Thomas R. Pickering

Abstract

THE DIPLOMAT'S DIPLOMAT

Few regions in the world haven't been infused with Thomas Pickering's sensibilities. In a distinguished diplomatic career, he has served as U.S. ambassador to Russia (1993–96), India (1992–93), Israel (1985–88), El Salvador (1983–85), Nigeria (1981–83), and Jordan (1974–78). In addition, he held the position of undersecretary of state for political affairs–the State Department's third-ranking post–from 1997 to 2001, and was special assistant to William Rogers and Henry Kissinger during their tenures as secretary of state.

Today, as co-chair of the International Crisis Group, a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board, and the vice chairman of Hills & Company, an international consultancy firm, Pickering continues to travel around the globe, helping to quell sensitive international security matters with constructive dialogue and direct engagement. To wit, for more than five years, he has participated in back-channel discussions with Iranian academics and policy advisers on a host of issues–including Tehran's nuclear power program.

To break the official diplomatic stalemate between Washington and Tehran, Pickering, along with United Nations Association of the United States of America president William Luers and former Managing the Atom Project executive director Jim Walsh, suggested earlier this year in the New York Review of Books that a multinational enrichment facility be established in Iran. “If Iran's enrichment program is turned into a multilateral project, it makes it extremely difficult for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium,” they wrote. “Any attempt to do so, even secretly, would carry the risk of discovery by the international management team and the staff at the facility.” The Bulletin spoke with Pickering about this proposal and a range of pressing international security concerns.

BAS: What's your early read on the long-term impact of the Georgia conflict on U.S.-Russian relations?

PICKERING: It isn't clear yet. The situation is more serious than a blip, but it doesn't necessarily have to lead to a resumption of the Cold War and a full breakdown of relations. Mainly, moving forward, the future of the relationship depends upon how both sides handle the question of Georgia and how they handle the prominent issues in their relationship–including points of contention. For the Russians, one such issue is NATO enlargement; for the Americans, one such issue is further intervention in the now-sovereign states that once belonged to the Soviet Union–à la Georgia.

BAS: Can negotiations involving important nonproliferation matters serve as a fulcrum to getting the U.S.-Russian relationship back on track?

PICKERING: Disarmament negotiations are a significant part of the U.S.-Russian relationship, but to depend upon them solely to get the relationship back on track is to put too much weight on a difficult question. Yet to ignore them entirely is foolish in terms of our common national interests. On this critical issue, the United States and Russia have to take the lead if anyone else is to follow.

BAS: How then does a constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington begin?

PICKERING: Both countries need to meet to formulate a positive agenda. Lately, they've increasingly focused only on the negative elements. And when you have negative elements predominating an agenda, it begets disputes, fights, and tensions.

Focusing on the positives of their relationship should naturally lead to a time-phased negotiation to try to achieve agreements on these positive elements–often treaties. To help this process, a senior official on each side should be appointed to help manage the relationship–much as Vice President Al Gore and former Russian prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin managed the U.S.-Russian relationship for most of the Yeltsin period.

Disarmament negotiations are a significant part of the U.S.-Russian relationship, but to depend upon them solely to get the relationship back on track is to put too much weight on a difficult question. Yet to ignore them entirely is foolish.

Now, these talks could most certainly involve nuclear disarmament. For example, could we achieve at least a 50 percent reduction of weapons and delivery vehicles over the next five years? They could also include nonproliferation. For instance, could the United States offer Tehran multinational enrichment facilities inside Iran and strong inspections? And could the Russians support that? Should Washington ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? Should the United States and Russia take the lead in the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty? Should both countries take the lead in establishing an international fuel regime, which would provide fresh fuel for what we expect to be a growing number of reactors around the world, while hopefully curtailing the number of countries that possess nuclear weapons?

We could also discuss a global missile defense cooperative between the United States and Russia–both with respect to detection capabilities and response capabilities. It would also make sense to mull over Europe's involvement in such a system. Of course, there are many other issues that Moscow and Washington could talk about–i.e., trade–but these are the most trenchant issues, allowing them to be discussed at a high level.

BAS: How would U.S.-Russian relations be different today if the Bush administration hadn't pushed so hard for missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic?

PICKERING: Missile defense is just one of a number of issues where the Russians have made their frequent concerns and complaints well known over the last few years–and in my view at least, Moscow had slightly opened the door to the possibility of cooperation. Now, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates say, in turn, that they, too, tried to open the door with their meetings in Moscow. So it's a little hard for me to know precisely what went wrong in that mutual door-opening exercise–whether it wasn't pursued enough, or whether it was soured by other issues.

For example, the color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were completely misunderstood in Russia–likewise for NATO enlargement. The Russians think NATO enlargement will leave them surrounded by an iron fence that will continue to tightly constrict around them. In my view, that's a Soviet propagandist idea. The more positive U.S. view, is that NATO enlargement presents an enormous opportunity for many states to cooperate together to deal with the world's most urgent peacekeeping needs in the service of the U.N. Security Council.

Those two vastly different views have tended to characterize a depth of misunderstanding that has led to the relationship's negative downward spiral.

BAS: What role does miscommunication play?

PICKERING: It's a combination of ideology and the failure to accurately communicate. By that I mean that diplomacy ought to be two-thirds listening and one-third talking. On both sides, we've tended to reverse that paradigm.

BAS: While you've mentioned halving the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former defense secretary William Perry, and former senator Sam Nunn have gone so far as to call for a nuclear-weapon-free world. How do you achieve either of these objectives?

PICKERING: We need to think about them as a goal first. Then we need to think about what paradigms could be used and followed on the road to zero. Even more importantly, what will be the security paradigms that replace the current regime that's tasked with controlling the spread of nuclear weapons? For example, there are already people in parts of the world who are concerned that if nuclear weapons truly disappear, how does the international community deal with countries holding the most devastating conventional weapons? And would some countries develop new conventional weapons that would asymptotically approximate at least low-yield nuclear weapons in destructive capability? How do we guard against those kinds of things?

Obviously, this then raises the question of whether we need conventional weapons arms control measures to go along with a nuclear-weapon-free world. And these requirements need to be sufficiently transparent, equitable, well shaped, and monitorable so countries will have a high degree of assurance that they're moving toward an enhanced global security environment.

BAS: In the last few years, many experts have lamented the “militarization” of the U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid apparatus. Do U.S. diplomatic tools meet current security challenges?

PICKERING: Not really. It's clear that we've underfunded and underplanned the necessary personnel and programmatic requirement for a more robust diplomacy. It's striking that not only have former secretary of state Colin Powell and Secretary Rice called for this, but now Secretary Gates has joined them. And he's joined them from the perspective that this is of national security importance and that it's a badly needed complement to the military. I would make the point that it's a needed complement to the military in the sense that diplomacy is our first line of defense and our first line of avoiding conflict–whether it might be between the United States and others or solely between other countries whose conflicts strongly affect us.

I'm chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and we've prepared a recent study to flesh all this out. It indicates that we need to add at least another 4,700 people over 5 years in all aspects of diplomacy–including development, public diplomacy, and stabilization, reconstruction, and security assistance. It also conceives of more robust programs that move development from the hands of people who are almost solely contract managers to individuals who can actually represent the United States on the ground in executing development assistance throughout the world.

BAS: Beyond improving U.S. diplomatic efforts, in what other ways can the country's national security system be improved?

PICKERING: In addition to the American Academy of Diplomacy study, I'm also participating in an extensive study called the Project for National Security Reform. Among the things that we've found is that there's a lack of cooperation among agencies and an inability to plan and relate policies in the national security area to budgetary requirements. Sadly, we've also found that in every presidential transition, every piece of paper generated by the former administration is taken out of the White House and the executive offices of the president and put away in a library. Therefore, we go through horrible transitions from president to president.

Unfortunately, the coming transition will have those attributes unless major efforts are made to change the dynamic. The notion of throwing away all of the prior administration's substantive findings is absolutely foolish. After all, foreign policy concepts don't vary radically between parties–certainly not to the point where everything has to be discarded. In some areas, there have been important changes made from one administration to the next, and that always should be the right of the new administration. But the United States shouldn't put itself at a huge disadvantage with respect to the rest of the world for narrow, ephemeral political reasons that come out of the campaign process.

Interestingly enough, in the past, the entire procedural setup similarly was changed. But President Bill Clinton kept most of the procedural and organizational arrangements of George Herbert Walker Bush, and George W. Bush has kept most of Clinton's arrangement. Hopefully, it will stay that way.

BAS: Where do you see overlap in State Department and Defense Department activities in U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid programs?

PICKERING: In recent years, the military has begun many security-assistance programs mainly because it had the money and Congress wouldn't give the money to State. And because Defense was involved in combat, it saw these programs as a necessary adjunct to its combat success. What we're proposing in the American Academy of Diplomacy study is to give the secretary of state traditional authority over security-assistance programs, which is basically setting policy and the financial parameters–with advice and guidance, of course, from the defense secretary and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, when combat conditions exist, we readily accept the notion that because these programs are so closely tied to the battlefield–often it means training local forces to support and assist U.S. troops in combat–that policy and fiscal decisions should be made by the defense secretary.

In either case, such programs should be implemented by the armed services. It's that kind of new alignment–or realignment along old principles–that will help us move away from the militarization of the foreign policy process in respect to these programs.

BAS: Almost a year ago, you released a report as co-chair of the Afghanistan Study Group that detailed the security situation in that country. Has the situation on the ground changed since?

PICKERING: It's a tremendously difficult problem that unfortunately hasn't gotten any better. In that report, we said that we had no game plan. We didn't have a single strategy that brought together Afghans, our allies, and ourselves in a single, overall effort that combined both military and civilian plans. We also found that we were failing very, very badly in Afghan police training. We were doing better in training the Afghan military, but the effort could certainly be stepped up.

We reported that we were failing badly at bringing in sufficient amounts of and sufficient focus to civilian assistance for rebuilding and development programs in Afghanistan–in part because we were missing some of the security necessary to do that effectively. We discovered that we hadn't established a useful or perceptive program for dealing with the enormous drug cultivation that goes on in Afghanistan, and that we needed to find adequate ways to bring Afghan farmers away from the production of opium poppies and toward other crops. The data indicated that they would do so if they could make 50 percent as much money on alternative crops, and that aerial eradication would alienate large parts of the Afghan farming public in critical areas and create another, much bigger recruiting ground for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

As for solutions, we said that we needed to unify leadership in Afghanistan–if not bringing everything under the control of a single leader (military or civilian), at least better coordinating civilian leadership and military leadership among our friends. In addition, we recommended that the Afghans, Americans, and U.S. allies work more closely with the leaders in Kabul to make sure that U.S. actions accomplished what the Afghan government itself felt were the most important things.

Those recommendations should be revisited, and indeed, there are a number of organizations who are about to do so. But until new recommendations come forward, those are as good as we can get.

BAS: Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has talked about rolling back the U.S. presence in Iraq. How would you initiate such a build-down diplomatically?

PICKERING: To start, we need to work closely with the Iraqis to settle the major differences and difficulties that have come up between them–what's the final program for governance, what role does the majority and minority play, how do all parties involved mutually respect each other with respect to those roles, how should the enormous income from the development of oil be distributed, what's the future of Kurdistan, etc. Thus far, seemingly, we've allowed the Iraqis to work on those problems themselves, with some prodding from Washington. It may be that other players–including Iraq's neighbors, each of whom has an interest in one or a number of the Iraqi factions–need to be brought in to help produce a coordinated view.

No preconditions with Iran means that we're each willing to talk to the other about whatever subject the other side wants to raise and work on. It doesn't mean anything more than that. It doesn't mean that we're legitimating the Iranian government.

I don't think the impact regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria could have on the final outcome in Iraq can be underscored enough. In fact, in a perfect world, a Middle Eastern regional organization could emerge out of this conflict and help provide future stability to the region, along with fostering trade and cooperation.

Finally, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major countries throughout the world need to play a much more active role in working toward a political settlement–although, admittedly, it will require an enormous burden on them. The United Nations could also help here–particularly in appointing negotiators from the region that might be useful in discovering what each of the parties wants, what they might be willing to accept, and in what way those two particular requirements can be put together.

BAS: But can the United Nations actually bring all of these parties together?

PICKERING: The United Nations is an important organization to use to provide the home base for the negotiating team to deal with these questions. That said, the United Nations is no more useful, focused, or powerful than its member states. That's why I've suggested that the critically important member states–both in the region and around the globe–need to be involved in this process if we're going to use diplomacy to overcome civil strife and find a way to marginalize the terrorists.

BAS: What then will entice regional engagement?

PICKERING: You have to work closely with the key regional parties to point out how such an effort could benefit them and to solicit their ideas. This is where a U.N. negotiating team could be particularly useful. Then you could put these ideas around a negotiating outcome and bring in others to support the common outcome as it moves ahead, recognizing that the key players here have to be the Iraqis. But the Iraqis need help from other players in order to bring the process together.

BAS: What lessons should Washington take from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan?

PICKERING: In both areas, there clearly was a need for serious pre-conflict preparation in the diplomatic arena–much as we did prior to the first Persian Gulf War. That effort, of course, required a lot of careful work, including very careful justifications of the reasons for using force and an effort to exhaust diplomacy.

In addition, very early in the post-combat period, Washington should have instituted robust civil-military cooperation to deal with what was largely a reconstruction and stabilization job–much of which could have helped undermine the causes for the insurgency.

BAS: In terms of Iraq's eastern neighbor, Iran, you believe that Washington should offer direct negotiations with Tehran without preconditions. Is that politically feasible?

PICKERING: No preconditions means that we're each willing to talk to the other about whatever subject the other side wants to raise and work on. It doesn't mean anything more than that. It doesn't mean that we're legitimating the Iranian government. And it doesn't imply that we've gotten to the stage of diplomatic relations yet. It does, though, open the door for the United States to talk directly with Iran about all of the issues that are on our mind and vice versa.

While perfectly splendid, the precondition currently posed by the United States–that the Iranians should cease enrichment activities–clearly isn't achievable, at least in a reasonable time frame. In the meantime, the Iranians are continuing to perfect their enrichment capacities, which puts them closer to turning those capacities into the service of a nuclear weapons program should they choose to do so.

Thus, we aren't moving ahead, and the things that seem to be blocking the route to progress are items of our own making. Now, there's nothing chiseled in stone that says conversations with Iran will produce immediate, glorious results. But it's no secret that our European partners and our Security Council partners have expressed a serious interest in the United States being engaged. And certainly within recent months, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns attended at least one of the talks on a one-time basis. That indicates that if we had real objections in principle to talking with Iran, those have probably been overcome.

My feeling is that it will take time, effort, and commitment, but by talking directly to the Iranians, we can explore a wide-range of activities that might all contribute to a settlement. I don't believe in a grand bargain, but I do believe in a grand agenda.

BAS: You've been conducting back-channel talks for quite some time with the Iranians. What's your sense of what the Iranians would like out of a dialogue with Washington?

PICKERING: Since we've agreed not to talk about them in specific detail as a way of continuing to encourage frankness and the dialogue itself, I'll eschew specifics. But in broad terms, I would say the talks have been helpful to each side in understanding the motivations and interests of the other side and what some of the concerns are that they have with respect to the other.

These have been helpful to us in understanding which direction the process of dealing with Iran on nuclear and other questions might go, and hopefully, Iran understanding the same with respect to the United States. These are the exact reasons for conducting the talks: They improve understanding and can confect a common agenda. They don't bind anybody or substitute in any way for official talks–they merely provide additional grist for the official mill.

BAS: From these discussions, do you get a sense that Tehran would be open to a multinational enrichment facility, which you've proposed, as opposed to a purely domestic enrichment capability?

PICKERING: I don't know. We'll have to wait and see. That might not come until there are opportunities for direct conversations.

BAS: Explain why you believe that establishing a multinational enrichment facility in Iran is the best way to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

PICKERING: I don't know if it's the best way, but it might be the most feasible way. What we attempted to provide is what the Iranians say they want–the development of Iranian technology for enrichment purposes to assure fuel supply–while at the same time, creating a strong firewall against their acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly, if we can persuade Iran to stop domestic enrichment and accept stringent, intrusive inspections, we'd have a better deal. But the administration seems focused only on stopping enrichment, leaving aside the notion that all kinds of other activities might be going on inside the country–including clandestine replication of Iran's enrichment arrangement.

Therefore, at the moment, the administration's proposal has acquiesced to weak International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Conversely, our proposal even goes beyond the Additional Protocol, calling for additional access and additional methods of inspection. Also, given Iran's stubbornness and intransigence with respect to enrichment, we thought it was better to compromise and allow multinational enrichment inside Iran with transparency and a better inspection system than not to have good inspections and continue to use pressure to attempt to get Iran to cease enrichment.

Finally, almost everybody agrees that trying to open a straightforward dialogue without preconditions is probably the best way in which to influence either issue. My personal view is that even with a diplomatic dialogue, we will need to have sanctions in reserve so that they can be employed if the Iranians prove to be difficult in working out an arrangement.

BAS: Do you see that plan as a template for other countries that decide to pursue a nuclear power program?

PICKERING: No, that plan is only for Iran, which is a reason why I've strongly advocated for an international nuclear fuel regime that would assure that fuel could be provided as long as countries were abiding by their nonproliferation obligations.

BAS: There are many ideas and proposals circulating in terms of establishing such an international nuclear fuel regime. Do you favor any one in particular?

PICKERING: I personally favor a fuel regime that features at least two or three competitors among the current enrichers and nuclear states and includes the ability to provide fuel as a last resort. One idea might be to put aside a certain amount of fuel in a truly neutral country and allow the IAEA to sell that fuel on the basis that it hadn't found the purchaser in violation of its nonproliferation obligations. That would be a method of assuring countries that fuel sales wouldn't be used to extract political concessions, but would be made on the basis of full compliance with nonproliferation obligations. Those kinds of things would be important to assure Iran and other countries that such a regime would meet their long-term fuel needs.

BAS: Is the Iranian nuclear program the issue that you would place atop the next president's national security agenda?

PICKERING: There are so many critical issues at the moment. Certainly, at its core, the present financial crisis is a national security issue. And there aren't many other issues that need to be addressed as rapidly and with as much urgency as our economic downturn.

Among the other pertinent national security issues, I would place the entire Middle East–Iran, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli issue, and Afghanistan and Pakistan by extension–at the top of the short-term list. And unfortunately, the new administration won't have the luxury of choice; each of these issues is equally demanding. The useful news is that the ability to make progress in some of these areas will help set the atmosphere and maybe even assist in making progress in the others.