Abstract
After dramatic reductions of nuclear weapons under START and the creation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in 1992, nuclear weapons cuts receded from the cooperative agenda of the United States and Russia. The two nations, which possess by far the largest nuclear arsenals on the globe (an estimated 20,000 weapons combined), have virtually halted their efforts to limit the number of weapons they store and deploy. Yet, the dangers inherent in their vast stockpiles of nuclear materials and weapons remain.
Indeed, cooperation between the two countries on nearly all fronts–except certain nonproliferation programs–has deteriorated during the past decade. Throughout the waning years of the Soviet Union, scientists, academics, and government officials regularly met to discuss the shared interests that lay at the center of U.S.-Soviet security and economic partnerships. The programs of the National Academy of Science's Committee on International Science and Arms Control, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education, and the American Council of Learned Societies are a few of the efforts that allowed adversaries to find common ground. After gaining direct knowledge of the other's politics, scientific research, and culture, many of the programs' participants went on to contribute to the creation of sensible policies in their national governments. Even when official U.S. Soviet relations were tense, scientists, academics, and other officials continued to talk with one another. Additionally, regular communication between the two nations' militaries provided a modicum of assurance.
Despite the political and cultural openings that followed the Soviet Union's dissolution, dialogue between officials faltered. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission established in 1993 succeeded in formally engaging high-level Russian and U.S. officials and their staffs on issues important to both nations–such as energy security, defense conversion, and space cooperation. Cooperation between scientists at U.S. nuclear weapons labs and their Russian counterparts improved nuclear safety and security in both countries. But these efforts have lost or are losing funding and political support. Likewise, channels of communication between military officials have shut down. Retired Gen. Eugene Habiger, the former commander of U.S. Strategic Command who established regular meetings and exchanges with his Soviet and Russian counterparts, has lamented the loss of direct contact between his successors and Russian military officials.
Discussion between U.S. and Soviet (then Russian) officials flourished because participants on each side understood that they shared common interests. To begin with, each nation recognized the global impact of total nuclear war. Their work together led to understandings that helped to avoid crises and sent a message to the rest of the world that even the most entrenched adversaries could work together to address problems that extended beyond their national borders. This spirit of engagement and collaboration has largely faded.
U.S. and Russian officials, including presidents Bush and Putin, speak of the friendship between the two countries, but a series of high-profile disagreements–on missile defense, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, independence for Kosovo, and U.S. influence in former Soviet republics–belie the partnership. The two countries have failed to follow through on the few joint security arrangements that they have agreed on, including the Moscow Joint Data Exchange Center, and seem reticent to make any further commitments, as seen in the failure to negotiate a follow-on agreement to START.
In the face of planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia offered to work with the United States to integrate Russian radar installations in Azerbaijan and in Armavir, Russia, that by many accounts would support U.S. aims. At the July 2007 “Lobster Summit” in Ken-nebunkport, Maine, Putin again advocated for collaboration on missile defense and on the Moscow information exchange center. He even suggested establishing an additional center in Europe where Western and Russian officials could compile and share defense information. Putin surmised that such collaboration would raise to an “entirely new level of quality” cooperation between the two countries. He was right. In contrast, since the summit, the Bush administration has shown little interest in moving beyond existing U.S. designs, and U.S. negotiators have only alienated Russian officials with half-hearted, conditional offers of compromise.
To improve U.S.-Russian relations, leaders on both sides need to recognize the shared agenda of the two countries and the opportunities that genuine collaboration would present. Building a partnership based on mutual trust and respect will help resolve a range of global security issues. As John Steinbruner argues in “Consensual Security,” on p. 23, cooperating on several issues–nuclear technologies, climate change, biotechnologies, and space security–could lead to a transformation of international relations.
In addition to negotiating further reductions in the size of their nuclear weapons stockpiles (both deployed and reserve), Russia and the United States should immediately reduce the launch readiness of their nuclear arsenals. By transforming their nuclear postures toward each other, Russia and the United States might finally move beyond the Cold War strategic template that each claims is distant history but which poisonously lingers, posing unnecessary risks.
Russian and U.S. leaders should also build on their 123 nuclear cooperation agreement and begin to lead negotiations for an international nuclear fuel regime that would eliminate the need for countries to develop their own nuclear fuel enrichment and manufacturing facilities. Converting fissionable material from U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons into fuel for civilian nuclear power production could help fill demand. Together with weapons reductions, these joint moves would enhance the credibility of both countries as world leaders.
Further agreement on nuclear weapons reductions and nuclear energy cooperation makes sense for other domestic and foreign policy reasons. Russia is eager to complement its roaring oil economy with a revived nuclear energy enterprise and growth in its high-tech sector; the United States has an interest in securing its energy future and keeping markets open across Asia. Both countries want to limit nuclear proliferation as civilian nuclear power becomes more prevalent globally. By leading an international effort to clarify and codify the rules of nuclear development and commerce, Russia and the United States could lay the groundwork for further economic and political partnerships.
The more overlap the two countries' agendas acquire, the more their leaders will be able to articulate to their citizens the benefits of shared action. Russians and Americans often seem trapped by vestigial Cold War concerns, but they crave economic opportunity, and seek to play a leadership role in the international community. It's up to leaders in both countries to take actions that promote an understanding of how the future security and prosperity of Russia and America are inextricably linked.