The North Korea-Myanmar Relationship: A Technical Perspective

Abstract

Although the evidence indicates that Myanmar hasn't achieved a nuclear weapon capability, its ever-tightening connection to Pyongyang and ongoing interest in dual-use technology must be constrained.

Suspicions about secret nuclear facilities in Myanmar have existed for years. And concerns about nuclear cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea–underscored recently by U.S. officials such as U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton–have grown recently as well. 1

Obviously, no one can ignore the possibility of significant North Korean nuclear assistance to Myanmar's enigmatic military junta. Pyongyang's past proliferation activities–most especially its secret sale of a reactor to Syria–cannot but lead to more scrutiny over whether it might sell Myanmar a reactor, other nuclear industrial equipment and facilities, or the means and guidance to manufacture nuclear facilities. When one adds Myanmar's own efforts to acquire abroad sophisticated dual-use goods that can be used for nuclear purposes, it becomes essential to determine and constrain as necessary the military junta's nuclear intentions.

For many years, various dissident groups, researchers, and news reports have claimed that there are covert nuclear sites in Myanmar, including reactors, uranium mines and mills, reprocessing plants, and uranium enrichment facilities. But as far as we can determine, the evidence behind many of these claims is largely based on interviews with defectors or analysis of ground photos and satellite imagery. For instance, the opposition group Dictator Watch has published a range of sites that it says are nuclear in nature. 2 Similarly, Swedish journalist Bertil Lintner has published what he claims are a series of photographs taken in the mid-2000s of extensive tunnels built with North Korean assistance. 3 He has suggested that some of these tunnels might be nuclear-related. More recently, respected Australian National University professor Desmond Ball and Thailand-based Irish-Australian journalist Phil Thorton, citing defector accounts, claimed in the Sydney Morning Herald that Myanmar built one secret nuclear reactor with Russia's help and is building another secret reactor with North Korea's help. (Later, the claim about a Russian-supplied reactor was retracted.) In addition, Ball and Thorton reported that Myanmar is building, or plans to build, secret plutonium separation plants, uranium refining and enrichment plants, and facilities to develop and produce a nuclear weapon. The nuclear allegations in these reports cannot in general be confirmed. As Ball and Thorton admit, any information based on interviews with defectors must be approached cautiously. 4 And the sheer number of secret sites alleged by these defectors by itself raises doubts about their claims.

Only in a few cases do the reports listing nuclear sites provide enough information to assess their veracity using satellite imagery. Where we could identify specific sites, we assessed that they were not in fact nuclear facilities. In particular, we reviewed the ground photographs of suspected tunnel facilities in Myanmar obtained by Lintner and determined that at least one of the purported tunnel entrances is a dam penstock. 5 Other photographs do indeed depict tunnel entrances and indoor storage facilities, but it is likely that they are not nuclear industrial facilities. We could not identify anything in the photos that would indicate a nuclear-related use.

We also assessed claims made by Dictator Watch and cited by the Sydney Morning Herald of a covert uranium mill and mine near Mandalay. 6 After an analysis of available satellite and ground imagery and relevant open-source information, we assessed that the suspected uranium mill was too large to be a small clandestine uranium operation. 7 In fact, ground photographs of an established commercial cement plant matched very closely with the overhead imagery claimed by Dictator Watch to depict the uranium mill. Additionally, we determined that the suspected uranium mine was probably a quarry, judging by the piecemeal scraping marks on a mountain. A covert uranium mine would likely utilize modern open-pit or underground mining techniques.

Despite debunking a few claims about secret nuclear facilities in Myanmar, we believe that there remain legitimate reasons to suspect the existence of undeclared nuclear activities inside the country, particularly in the context of North Korean cooperation. For example, Myanmar is buying a wide variety of suspicious dual-use goods internationally, meaning governments and companies need to be more vigilant in examining Myanmar's requests for equipment, whether they come via governmental entities, trading companies or other foreign trading companies. Companies should treat inquiries from Myanmar no differently than those from Iran, Pakistan, Syria, or North Korea. Another dimension to this story is whether Myanmar is acting as a cooperative transshipment partner for goods ultimately destined for the North Korean or Iranian gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programs.

Only in a few cases do reports listing nuclear sites in Myanmar provide enough information to assess their veracity using satellite imagery. Where we could identify specific sites, we assessed that they were not in fact nuclear facilities.

The known details about Myanmar's nuclear capability. Myanmar receives a relatively small level of technical assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in nuclear medicine, agriculture, and research reactor-related fields. It also receives nuclear energy training in South Korea with other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Myanmar has barely any known indigenous nuclear infrastructure to support the construction of nuclear facilities. Yet it has sought to purchase a nuclear research reactor for about a decade.

In September 2000, Myanmar asked the IAEA for assistance in acquiring such a reactor. 8 The IAEA said that it would do so only after Myanmar achieved a set of milestones, including bringing its reactor safety and regulatory infrastructure up to a minimally acceptable international standard. Meanwhile, without telling the IAEA, Myanmar started negotiations with Russia for the purchase of a 10-megawatt-thermal research reactor. 9 A draft cooperation agreement was approved by Moscow in May 2002 for the construction of a nuclear research center that would include the research reactor, two laboratories (believed to include hot cells for radioisotope production), and facilities for the disposal of nuclear waste. Eight years later, however, the reactor complex still has not been built. 10 Additionally, neither side has publicly announced the reactor's planned location.

Under the terms of its cooperation, Russia has reportedly conducted training of Myanmarese in fields related to the construction and operation of research reactors. According to a European intelligence official, Russia assists Myanmar's uranium exploration and mining efforts, but this effort is relatively small and has not extended to the construction of a mill to process uranium ore, which Myanmar has in limited quantities.

Myanmar joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, and it insists that it is in compliance with all of its treaty obligations. It has a traditional comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA supplemented by a Small Quantities Protocol that it signed in 1995. The protocol is applicable since Myanmar has declared it has no major nuclear facilities and only small quantities of nuclear material (1 kilogram of plutonium, or a little more than 1 kilogram of weapon-grade uranium). Under the protocol, the IAEA has agreed not to implement safeguards, with a few exceptions. These conditions include Myanmar agreeing to report if it imports or exports nuclear material, acquires more than a minimal amount of such material, or has built a new nuclear facility that is within six months of being loaded with fuel.

Myanmar has discussed with the IAEA improving safeguards in the context of its reactor deal with Moscow. 11 However, Myanmar has not agreed to update its commitments under the Small Quantities Protocol. In particular, it has not agreed to stricter guidelines that would require it to report when it authorizes a nuclear facility's construction. Moreover, Myanmar has not signed the Additional Protocol, which would obligate it to provide far greater information about its nuclear activities and plans and allow the IAEA much greater access to its sites. Implementation of the Additional Protocol could go a long way toward reducing suspicions about reports of undeclared nuclear facilities and materials.

A new constraint on Myanmar's cooperation with North Korea is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which was passed in mid-2009 and prohibits member states from engaging in trade with Pyongyang of almost all conventional weapons and in sensitive areas such as those related to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Although the Myanmarese regime has stated its commitment to fully comply with the resolution, the fundamental question remains: Has Myanmar decided to embark on a covert route to nuclear weapons either on its own or with the help of North Korea?

Suspicious procurements. Myanmar is unable to build nuclear facilities on its own. Consequently, it must depend on outside suppliers for nuclear technology, equipment, materials, and facilities. Myanmar is seeking from abroad a large quantity of top-notch, highly sophisticated goods with potential missile and nuclear uses. Yet no pattern has emerged in these procurements that leads to a specific missile or nuclear application. Nonetheless, the procurements are often suspicious or highly enigmatic, according to one senior European intelligence official.

Myanmar's military regime may be using North Korean trading entities to acquire sensitive nuclear and nuclear dual-use goods. Military cooperation between the two regimes has increased over the last several years. Pyongyang also could supplement Myanmar's foreign procurement networks and could sell nuclear goods made in North Korea. The North would find such an arrangement lucrative, and it could use Myanmar as a willing transshipment point for illicit sales for itself or others. Another possibility, albeit less likely, is that North Korea could be building sensitive facilities in Myanmar for its own use.

Myanmar is seeking from abroad a large quantity of top-notch, highly sophisticated goods with potential missile and nuclear uses. Yet no pattern has emerged in these procurements that leads to a specific missile or nuclear application. Nonetheless, the procurements are often suspicious or highly enigmatic, according to one senior European intelligence official.

Evidence of North Korean and Myanmarese cooperation includes the reported presence in Myanmar of officials from Namchongang Trading, a North Korean company that is sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. Such contacts cause concern because Syria's reactor project depended on assistance from Namchongang. The nature of cooperation between Myanmar and Namchongang remains largely unknown, but the trading company reportedly sold equipment to the regime or provided some type of technical assistance. 12 Although there is no concrete evidence that Pyongyang is supplying a reactor to Myanmar, any involvement by Namchongang in Myanmar is bound to increase suspicions. Reports of such a sale date back to at least 2004, when Namchongang was helping Syria acquire its reactor. 13 According to a 2004 Asia Times article, Myanmar approached North Korea in November 2002 after the military regime failed to acquire a reactor from Russia, China, and India. 14 The article went on to report that a deal was signed between Myanmar and North Korea in early 2004. 15 This claim, however, remains unconfirmed.

In June 2009, Japan arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer to Myanmar via Malaysia. 16 The original order for the magnetometer came from the Beijing office of New East International Trading, Ltd., which reportedly operates under the North Korean government's direction. 17 The company is headquartered in Hong Kong, but it also has a Pyongyang office and is flagged by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) for its procurement efforts on behalf of the North Korean military. 18

In addition to legitimate commercial uses in archaeology and geophysics, magnetometers can be employed to make magnets for missile-control systems and gas centrifuges. They are controlled under Japan's “catch-all” regulations, which ban the export of dual-use items to countries such as North Korea and Myanmar. Japanese officials seized the magnetometer in January 2009 and launched an investigation that later led to the arrests. The three individuals detained were the heads of three separate Japanese entities. North Korean national Li Gyeong Ho was president of the Toko Boeki Trading Company; Japanese national Hirohiko Muto was president of the Taikyo Sangyo Trading Company; and Miaki Katsuki, another Japanese citizen, was president of the Riken Denshi Company, the magnetometer's manufacturer.

In September 2008, Li, under the direction of the Beijing office of New East International Trading, asked Muto to submit documents to local customs authorities for the purpose of exporting the device. METI informed the company that an export license was required, and the export could not be authorized. 19 At this time, they conspired to export the item to Myanmar via Malaysia without a license. But soon after, Japanese custom agents stopped the export. A month later, the premises of Toko Boeki were searched by police, and Li, Muto, and Katsuki were charged with violating Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law. 20

In November 2009, Li was found guilty, given a two-year suspended sentence, and fined $67,000. In his ruling, the judge said that the attempted export involved “dangerous equipment used to develop and/or manufacture nuclear weapons.” 21 Although this case implies that North Korea was purchasing dual-use equipment for Myanmar, the investigation did not confirm whether the item was intended for use in a missile or nuclear program in Myanmar or for shipment onward to North Korea or to a third country.

Yet more suspicious procurements. The magnetometer was not the only item ordered by New East International Trading for shipment to Myanmar. In August 2008, Toko Boeki exported to Myanmar two small cylindrical grinders, each valued at about $28,000, without a license. This type of grinder can be used to make missile control systems and to grind magnets for gas centrifuges. 22

Furthermore, according to a European intelligence official, a couple of years earlier, Myanmar purchased extremely high-precision and expensive dual-use industrial equipment, including computer-numerically controlled machine tools, from companies located in Switzerland, Germany, and Japan. The equipment was ordered by Myanmar's Department of Technical and Vocational Education, a government agency that is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology and is ostensibly responsible for domestic technical education programs. The equipment, however, is too sophisticated for normal teaching and student endeavors, so its purchase raised suspicions. At the time of the orders, according to a European government official, the head of the agency was Ko Ko Oo, who was also the head of Myanmar's Department of Atomic Energy, which is under the Ministry of Science and Technology. Officials in both departments have significant personnel links and associations. 23 In such a small country, nuclear officials might be responsible for more than just nuclear-related activities. But the connection raises the questions of whether the equipment was intended for a nuclear purpose and whether the Department of Technical and Vocational Education acted as a front for the Department of Atomic Energy or a military entity.

Evidence of North Korean and Myanmarese cooperation includes the reported presence in Myanmar of officials from Namchongang Trading, a North Korean company that is sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. Such contacts cause concern because Syria's reactor project depended on assistance from Namchongang.

It is unclear if the procurements in Europe were legal: If the equipment was ultimately used in a military or nuclear program, the purchases would be illegal in most European countries. Upon closer examination by European officials, the declared end use of the machine tools–manufacturing sophisticated locomotive diesel engine parts–did not look credible. Designs of parts given to suppliers appeared incomplete, and they were missing key tolerances. In addition, the quality and price of the equipment are beyond what Myanmar would be expected to purchase or need, given its relatively primitive diesel locomotive manufacturing base and its modest plans for expansion. 24

European intelligence services identified the equipment as having a gamut of possible uses–including the manufacture of highly sophisticated civilian machinery, aircraft turbines, missile parts, and nuclear components. The equipment appeared oversized for producing gas centrifuges and too precise for missile manufacturing, but it could still be dedicated to such purposes.

We have learned that two sets of this high-precision equipment were sent to two separate industrial buildings in Myanmar. Both buildings are located far from any major city and have extensive security. One of the buildings is a large, blue-roofed structure located 16 kilometers (10 miles) northeast of Pyin Oo Lwin, the town where Myanmar's Defense Services Academy training facility and other military installations reside. The structure is at the end of a long road set back from the main highway. According to an intelligence official, the building is actually inside of a deep hole. A 12-meter wide road leads to it. The width of the road would imply the use of trucks hauling wide or long objects. Commercial satellite images of the building from 2005, early in its construction phase, show large, sturdy foundations, but the building appears unsuitable to support a nuclear reactor. 25 The second building has very similar characteristics. It is located in an isolated compound about 130 kilometers (81 miles) west of Mandalay and sits on a wide foundation; its side lengths are roughly 80 meters (identical to the first building). The roof is vaulted and also appears to be blue.

The buildings' distances from major cities are odd because one would expect facilities that make locomotive engines or other sophisticated machinery to be built close to a skilled civilian workforce. Instead, workers at the first building would need to travel about one hour by bus from Mandalay to reach it. If anything, the equipment would be expected to go to existing diesel locomotive manufacturing facilities, in particular the Insein Locomotive Shed and the Ywahtaung Diesel Locomotive Shed, both of which were upgraded in 2006 to make diesel locomotives and are located near Yangon and Mandalay, respectively. 26

At first, European analysts believed that Myanmar was not the actual end user of these sophisticated imports. They thought perhaps North Korea was the true buyer due to the fact that the buildings lacked vital climate-control equipment, which is necessary to prevent the equipment from corroding or otherwise suffering damage to their sensitive internal mechanisms. But as of mid-2009, the equipment was still in Myanmar, and no connection to another country had been established. Other analysts have speculated that North Korea could locate military industries inside Myanmar. Yet the North Korean workforce is more highly skilled than the Myanmarese workforce, and North Korea can procure such sophisticated machinery for itself. Nevertheless, a joint military or nuclear enterprise might make sense.

Policy recommendations. There remain good reasons to suspect that Myanmar might be pursuing a long-term strategy to build nuclear weapons. Despite the public reports to the contrary, the military junta does not appear to be close to establishing a significant nuclear capability, as information suggesting the construction of major nuclear facilities appears unreliable or inconclusive. Assigning a purpose to suspicious procurements likewise remains uncertain. The procurements are multipurpose and difficult to correlate conclusively with a secret missile or nuclear program. And although Myanmar and North Korea appear to be cooperating on illegal procurements, who is helping whom cannot be determined with the available information. The evidence supports that the regime wants to develop a nuclear capability of some type, but whether its ultimate purpose is peaceful or military is unknown.

Because Myanmar's known nuclear program is so small, the United States and its allies have an opportunity to both engage and pressure the regime in a manner that would make it extremely difficult for it to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. For starters, priority must be given to establishing greater transparency over Myanmar and North Korea's cooperation and to inhibit any nuclear or dual-use transfers. Communication here is key. And even though the military junta historically has demonstrated little interest in breaking out of its isolation, it has shown recent interest in engaging with the United States. This interest should be exploited to induce the regime to break, or diminish, its relationship with Pyongyang. Washington also should press Myanmar in any talks for access to certain suspicious sites as a way to build confidence.

Next, before Russia provides a research reactor to Myanmar, it should make sure the military regime meets a specific set of conditions (e.g., more effective safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, and an upgraded safety and security infrastructure). Also necessary are verifiable commitments by the regime to not procure equipment illicitly and to abide by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, which would mean Myanmar would not buy any nuclear facilities, equipment, or materials from North Korea. Along these lines, governments should warn their companies about possible attempts by Myanmar to acquire high-precision machinery and other sensitive dual-use items.

The Syrian reactor, Iran's gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program, and Pakistan's highly enriched uranium program were all enabled in large part because of the failure of the international community to halt the illicit sale of nuclear-related technologies. The international community has a unique opportunity to set a new precedent and prevent Myanmar from acquiring materials that could eventually be used in an unsafeguarded nuclear program. Myanmar has no reason to seek nuclear weapons. The international community should convince Myanmar that pledging not to do so in a truly verifiable manner could provide it with significant benefits and rewards.