Abstract
Reining in the North
Jacques Hymans's article on Kim Jongil's motives for building the Bomb (“North Korea's Nuclear Neurosis,” May/June 2007 Bulletin) is important because it attempts to transcend the current debate between moderates and hardliners, both of whom Hymans sees as assuming that Pyongyang is a “unitary, rational actor” capable of being swayed by external incentives. Instead, Hymans thinks Kim is an example of an “oppositional nationalist,” which he defines as a ruler who has an intense fear of an external enemy coupled with intense pride in his national capacity for confronting the enemy–and is thus building the Bomb with his heart rather than with his head.
Hymans's argument begs the question of why North Korea ties the development of its nuclear program so closely to Pyongyang's relations with Washington. Far from seeking to build the Bomb at breakneck speed, Kim has been cleverly using it to establish normal relations with the United States, perhaps even to achieve a new security relationship–speeding it up when the United States refuses to talk, slowing it down when the opposite prevails.
Why play this game? It would seem obvious to any careful observer that Kim needs the United States as a protector, to allow him to fend off the advances of would-be regional hegemons who have always used the peninsula as a football, to catch up with his neighbors economically, and to win the propaganda war over the South. Unfortunately for Hymans, Kim's motives show him to be a unitary, rational actor who is interested in both a U.S. Marshall Plan for his economy (not some “carrots” but the entire vegetable garden) and a U.S.-DPRK Mutual Security Treaty to ensure his place in the region.
The fastest way to get Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program is for the United States to strike up a new security relationship with his regime, thereby gaining enormous leverage over him for the first time in the history of the nuclear crisis on the peninsula. Hymans's general theory for why rulers seek the Bomb has run into a special case that does not fit.
Chief foreign policy adviser to Gov. Bill Richardson
First, while Namkung's interpretation of North Korea's diplomatic goals is perhaps plausible, it is certainly not “obvious.” Having a “protector” makes you a protectorate. But as I note in my article, due to the oppositional nationalism of its leadership, Pyongyang has always rejected such dependent status. It has instead consistently bitten the hand that feeds it.
Second, while Namkung may be correct that North Korea typically speeds up its nuclear effort when the country is being shunned and slows it down when it is being engaged, as I note in my article such tactical shifts are entirely consistent with an unchanging strategic objective of obtaining nuclear weapons. This is not an argument against engagement, but rather an argument for having realistic expectations about what engagement might achieve.
The Clock
For 60 years, the “Doomsday Clock” has been the world's most recognizable symbol of global catastrophe. Since 1947, the Clock has moved forward and back 18 times, reflecting changes in the state of international security. The Bulletin's Board of Directors–in consultation with a prestigious group of sponsors that includes 18 Nobel laureates–is the “keeper” of the Clock, deciding when to move the Clock's hand, and by how much. At present, it is five minutes to midnight.
UPDATE: Friendly fire?
Coalition forces in Iraq are already contending with the legacy of unsecured stockpiles of locally-produced and imported small arms in Iraq, where insurgents have been arming themselves with weapons looted from the fallen government. (See “Sweating the Small Stuff,” by Matthew Schroeder, September/October 2007 Bulletin).
Further complicating the threat of loose arms in a war zone, the Government Accountability Office reported in August that the Pentagon has lost track of about 190,000 AK-47 assault rifles and pistols that were haphazardly distributed to Iraqi security forces in 2004 and 2005, before an accounting system could be put into place. Though the report does not contain information or even conjecture as to where the weapons could have ended up, experts already fear the worst: An unnamed senior Pentagon official cited in the Washington Post acknowledged that “some of the weapons probably were being used against U.S. forces,” making it likely that the U.S. military is again battling an enemy equipped, at least in part, by U.S. taxpayers.
Third, I would remind Namkung that even if North Korea did have no fonder wish than to become a non-nuclear U.S. protectorate, that final status would certainly be unacceptable to at least one of the “would-be regional hegemons” to which he refers. As things stand today, a warming trend in U.S.-North Korean relations is good for U.S.-Chinese ties. But if things got too cozy, Beijing would start to have second thoughts about the process. And as I note in my article, whatever we do on the peninsula, we should always remember that North Korea is at best a minor power in a region where we have much, much more important relationships to manage.
Controlling conventional arms
Thank you for drawing attention to the work of the Control Arms Campaign and its efforts to develop an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) (“Conventional Wisdom,” March/April 2007 Bulletin). I strongly support the idea of an ATT and believe that developing common international standards is an essential step in stemming uncontrolled arms proliferation. However, the ATT is but one part of a much larger strategy. The most effective strategy would be composed of complementary national, regional, and global initiatives that incorporate action on four different fronts: controlling supply, taking surplus or obsolete weapons out of circulation, ending misuse, and curbing demand. Each one of these steps is crucial to minimizing the deadly effects of small arms proliferation.
Senior analyst,
Center for Defense Information
Criminalizing first use
New York Democratic Sen. Hillary Clinton recently took Illinois Democratic Sen. Barack Obama to task for saying he would never use a nuclear weapon in Afghanistan or Pakistan, responding that she would not take any option off the table.
Those who say that we take no options off the table may think they are acting tough, but in reality they are being dangerously irresponsible. A presidential candidate making that statement is expressing a willingness to initiate nuclear war, and must not go unchallenged.
In W. K. H. Panofsky's online column, “The Nonproliferation Regime Under Siege,” (see thebulletin.org), he urges the United States to adopt a doctrine that “the only justifiable remaining mission of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others.” Simply to abjure first use is not enough, since the world cannot be sure we will never retract that promise. Accordingly, we should also seek to criminalize it.
Nuclear weapons have not been used in war for over 60 years. There may be no better proof than this that they are useless as war-fighting weapons. Against another nuclear power, a U.S. threat to use a nuclear weapon is likely to be ignored, as the other side could count on assured retaliation to act as a deterrent. Against a non-nuclear weapon state, using a nuclear weapon would be the most extreme act of terror and would be seen by the world as starting a nuclear war. Either would be extremely destructive to our security.
Accordingly, the United States would lose nothing and gain much by declaring that first use is and should be recognized under international law as a crime against humanity. Nuclear weapons would, of course, remain legitimate in response to another's first use. Regarding Iran, criminalizing first use would make it clear to them that they would gain nothing by trying to acquire that capability.
There were objections during the Nuremberg Trials over decisions made after the fact about what was a war crime. Far better for the international community to decide beforehand that first use, without exception, would be a war crime–not only in the interest of justice, but also to serve as a powerful force against ever starting a nuclear war and convincing nuclear wannabes of the futility of their efforts.
Aiken, South Carolina
Climate and conflict
As the Bulletin acknowledged with its decision to move the “Doomsday Clock” forward in January 2007, the environmental changes caused by global warming represent a potential threat multiplier for instability around the world. The resulting water shortages, food insecurity, and coastal flooding may exacerbate conflict along existing economic, ethnic, or sectarian divisions. Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East are all vulnerable, and many of the states at greatest risk are those whose governments are most fragile.
The bipartisan legislation that Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska and I have introduced, the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, states that the consequences of global warming represent a clear and present danger to the security of the United States. It further requires the intelligence community to produce a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)–a comprehensive review of a potential security threat that combines, correlates, and evaluates intelligence from all of the relevant U.S. intelligence agencies, to assess those risks.
The CIA, the National Security Agency, the Pentagon, and other members of the intelligence community must pool data, share perspectives, and work together to assemble an accurate picture of threats to U.S. security. We believe that the threat of global warming is significant enough to require such an assessment.
The 2006 National Security Strategy recognized that the United States faces new security challenges, including environmental destruction. An NIE, accompanied by additional funding for research into the strategic implications of global warming, will build on this recognition and help frame future policy.
Economist Jeffrey Sachs and many others have pointed out that we are already bearing witness in Darfur and elsewhere to the ways in which worsening climates may aggravate social tensions and exacerbate violence. I firmly believe that we need to take significant steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lead the world in efforts to improve energy efficiency and sustainability, but we must also face the fact that the global climate is changing and help those countries that are likely to be both most affected and least capable of responding to this altered environment.
Democrat, Illinois
Taking disarmament seriously
All of the nuclear weapon states support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) “in principle,” including those that are not parties to it. But they justify their continued possession of nuclear weapons with the specious argument that they have “special” security needs, which can only be satisfied with nuclear weapons.
Every nation can argue that it has “special” security needs since that is a subjective term. However, the rationale that “special” security needs can only be met with nuclear weapons ignores the advantages of other options, such as multilateral cooperative security assurances or different security policies.
In spite of past, present, or future security needs, whether real or imagined, special or otherwise, 180 or so other nations have found it possible to honor their legal commitment under the NPT. All of them have resisted nuclear weapons' siren call of international prestige; a few nations, such as South Africa and Libya, have even desisted from their own programs.
Contrast that with the conduct of the five nuclear-weapon-state signatories to the NPT, which have not lived up to their legal obligation to negotiate disarmament. As the Bulletin reported in its July/August 2007 issue (“The Next Generation of Nuclear Weapons”), the United States and Britain are planning to upgrade old warheads and nuclear weapons systems. Russia, France, and China are also modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Their continued possession of nuclear weapons and insistence on needing them for security may be the single greatest stimulant for nuclear proliferation.
All nations must support the NPT in practice, and nuclear weapons must come to be irrelevant to their security needs. If no nation has them, no nation needs them. The world made biological weapons illegal in 1975 and did the same with chemical weapons in 1997. Let's put our principles into practice and finally make nuclear weapons illegal too. If not now, when?
Atlanta, Georgia
Rylstone, New South Wales
Risky Russian rhetoric
It takes both courage and wisdom so characteristic of Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin to provide insight into the rationale behind Russia's official anti-Western propaganda and its prime purpose (See “Reading Russia's Posture,” July/August 2007 Bulletin). His message is that, “When it comes to analyzing Russia's nuclear attitudes, one must understand that there exists a vast gulf between what is said and what is done. Statements made by Russia's military and political leaders are–perhaps not surprisingly–quite different from actual Russian policy.”
Playing up external threats has been a time-tested tool throughout modern history to consolidate society at its most crucial stages of development and to rally the population behind the national idea. In this sense, Russia's double standards as described by Dvorkin are hardly a unique phenomenon. However, using the West as a straw man for accelerating the development of a national identity can do irreparable long-term damage to the Russian public, which is predictably reacting with dramatically increased hostility to the West and with intensified ultra-nationalistic feelings. With Moscow fanning the flames of old animosities, it comes as no surprise that Russians once again cling to the cliche depicting their country as encircled and relentlessly squeezed by hostile states.
It is naïve to believe that misplaced public risk perceptions resulting from such misguided policies could be waved easily away by a magic wand whenever warranted by new and perhaps benign short-term political considerations. Public risk perceptions have deeply embedded, durable qualities, unlike policy and propaganda imperatives. Unfortunately, these perceptions not only change slowly but are also extraordinarily persistent even in the face of contrary evidence. Broken public trust in Russia's international partners will not be so easy to restore among the Russian populace, who is an important stakeholder in the success of international cooperation.
Associate director,
Center for International Trade and Security
University of Georgia
Health and governance
I read with interest Jonathan D. Clemente's article “In Sickness and In Health” that appeared in the March/April 2007 Bulletin. His thesis–that physical and mental problems in world leaders have a profound effect on world events–has been well documented. Although Clemente has no first-hand experience in this arena, he has done his research carefully.
Whether the issue is political, economic, or military, people are involved, and failure to appreciate the human factor can be a fatal flaw, especially in the formulation of policy and plans. “Within that context, policy makers should not underestimate the effects of medical and psychological issues (minor and major)–including side effects of medication–on governance and decision-making.
Over the course of a long CIA career, I have found this work to be a challenging, intellectually stimulating, and medically ethical way to make a difference at the global level. I would encourage experienced professionals with a doctorate in any of the medical or social sciences to consider submitting a resume to the CIA.
Retired chief
Medical and Psychological Analysis, CIA
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in the letter above are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or any other U.S. government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or CIA endorsement of the author's views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
Have faith in the NPT
Reading Jeffrey Lewis's “A Crisis of Confidence” (January/February 2007 Bulletin), I was reminded of a concept I enunciated some years ago. It is essentially a corollary to the idea of the “self-fulfilling prophecy,” which I call “the principle of anticipatory rejection.” My idea was that if you believe a course of action will be rejected, then you avoid that rejection by not pursuing it in the first place. Thus, being convinced that other parties to the nuclear nonproliferation regime will not act in good faith, certain U.S. officials have declared it invalid, thus exempting them from its obligations. With such reasoning everyone loses, because inevitably, if we are perceived to be proceeding without restraint, others will follow suit.
St. Louis, Missouri
CORRECTIONS: The “Energy Comparison” chart accompanying Matthew L. Wald's essay, “Getting Power to the People” (September/October 2007 Bulletin) mistakenly cited the cost of generating electricity with nuclear power as 39.6 cents per kilowatt-hour. The correct figure is 3.96 cents per kilowatt-hour.
U.S. treaty obligations do not require the dismantlement of 4,500 nuclear warheads, as spelled out in the snapshot box of the September/October 2007 Nuclear Notebook, “The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, Today and Tomorrow.” We regret this editing error.