Sergio Duarte has plenty of reasons to be pessimistic about global nuclear disarmament
efforts. The Brazilian diplomat and current head of the U.N. Office for Disarmament
Affairs has witnessed the ebb and flow in world opinion on the issue during his decades
in diplomacy. While nations renewed their commitment to nuclear disarmament after the
end of the Cold War, their positions diverged in the years afterward, culminating in an
acrimonious and largely unproductive 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference, which Duarte headed.
Yet, Duarte remains optimistic about the prospects for global disarmament. He believes
that in addition to a renewed emphasis on the issue in public debate, disarmament
efforts might be bolstered by the ongoing global economic and climate crisis, which have
helped to emphasize the need for international cooperation to address a range of policy
issues. Early this spring, Duarte discussed with the Bulletin the roles
that governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the public can play in moving
forward disarmament discussions.
BAS: Why should Bulletin readers be hopeful about nuclear
disarmament efforts around the globe?
DUARTE: Well, you know there have been a number of initiatives over the past
three years, starting perhaps with that of the four former U.S.
statesmen–[George] Shultz, [Henry] Kissinger, [William] Perry, and [Sam]
Nunn. Several others from different countries also have voiced the opinion that it is
now time to get to work seriously on these issues of nonproliferation and nuclear
disarmament. Also, the United States has embraced an administration and a president that
during the presidential campaign said important things on this issue, as did the
secretary of state at her confirmation hearings. All of these things make me think that
it is time for the world to take cooperative steps in the direction of disarmament.
BAS: Words are one thing, actions are another. What can the United States do
to make the world understand its commitment to these issues?
DUARTE: It is important to reiterate commitments and to say these things
without “buts.” Besides that, a number of actions have been
proposed. One important one, of course, is for the United States and Russia to continue
their disarmament efforts; it is very important that they continue reducing their
arsenals. It is also important, in terms of making the world understand that these ideas
and actions are serious, that when they agree on further reductions, both countries make
it clear that they are doing so because they have international commitments under the
NPT. They aren't acting only because of their own bilateral relationship or
their strategic relationship or because the weapons may be too costly to maintain or may
be obsolete or whatever. They are making the reductions because they have international
commitments to do so. It also would be useful for the rest of the world to know that
they recognize they have commitments toward others.
BAS: What role should other nuclear weapon states, including Israel, India,
and Pakistan, play in the disarmament movement?
DUARTE: It is incumbent upon the United States and Russia to take the lead
in the disarmament process seeing that they possess overwhelmingly the largest arsenals.
The other nuclear weapon states, with some exceptions, have said that they will join in,
or that they would be willing to join in when the two major possessors arrive at certain
agreed reductions. We don't have any reason to doubt them, and then again,
they have comparatively small arsenals. So there would be a role for them at some point.
They also could encourage the major possessors to go ahead with their reductions by
strengthening their stated intention to join in at some point. Article VI of the NPT
commits all countries to disarma-ment–not only the United States and Russia,
and not only the other possessors but all parties to the NPT. France and Britain
recently stated their intention to join the reduction process at some point. We can be
at least reasonably confident that, if there is leadership from the two big possessors,
that the others will join in, perhaps in different stages of the process.
BAS: So, progress toward disarmament is wholly dependent on the actions of
Russia and the United States?
DUARTE: Well, it's a fact of life, I guess. The rest of the world
has to encourage those who have the arms to reduce and eventually eliminate them. They
also have to show confidence that this process is serious and that it is meant to arrive
at a conclusion. An important part of that, of course, are verification measures that
can be taken bilaterally or among a number of countries. There are also measures that
can and should be taken internationally, to the satisfaction of the whole community, in
nonproliferation as well as in disarmament. There should be some way for the entire
world to have confidence in the process of disarmament.
BAS: By insisting on verification measures, can non-weapon states ease the
process for themselves?
DUARTE: Of course. Verification is key to establishing confidence. There are
many, many other confidence-building measures that also can come into the process.
Countries that will have to disarm will have to have internal legislation. They will
have to have budgets for that purpose. They will have to have organs and agencies,
internal agencies, dedicated to that purpose, and this is something that can be
verified. These activities must be public. If these things happen, they would increase
the confidence of the rest of the world that the armed countries are really serious
about reducing and eventually eliminating their weapons of mass destruction.
Uncertainty is states' main rationale for keeping their nuclear weapons,
though not their only one. yet everyone is uncertain. If this is the main rationale,
then everyone should have the weapons. This is not a position that is conducive to
agreement.
Take the Chemical Weapons Convention. The agreement provides for international
verification; international agencies are assigned to tasks, and internal measures are
put together, all to prevent countries from developing those kinds of weapons and to
make those who do have the stockpiles destroy them. This has been done over the past
decade or so with a very high degree of success. So it's not impossible.
BAS: Nuclear weapons are transformative weapons and put nuclear weapon
states in very different strategic positions than non-nuclear weapon states. How do you
bridge those different positions?
DUARTE: The international community has been trying to bridge those
positions for the past few decades, and some progress has been achieved.
The nuclear weapon states, including the United States, have always said that their
weapons are only good for deterring others from using them. If every nuclear weapon
state believes that, then the only use for those weapons would be to deter. Now if they
do away with the weapons, this can no longer be a justification.
Some nuclear weapon states, China for instance, say that they will never be the first to
use them. If you ask other nuclear weapon countries why they have these weapons, what is
it that they want to deter, they will answer “uncertainty.” This
is their main rationale for keeping their weapons, though not their only one. Yet
everyone is uncertain. If this is the main rationale, then everyone should have the
weapons. This is not a position that is conducive to agreement.
BAS: Do they need to come up with a better rationale if they want to keep
their weapons?
DUARTE: I don't think there is a better rationale, frankly. They
don't need to come up with a rationale; they need to realize that in the 21st
century, nuclear weapons are not a legitimate means of defense.
BAS: How does the growing interest in nuclear energy around the world affect
talk of disarmament?
DUARTE: It does affect it, because nuclear technologies can be used for dual
purposes. When the NPT was written, the original drafters did not pay enough attention
to that possibility. Perhaps they thought that the technology would develop too slowly
to be of use, or that it would be impossible for other countries to master the dual-use
technology. Yet it took only 30 years or so.
Even when the NPT was drafted, there were several countries that already had the
technologies but decided to forgo developing weapons in order to join the NPT, because
they had the nuclear umbrella. Others did not have the umbrella at that time, and they
could not develop the technology themselves. But you cannot curtail the advancement of
knowledge. It's impossible. In any field, you cannot say, “Well,
that part of knowledge you cannot get. You cannot enter.” So it was
inevitable that other countries would master the technology. This is why systems of
verifying nonproliferation commitments have been put in place. They have not yet been
adopted by everyone, but the mechanisms already exist.
BAS: The idea of having multilateral fuel-cycle facilities emerged as a
possible solution at the very beginning of the nuclear age, and it is being refloated
today. What's missing from current proposals?
DUARTE: These are good ideas, but they still need a lot of clarification, a
lot of discussion. At present, it would be hard to convince some countries that there
would not be interference in the supply of nuclear fuel or that arrangements would be
100 percent trustworthy. From ongoing discussions, I get the impression that some
countries are hesitant to embrace these proposals.
BAS: What questions remain for you?
DUARTE: Who would be the guardian of the fissile material stockpiles? How
would fuel be distributed? How could you guard against interested or strong states from
interfering with the process? How could you guarantee that facilities would be outside
of the influence of the host state or the receiving state? A number of questions remain
to be discussed. No system can ever be 100 percent, foolproof guaranteed. But it must be
something that nations will trust. Trust is very important.
BAS: Leading into the 2005 NPT Review Conference, there seemed to be a
breakdown in trust. Do you think states can use the forthcoming Review Conference to
rebuild trust?
DUARTE: I don't want to predict the future, but I hope that the
parties to the NPT have learned the lesson that in a conference system such as the NPT
you cannot pursue only your own narrow, parochial interests. The questions are so wide
and they interest everybody that a holistic approach is necessary. Issues have to be
seen from different angles, and there needs to be an appreciation of the connections
parties have with each other. One party cannot say that one aspect is so much more
important than others that they only pay attention to that issue and neglect the rest.
How long have we thought seriously about climate change? How long have we thought
seriously about human rights internationally? These are very short moments in world
history. We've thought about disarmament for perhaps a little longer, but
not too much longer.
BAS: Do you think that states parties have been doing that in the
preparatory committee meetings to 2010?
DUARTE: When I say I hope they have learned their lesson, I'm
hoping that they do a better job. With some utterances in several international
quarters, we can at least hope that things are different. But then again, this is only
an expression of hope that they will be more attentive to each other's
problems and interests when they meet next year.
BAS: What effect will the global economic crisis have on the NPT and
disarmament efforts more largely?
DUARTE: For several years now, the questions of disarmament have been on the
back burner. They have come to the fore recently, but now, of course, the two important
issues that touch all countries and that urgently need to be addressed are the financial
crisis and the climate change crisis. I don't think these issues have put
disarmament back on the back burner, but the international community has been seized by
them in the past year or so. Accordingly, there may be a change in the degree of
earnestness with which countries will look seriously into the question of disarmament.
Then again, that can help also.
BAS: How so?
DUARTE: By making it known that these global questions–climate,
finance, human rights, disarmament–must be tackled seriously and by the
international community as a whole. Everyone has a stake, so they are important to
address.
BAS: Have you learned anything about the power of national interests from
global efforts to reduce carbon emissions?
DUARTE: I may sound too philosophical, but I think you have to look at these
things with a very wide historical perspective. If you look at the history of humanity
and relations among countries over the past century, you have to admit that
we've come a long way. The international community has put together
mechanisms, tenets, and international legislation to address things that a few hundred
years ago were never thought of as part of the common interest. There's still
a lot to be done. I'm not saying that we solved all of the problems, but at
least today there is a clear conscience that some problems must be solved by everyone,
the whole international community together. How long have we thought seriously about
climate change? How long have we thought seriously about human rights internationally?
These are very short moments in world history. We've thought about
disarmament for perhaps a little longer, but not too much longer. That's not
a reason to be complacent, but it is important to realize how difficult these questions
are and that some progress has been made.
BAS: You mentioned the institutions that have been built up over the last 60
years. One of them is the Conference on Disarmament. To what extent is the Conference on
Disarmament adequate to address today's security challenges?
DUARTE: Let's start with the U.N. Charter, which is only about 60
years old. The charter has provisions that deal with disarmament, that enjoin members to
work toward disarmament, and others that lay out a system of international security. For
the past decades there has been some progress on all of these aspects. The Conference on
Disarmament has evolved a lot since the 1960s, when its predecessors had to work under
difficult Cold War conditions–especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis when
the world thought it was on the brink of a nuclear confrontation. And the world was then
much different. We were in the Cold War. You had two countries that stood above the rest
in a way that you don't have today. Today, the capacity of countries to act
is much more spread out. In any case, the conference, over the course of its existence,
led to a number of important agreements on nuclear tests, the agreement on chemical
weapons, and other agreements and understandings on disarmament. Over the last decade
the conference seemed to be incapable of repeating its past performance in terms of
negotiating and bringing forward agreement.
BAS: Is it the right mechanism for today's problems?
DUARTE: I always say, and many people agree with me, that the problem is not
in the mechanisms. The problem is in the will of countries to use the mechanisms. But
then again, the case can always be made that the mechanisms need to be improved. But I
think it's a useless discussion. If countries were willing to use the
instruments that they have at their disposal, they don't need to change them.
The problems at the conference are mainly a matter of the different perspectives and
interests. In the past, perhaps it was easier to arrive at agreements. Take the NPT for
instance, which started as an arrangement between the two major powers, and they
convinced their allies, the other countries in their spheres of influence, that it was a
good thing, and they signed up. Eventually, everyone signed up–well, almost
everyone signed up–but it was the brainchild of the two major powers. Today
it's not possible to do something like that. We have to find new ways in
which the different interests and views in the world community–the major
players at least–can be harmonized in order to get something useful and
lasting out of it.
Addressing regional questions, world questions, all the things that make countries
act internationally–you can only do that by sitting down and
discussing.
BAS: How do you do that?
DUARTE: I've worked on it all my life, and I don't
know any other way but diplomacy–discussion, the free exchange of ideas,
understanding the legitimate interests of different countries. Addressing regional
questions, world questions, all the things that make countries act
internationally–you can only do that by sitting down and discussing.
BAS: Are there particular disarmament negotiations that you have
participated in and continue to draw insight and guidance from?
DUARTE: Those negotiations in which prospective members, those who were
involved in the talks, looked at the possible final results as being universal, as being
nondiscriminatory, and as taking into account the different interests of the
participants in the negotiations, are the ones that are stronger and more destined to
last. You cannot say that things will be eternal, because circumstances change, but I
think nondiscrimination is important. Countries do not like to be treated differently.
BAS: But countries do have different strengths and roles in the
international community, so how do you accommodate that?
DUARTE: That is a difficulty, but it is not insurmountable. Take the
Chemical Weapons Convention. There were possessors, and there were nonpossessors. There
were large arsenals, and there were small arsenals. There were difficulties in fitting
the destruction timetables for different participants. There were difficulties in
monitoring the member states that did not possess the weapons but did possess chemical
industries that could produce the components for them. But ways were found in which
these challenges could be dealt with in a nondiscriminatory way, and parties seemed to
be satisfied with the arrangements. Of course nothing is perfect, and difficulties
arise. The member states meet every year, they review the treaty, and they make
decisions, all of which is absolutely normal.
BAS: Can you list other negotiations with nondiscriminatory outcomes?
DUARTE: Take the nuclear-weapon-free zones. I come from the region where the
first one was established. It took some time; it was difficult; it was not easy to do;
but eventually, Latin American countries came to an agreement that they would not
possess nuclear explosives and other weapons, and so far they have kept their promises.
This was 1967. Most of the non-nuclear parties to the NPT have kept their commitments
and have not become nuclear. Now you have one that left the treaty, and then made an
explosion, and there are doubts about another's program. But no other country
except the one that left the treaty has actually produced a nuclear weapon. So countries
can abide by their commitments.
BAS: Why is it so difficult to make arms control and disarmament issues
resonate with the public?
DUARTE: It has to do with a clear-and-present danger. Back in the 1980s in
Europe, populations were afraid of nuclear weapons that were pointed directly at them,
and they reacted publicly by demonstrating. This danger also resonated here in the
United States. I remember one million people marching to Central Park to demonstrate
against nuclear weapons.
Since then, those tensions have diminished because of the thaw in relations between the
United States and Russia. Also governments, especially in nuclear countries, have
succeeded in convincing their publics that there are good weapons and bad weapons and
that we should take care of the bad weapons, but the good ones should stay where they
are.
BAS: Do you agree that there are good nuclear weapons and bad nuclear
weapons?
DUARTE: No, I think all nuclear weapons are bad. Of course, you have people,
such as terrorists, which countries are understandably afraid of, but that still
doesn't make the weapons good on one side and bad on the other side.
BAS: How do you get national leaders and the public to understand that?
DUARTE: I think it's the public that must convince their rulers
and their representatives, especially in democratic countries. It is up to the public to
understand. There are several organizations that are dedicated to trying to put that
message across and the United Nations supports the work of civil society toward nuclear
disarmament. At the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs we promote the existing
agreements, and we help countries that have agreed to them to fulfill their commitments.
We also disseminate knowledge about why there should be agreements, why international
life would be more predictable with them. In doing so, sometimes I make a parallel
between climate change and disarmament, by saying that if we don't do
something seriously about climate change, then life on Earth may disappear as we know it
in a few decades. But if we don't do something serious about disarmament,
life on Earth as we know it may disappear in a matter of seconds. That is what we have
before us.
