myanmarese relationship cannot be done overnight. U.S. engagement will only be effective if it endures over time.

Without a doubt, China can provide critical leverage in these discussions. Here, though, Washington needs to tread carefully. If it is perceived as countering China's increasing influence in Northeast and Southeast Asia, Beijing will likely react by strengthening its ties with North Korea and Myanmar. Instead, the United States should share its ideas about international and regional security with China in the hope that Beijing will join Washington in its efforts.

For their part, both North Korea and Myanmar seem willing to begin a dialogue with Washington and the international community. In December 2009, Pyongyang invited Steven Bosworth, U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, for a meeting, after which he stated, “The talks were quite positive.” 27 Another positive sign: The North declined to criticize the South in its New Year's Day editorial in the government paper Rodong Sinmun, which had become a recent annual tradition. 28 In fact, it emphasized in the editorial that the animosity between Pyongyang, Washington, and Seoul should give way to peace on the Korean Peninsula. Further, at the national meeting held in Pyongyang on Kim Jong-il's birthday–one of the country's biggest holidays–Kim Yong-nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly, underscored that the hostile relations between North Korea and the United States should be reconciled through dialogue and negotiations.

Meanwhile in Myanmar, general elections will be held this year–a barometer for identifying the junta's intentions in terms of democratization and openness. The junta did allow Campbell to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi when he visited Yangon in November, and Myanmar's high officials are promising “free and fair elections.” 29 But it also barred Aung San Suu Kyi from appearing on the ballot by excluding anyone who has been convicted by the government–she is under house arrest for various petty offenses to the regime–and there is little evidence that the elections will feature the full participation of every domestic political party. Nonetheless, if the elections prove relatively clean and inclusive, the international community stands at the ready to help Myanmar–especially economically.

Neither Naypyidaw nor Pyongyang makes negotiating easy; they are both recalcitrant and unpredictable. Nevertheless, security in the region will not be achieved until the tension between the two countries and the international community has calmed and the dangerous relationship between North Korea and Myanmar has ended. And the best way to accomplish these important aims is to begin talking to them (and to keep talking to them)–no matter the level of difficulty.