Peace Talk: My Life Negotiating Science and Policy

Abstract

A pioneer in the field of elementary particle physics and the first director of one of the most productive research facilities ever built, W. K. H. “Fief” Panofsky served as an adviser at the highest-level of government who advocated reason and restraint in the ongoing discussion of nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The following is an excerpt from his forthcoming autobiography, Panofsky on Physics, Politics, and Peace: Pief Remembers (Springer). A frequent contributor to the Bulletin for many years, Panofsky died on September 24, 2007 at the age of 88. We will miss his brilliance, courage, and compassion.

I announced my retirement as lab director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) in 1984 and became emeritus professor in 1989. The end of SLAC responsibility led to the concentration of my work fairly heavily on nuclear weapons arms control, in addition to various advisory and committee activities. A focus for addressing security matters was the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which I had joined in 1981 and chaired from 1985 to 1993. Several major studies were completed by CISAC while I was chairman. Two dealt with U.S. nuclear weapons policy. 1

Possibly the most important result of these studies, to me, was to clarify my thoughts on the question, “What are nuclear weapons for?” One study addressed the various forms of deterrence policy. After considerable debate, the committee agreed that the only justifiable remaining mission of nuclear weapons after the end of the Cold War would be to deter their use by others. This conclusion is equivalent to a “no-first-use” policy; that is, we recommended that the United States would never again be the first one to actually launch a nuclear weapon. This conclusion extends to their use to deter attacks by chemical or biological weapons.

Usually nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are lumped together under the single designation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I objected to the use of the WMD terminology because of the fact that the military characteristics of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are highly dissimilar; in fact, chemical weapons do not pack any more lethal destructive power per unit of weight of delivered munitions than do “conventional” chemical explosives. 2 Although the committee did not agree on a simple call for elimination of nuclear weapons, or even prohibition of nuclear weapons (elimination and prohibition are not the same!), it pushed for the creation of conditions that would make prohibition of nuclear weapons possible.

Independent science advice to the government is essential simply to prevent “bad science,” which occasionally is supported by government over a protracted period of time.

An important contribution was the committee's reports on management and disposition of excess weapons plutonium. It has been widely recognized that the stockpiles of plutonium accumulated in the world vastly exceed any reasonable need and constitute a burden in terms of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and radioactive contamination. Moreover, production of plutonium continues as a result of reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. Prior to CISAC's reports on plutonium disposition, the Energy Department had proposed construction of reactors specially designed for the plutonium disposition mission. The committee rejected that expensive and slow option and examined all possible disposition options, ranging from such extremes as shooting the plutonium into the sun on a rocket to burying the plutonium in very deep, multi-kilometer-long shafts. CISAC recommended two disposition options. The first was fabricating the plutonium into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, a combination of uranium and plutonium oxides, and then burning the MOX in existing reactors in the United States and Russia. The second option was to mix the excess plutonium with highly radioactive fission products from spent nuclear fuel and to immobilize this mixture by vitrifying it in heavy glass modules. This product would be essentially impervious to theft due to its radioactivity and could be disposed of together with other forms of spent fuel in a geological repository.

In agreeing on its report, the committee created and recommended the application of two concepts: the “spent fuel standard” and the “nuclear weapons standard.” The spent fuel standard implied that material containing plutonium, once disposed of, should not be any more amenable to theft or diversion than ordinary spent fuel from light water reactors. The nuclear weapons standard implied that plutonium, whether separated for civilian or military purposes, should be as securely protected before it is irreversibly combined with radioactive materials, as is an assembled nuclear weapon. A separate study by CISAC examined the extent to which current practices conformed to these standards.

Because the technological problems associated with the second option, that is, disposition of plutonium in a reactor, are complex, the complete study of the reactor-related options for plutonium disposition threatened to delay the issuance of the report. Accordingly, we decided to issue our report and prepare a separate report, under the chairmanship of John Holdren, dealing with the reactor-related options; the separate report was issued about a year later. 3

Both reports had a profound impact on policy but, sadly, not on eventual action. The Energy Department reversed policy and fully adopted the recommendations. I recall personally briefing Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary during a one-hour automobile ride when she was returning from a visit to SLAC. Negotiations were initiated with Russia to proceed with the disposition of excess plutonium, and I joined a special joint committee addressing that subject established by the academies of the two countries. Unfortunately, practical implementation of these decisions proved to be slow. The Russians were not interested in the “immobilization option” of burying plutonium as waste combined with radioactive material but agreed to pursue the MOX disposition path. They objected to immobilization as “throwing away” the fruits of hundreds of thousands of hours of socialist labor dedicated to producing the plutonium. The Energy Department, however, endorsed a dual approach and initiated programs toward both methods of disposition. In 2000, presidents Bill Clinton and Vladimir Putin announced a Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement to dispose of 34 tons of excess material, enough for about 10,000 nuclear weapons, but only about one-fifth of the total Russian inventory.

At the time of this writing, the amount of actually disposed plutonium was zero; despite the presidential agreement and provision of funds, the process was sidetracked by disagreements about such ancillary issues as liability of participating contractors and access to the disposition process by personnel of the contracting parties. Vacillations have forestalled any progress, and the vast plutonium stockpiles continue to need babysitting.

In 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered his famous “Star Wars” speech, in which he proposed an intense research and development program to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” by a defensive antimissile shield. I had received a few days' advance notice of the speech, but there had certainly been no prior consultation with any independent members of the scientific community.

Edward Teller, with direct access to the president, had been the principal advocate of Star Wars. He proposed a nuclear weapon-energized laser that would generate a highly directional X-ray beam as the means of providing the required shield.

For a number of reasons, President Reagan's speech was very confusing if not upsetting to those independent scientists who had long experience with the offense-versus-defense issue. First, the standards that a defense would have to meet to intercept essentially all incoming missiles were extremely high, and, notwithstanding the conjectured laser, no realistic technology was in view, or is in view today, to meet these standards. Second, nuclear weapons can be delivered to the U.S. homeland by many means other than ballistic missiles, so erecting a leakproof defense, or “astrodome” as it was dubbed, against only long-range ballistic missiles would have had limited value, even if it were feasible. 4 Third, any defense against nuclear weapons–in particular in the U.S.-Soviet context–would be escalatory if the cost to defeat such a defense by amplified offensive measures such as decoys proved to be much cheaper than the cost of the defense. I was drawn into a large number of discussions, including congressional testimony, in which strong criticism of the Star Wars proposal was expressed.

One interesting by-product of this role was my participation in a special study of the Pontifical Academy initiated by Pope John Paul II in late January 1985, ostensibly convened to discuss the weaponization of space, but which actually addressed the ballistic missile defense issue. A representative of President Reagan had requested that the Pope endorse the Star Wars initiative using the simplistic but defective argument that defensive measures are more conducive to peace than the offensive balance then in existence. The Pope shrewdly did not accept the request, instead asking his Pontifical Academy for counsel. I participated in the consequent deliberations, which advised the Pope that things were not as simple as that, and the Pope never endorsed Reagan's proposal.

An unprecedented success in arms control was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in 1970. Over time, the treaty has been acceded to by all nations on the globe excepting Israel, India, and Pakistan; North Korea signed, but later withdrew. Stemming proliferation of nuclear weapons appears essential to avoid an uncontrollable distribution of nuclear weapons, which would indeed endanger the future of civilization. Nevertheless, this task is an exceedingly difficult one: Proliferation of any new technology, once invented, has never been prevented in the history of humanity.

Israel acquired nuclear weapons during my tenure on the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The increasing evidence was incontrovertible, and I was troubled by the fact that on the political level the decision was apparently reached not to react to this instance of nuclear proliferation.

On September 22, 1979, a light flash was observed by one of the Vela satellites that had been orbiting for about a decade as part of the satellite family deployed specifically to monitor nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space. The detected flash occurred over the South Atlantic or the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. government's intelligence services were apparently persuaded that it originated from a surface nuclear explosion. As a result, President Jimmy Carter convened a special eight-member panel chaired by the experienced MIT physicist Jack Ruina; I was a member of this panel. We reviewed the available evidence with representatives of the relevant government agencies. In my view, the evidence for the light flash originating from a nuclear weapon was unpersuasive, or “not proven,” to use the Scotch verdict terminology; our report made the perhaps even stronger statement that the light flash was probably not caused by a nuclear explosion.

The evidence from the 1979 light flash continues to be controversial to this day. The National Security Archive records no fewer than 15 documents reporting on reviews of the incident. In addition, I participated in an in-depth Jasons review, which also reached an inconclusive result. I was particularly annoyed by an account by Seymour Hersh that claimed that the presidential panel chaired by Ruina was “instructed” to issue a negative report. 5 The membership of that panel certainly contained many individuals, such as Luis Alvarez, who were clearly “uninstructable,” and I would include myself in that category. Speculations about this event contend that if it were a nuclear explosion, it might have originated from some type of collaboration between Israel and South Africa, each of which at that time had an existing nuclear weapons program. Note that South Africa has dismantled its nuclear weapons program, including five completely assembled weapons.

The totality of these experiences has persuaded me of the crucial importance of independent science advice rendered to the highest level of government. Such advice can be divided into two categories: science in government and government in science. Science in government concerns scientific input to governmental policy, whereas government in science describes the financial and administrative support of science by governmental entities. Although science in government has been deteriorating, government in science is still vigorous, as demonstrated by some of the episodes I have cited.

Independent science advice to the government is essential simply to prevent “bad science,” which occasionally is supported by government over a protracted period of time. Such advice provides an independent voice able to both “blow the whistle” on bad science and to reach receptive ears. Examples along these lines, in some of which I participated, are abundant. A nuclear-propelled aircraft was supported by government at large expense over a long time until independent advice that such a device was simply impractical prevailed: The combination of the weight of the required reactor and that of the shielding for the pilot was an insurmountable barrier.

Pleas for eliminating nuclear weapons lack reality, but prohibiting them is within the range of feasibility. “Prohibition” and “elimination” are not the same; prohibition implies the possibility of limited clandestine evasion.

In addition to the PSAC, I served on a number of independent advisory bodies, including the advisory committee to the National Nuclear Security Administration, the defense branch of the Energy Department. But recently, this and most other independent advisory bodies have either been allowed to expire at the end of their designated terms or have been abolished outright. Examples include the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the advisory committee to the Department of Homeland Security, and the State Department's advisory committee on arms control. 6 Moreover, the scientific advisory bodies still in existence, such as the President's Council on Science and Technology and the Defense Science Board, are having a progressively increasing fraction of their members drawn from the industrial-scientific community and therefore can be considered to be less independent.

The issue of science advice to the highest levels of government comes to the very heart of the relation between science and government. Essentially all the questions discussed on these pages involve not only science, but also morality and politics. Much has been written about the social responsibility of the scientist. Indeed, scientists engaged in scientific work should become aware of the social consequence of their efforts. But this is easier said than done. When engaged in scientific or technical work, most performers are consumed by the substance of their work, and awareness of the consequences can come much later. When a scientist becomes aware of such consequences and enters the public arena as a citizen, then he can be accused by his peers or the public of abusing what reputation he may have as a scientist in having his opinion given undue weight. Yet if he remains silent, he can be accused of being callous and not baring the consequences of his work to the public.

I have chosen the middle road between these two approaches in pursuing basic physics and creating the tools to make progress in that field possible, while at the same time dedicating a substantial effort to examining and disseminating the impact of science on human affairs, particularly in national security. Let me conclude by expressing my views on the current dilemma brought into the world by nuclear weapons created through the efforts of physicists.

It is well known that nuclear weapons have multiplied the explosive power that can be carried by munitions of a given size and weight by a factor that can exceed 1 million. Two weapons, of average explosive yield one-twentieth of those in today's stockpiles, killed 250,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Notwithstanding these facts, the total inventory of nuclear weapons during the Cold War grew to about 70,000, and today, even after the end of the Cold “War, the number remains at somewhat below 30,000. Clearly these numbers are vastly in excess of any reasonable security needs.

Yet these stockpiles remain and constitute, in themselves, a threat to humanity. As a consequence, after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapon risks continue in several categories. First, the risk that some substantial fraction of the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the United States and Russia may be launched as a result of a warning yielding false alarms, or through errors in communications in command and control. Second, the risk that nuclear weapons might be used in a regional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries such as India and Pakistan. Third, the risk that nuclear weapons might spread to many other countries, resulting in a situation unmanageable by human institutions. Fourth, the risk that nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials might reach subnational terrorists and be exploded in populated areas. I do not give a critical discussion here of these dangers beyond regretting that the physical realities of nuclear weapons have been largely submerged under the symbolism of power that they seem to represent to political leaders. Let me instead make some relevant historical remarks.

After World War II, the control of U.S. nuclear weapons remained largely in the hands of the air force, and the air force leadership intended to use more and larger nuclear weapons as punitive tools to threaten and, if necessary, execute massive anti-population attacks. Concurrently, a series of major studies by scientists (in which I did not participate) considered the policies that should govern nuclear weapons. One of these studies, called Project Vista, was conducted at Caltech with J. Robert Oppenheimer as a leading participant. That study advocated design and construction of smaller nuclear weapons to be used in limited tactical attacks. The air force response was irate, and the report was suppressed, receiving scant attention even from those few who had access to it.

Paradoxically, during the evolution of the Cold War, the situation reversed. “Deterrence” became a common description for most policies; however, that term received a wide range of interpretations. Deterrence implies that assets of a potential opponent should be held at risk to a degree sufficient to persuade him that initiation of hostilities would result in retaliation, which in turn would deny him his initial objectives and would lead to an unacceptable loss. But there remain many unanswered questions.

What is to be held at risk? How do you understand the mind-set of an opponent in judging his scale of values? What is to be done if deterrence fails? Inasmuch as none of these questions have clear answers, during the Cold War successive political leaders both in the United States and the Soviet Union progressively diversified the missions that nuclear weapons were supposed to accomplish, and the insane buildup mentioned above was the result.

Ironically, both scientists and members of the defense establishment reversed their initial position on the mission of nuclear weapons after World War II. Some military leaders and civilian analysts maintained that “nuclear war fighting” at a variety of levels of nuclear violence would be possible, and that if war broke out, the West should prevail in a protracted nuclear exchange, or that, in other words, “a nuclear war could be won.”

In contrast, most scientists now conclude that such a course would lead to uncontrollable escalation with devastating results, and that only “finite” or even “minimum” deterrence, without anticipating actual military use of nuclear weapons, would be a prudent approach. Specifically, the Cold War policy of “extended deterrence,” that is, not only deterring a nuclear attack by others but also employing nuclear weapons to deter a variety of nonnuclear aggressive moves, has been largely rejected by the scientific community.

However, during the Cold War in Europe, U.S. and NATO policies largely promoted the role of nuclear weapons in compensating for the perceived inferiority of conventional weapons in NATO forces, thereby using nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression by the Soviet Union. Ironically, Russia today appears to justify its nuclear arsenal–the world's largest–as needed to compensate for the perceived inferiority of Russian conventional forces.

Nuclear weapons have not been used in combat for more than 60 years, but will that nonuse taboo hold? The nuclear weapons risks listed above remain very real, but at the same time, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented. Pleas for eliminating nuclear weapons lack reality, but prohibiting them is within the range of feasibility. “Prohibition” and “elimination” are not the same; prohibition implies the possibility of limited clandestine evasion.

Prior to possible prohibition, it seems feasible to me to drive for consensus that the only justifiable remaining role of nuclear weapons is deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons by others. Retaining, or even searching for, other missions for nuclear weapons is shortsighted and prolongs or even exacerbates the nuclear dangers. Such a restriction on the mission of nuclear weapons is equivalent to a universal declaration of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons, a declaration that has been embraced only by China, and by none of the other nuclear weapons states. But most important, such a restricted view of the mission of nuclear weapons should enable drastic reductions of the existing nuclear weapons stockpiles, in particular those held by the United States and Russia. Such a limit imposed on the role of nuclear weapons can be used to revitalize the nuclear weapons arms control drive, which lately has suffered a series of setbacks. This has been a personal disappointment to me because some of the achievements in nuclear weapons arms control that were enacted during the Cold War, some of which I participated in developing, have now fallen on hard times.

The U.S. government has opposed formal arms control treaties largely on the grounds that they limit U.S. flexibility. Indeed, they do: Treaties are binding agreements that transcend any one administration and preempt U.S. law. But such formal strictures are a necessity if they are to endure and become binding on all parties to the treaty. Currently, arms control is largely being promoted through enforcement by “a coalition of the willing,” meaning that different standards are being applied based on whether the relevant nation is “good” or “evil.” But which nation is presumed to harbor good guys or bad guys changes over time, and even depends on which nation is perceived to support or not support current U.S. interests; nuclear arms control, to be effective, must be more enduring than that. Selective enforcement, as practiced by the current administration, cannot lead to lasting control.

The United States, as the unquestioned leader–measured by nonnuclear armaments and economic strength–should have the strongest possible interest in leading the reining in of nuclear weapons on an irreversible basis. But the excessive emphasis on the part of the United States on solving international conflicts by military force is a driver toward nuclear proliferation: Less prosperous nations that cannot match the conventional military prowess of the United States are driven to compensate by acquiring nuclear weapons.

Restricting the mission of nuclear weapons (followed by reducing nuclear weapons inventories by treaty and stringently controlling weapons-usable material) does not in itself prohibit nuclear weapons but still greatly reduces their above-listed dangers. Anything less than such a drastic move simply postpones the need for action. Must we wait for a nuclear catastrophe before such actions are taken?