Abstract
The Nuclear Suppliers Group should play a vital role in preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, and its members, including the United States, should welcome international participation in their facilities.
Only a handful of states presently possess uranium enrichment technology–used to create low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear reactors and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear bombs–and those states have generally refused to allow its spread. The interest in nuclear power around the globe to meet growing energy needs and the desire to limit carbon dioxide emissions brings with it the danger that countries may attempt to develop their own national enrichment plants. The further spread of such sensitive technologies poses a serious threat to the already shaky nuclear nonproliferation regime–Iran's development of its own enrichment capabilities, whether for energy production as it claims or for weapons as other states fear, is a case in point.
The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports. These rules include a number of conditions for the export of nuclear materials and equipment that are identified on a “trigger list,” so-called because the export of these items triggers a requirement that recipient states provide certain nonproliferation assurances before trade can commence. These include the acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in perpetuity and a pledge that the transferred items will be used only for peaceful, non-explosive purposes, as well as agreement to apply physical protection measures and to accept controls on retransfers of such items.
The NSG and its guidelines have evolved over time in order to keep pace with technical innovations, political developments, and in response to various challenges to the nonproliferation regime. Further modernization of these rules, however, is vital to ensure that the goal of nonproliferation, and even the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, can be realistically met as the world finds itself yet again increasingly interested in the promise of nuclear energy.
It became clear during this time that international nuclear export controls needed strengthening and that suppliers needed to adopt more uniform nuclear export policies. At the initiative of the United States, seven major nuclear suppliers met in London in 1974 in an attempt to close the loopholes and upgrade controls on the export of nuclear technology.
The original seven participants in the NSG, known informally as the “London Club,” were Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Early in 1976, these members agreed on a first version of nuclear transfer guidelines. Between 1976 and 1977, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland joined the group. The guidelines were finally accepted by all 15 members in September 1977 and later published by the IAEA in January 1978. 1
Among other things, the 1978 NSG guidelines called upon members to exercise restraint in transferring enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production technology; to encourage recipients of such sensitive technology to accept supplier involvement or other appropriate multinational participation in any resulting domestic facilities; and to pledge that any transferred enrichment technology produce no higher than 20 percent enriched uranium without the consent of the supplier. The guidelines also called on suppliers to encourage recipient nations to design sensitive facilities with the application of IAEA safeguards in mind.
In the early 1990s, the revelation that Saddam Hussein had been able to build a covert nuclear weapons program demonstrated the need for a tighter multilateral system of export controls for dual-use items. Many NSG members had exported large quantities of material, equipment, and technology to Iraq that had been used in its effort to build a nuclear weapon. To meet this threat to the non-proliferation regime, the NSG added to its export control list dual-use technologies, i.e., those that have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications and that could make a significant contribution to a nuclear explosive or an unsafeguarded nuclear facility. In addition, the NSG stipulated that a recipient of items on the NSG nuclear trigger list must accept IAEA safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear activities as a condition of new supply–so-called comprehensive or full-scope safeguards.
The fundamental responsibility of the NSG is to support nonproliferation norms that are nearly universally accepted and to reinforce compliance with those norms. At the same time, those norms can be supported by a positive and cooperative role in international peaceful nuclear commerce.
While hailed at the time as a significant accomplishment, the NSG adoption of the comprehensive safeguard requirement as a condition of supply subsequently proved to be a somewhat hollow triumph due to significant loopholes. The safeguards guideline applied only to future nuclear cooperation and did not cover existing nuclear supply deals, grandfathering in existing commitments. The guideline also allowed nuclear exports to states that didn't have full-scope safeguards if such exports were “deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards are applied to those facilities.”
Russia has since exported nuclear fuel and reactors to India without requiring full-scope safeguards citing the grandfather clause. In addition, Russia argued that its export of low-enriched uranium to the Indian Tarapur reactors was based on the safety exception provided for in the NSG's comprehensive safeguards requirement. China has also cited the grandfather clause as justification for its nuclear assistance to Pakistan, without requiring Islamabad to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Recently the United States, for its own strategic and commercial reasons, entered into a nuclear deal with India, a non-NPT party, which permits nuclear cooperation with New Delhi without full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Although this U.S. initiative proved highly controversial in nonproliferation policy circles and faced opposition from certain NSG members, the NSG went along, approving an exemption for India from the group's comprehensive safeguards requirement.
Another even more serious challenge to the nonproliferation regime came in 2002-2003 when the international community learned about the clandestine transfers of enrichment technology from Pakistan (through the A. Q. Khan network) to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. In response, the United States launched two new initiatives designed to prevent the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. President George W. Bush proposed in a February 11, 2004 speech that NSG members refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that did not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants and that the world's leading nuclear exporters ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounced enrichment and reprocessing. Many non-nuclear weapon states saw these U.S. proposals as threats to their sovereign rights as independent nations and their NPT rights under Article IV to pursue peaceful nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment, as long as they are in compliance with their treaty obligations. Although the Bush administration later backpedaled, suspicions remain about U.S. intentions.
Most agree that current NSG guidelines are not adequate to safeguard against the uncontrolled spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. Rather than favoring the U.S. proposal of denial, however, most NSG members favor a French-sponsored proposal that would allow for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies only to states that are party to the NPT, are meeting their NPT obligations, have in force a comprehensive safeguards agreement, are in full compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreements, and have in force an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements. They would also have to adhere to NSG guidelines and report to the U.N. Security Council that they are implementing effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540, and make other assurances. 2
The NSG is also considering adopting a number of additional conditions for such transfers, including that a recipient has a credible and coherent rationale for pursuing enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in support of a civil nuclear power generation program, and that transfers would not negatively impact the stability and security of a recipient state. In addition, the United States has proposed that the transfer of enrichment technology be “black-boxed,” i.e. take place under conditions that will not permit or enable the replication of the technology.
Thus far, NSG members have been unable to agree on a proposal for new guidelines to govern enrichment and reprocessing transfers. One major obstacle has been that some states oppose the idea of black-boxing transferred technology because they want to be able to upgrade it over time to compete more effectively in the international market. Yet agreement on such new criteria, including black-boxing, should be a priority.
The fundamental responsibility of the NSG is to support nonproliferation norms that are nearly universally accepted and to reinforce compliance with those norms. At the same time, those norms can be supported by a positive and cooperative role in international peaceful nuclear commerce. For example, the NSG should adopt a common statement of principles that its members will strengthen the security of supply to importing countries and will not interfere with supply arrangements so long as consumer states are in full compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. One of these principles should offer countries that do not possess enrichment facilities and that are in good nonproliferation standing the opportunity to participate in the enrichment plants of NSG member states. Such participation could include guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel but should not include access to enrichment technology.
The NSG has an image problem. Some non-nuclear weapon states, particularly developing countries, view it as a cartel that seeks to deny them the benefits of nuclear energy and to relegate them to technical and commercial inferiority.
Presently, NSG guidelines call upon members to exercise restraint in the transfer of enrichment and other sensitive technologies and to encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. These guidelines should be further strengthened by persuading NSG members to adopt new measures that would require rather than simply encourage supplier involvement or appropriate multinational participation as an alternative to national enrichment plants (originally proposed in the mid-1970s when the NSG was first formed).
Even though new controls on exports of enrichment technology are necessary, they are not sufficient to prevent its eventual spread. They are only one tool among several that the United States and other suppliers will need to employ to discourage states from acquiring their own sensitive nuclear facilities. An additional approach would be to encourage broad international support for multinational enrichment facilities as an alternative to nationally controlled plants. Such an approach would help establish a norm that the vast majority of countries have no need to develop indigenous enrichment capabilities.
The idea of multinational enrichment facilities has already received considerable international support. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has proposed that enrichment and reprocessing be placed under some form of multinational auspices or control. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed a system of international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the control of the IAEA. Russia has already in fact established the International Uranium Enrichment Center at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex in Siberia. There have been a number of other proposals for multinational enrichment facilities, including Germany's suggestion for an enrichment facility on international territory administered by the IAEA and a proposal by Saudi Arabia for a multinational enrichment facility to serve the fuel needs of countries in the Middle East, including Iran, but located outside that region. There have even been some proposals for locating a multinational enrichment enterprise in Iran, including an intriguing concept from faculty members at MIT as well as suggestions from the Iranian government itself. A report issued by the joint committees of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences describes the feasibility of multinational enrichment centers that offer enrichment services without sharing basic technology. 3 The report cites the Angarsk project as one such center. The committees called for an international dialog to discuss the pros and cons of supplementing multinational facilities with one under broader international control. The Group of Eight (G-8) has also periodically endorsed the idea of multinational approaches to the fuel cycle.
Establishing a global consensus that multinational enrichment facilities are less costly and more proliferation-resistant than nationally controlled plants will require broad support that goes beyond nuclear supplier states and the G-8. It must include a wide spectrum of consumer countries as well. Convincing such states will be challenging, and the language of any proposal will be critical to achieving this objective. Portraying the advantages of participating in multinational facilities over national plants, including reliable nuclear fuel assurances at competitive prices, is more likely to win broad acceptance than a policy that stresses denial and renunciation.
A priority for the upcoming NPT Review Conference scheduled for May 2010 should be to promote these principles. The ultimate objective would be to have the final report of the conference reflect the belief that supplier states should be encouraged to offer consumer states not only assured nuclear fuel supplies but also meaningful involvement in their enrichment facilities (as shareholders and managers, yet without access to classified technology) and that consumers should consider participation in such multinational facilities as a full-fledged alternative to building their own national plants.
If existing technology holders, particularly those in nuclear weapon states, are not prepared to invite some form of multinational participation in their own facilities, it will be difficult to establish multinational control of sensitive nuclear facilities as a global non-proliferation norm that is acceptable to the majority of states. Consultations should begin soon with all enrichment technology holders. The Urenco partners–Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany–as well as France and Russia already have enrichment plants with some multinational participation. Brazil and Argentina have also agreed to establish a binational commission for enriching uranium.
The U.S. government should give serious consideration to the merits and feasibility of encouraging multinational involvement in the new centrifuge facility being built by U. S. Enrichment Corporation in Ohio. Encouraging foreign participation in the project would allow the United States to take a leadership role in establishing a global consensus that all new enrichment plants should be multinational in nature and subject to IAEA safeguards agreements. It would also further U.S. national interests by helping to maintain a reliable and competitive source of domestic enrichment services. Other supplier nations should be encouraged to do the same for their enrichment facilities.
Establishing a global consensus that multinational enrichment facilities are less costly and more proliferation-resistant than nationally controlled plants will require broad support that goes beyond nuclear supplier states and the G-8. It must include a wide spectrum of consumer countries as well.
If, as it seems likely, an effective solution to the fuel cycle problem depends on embedding it in a broader commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, the way to move forward is, first, to continue engaging the United States and Russia in a commitment at the highest levels to work jointly toward this goal. The United States and Russia can only do so much on their own, but their example can rally other nations to the cause of reducing nuclear arsenals step-by-step to the vanishing point. If the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world is accepted by the international community and actions to provide multinational or international control of the fuel cycle are widely seen as consistent with that goal, it should be easier to expand the use of nuclear power without running the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.
