Abstract
In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, there was much hand-wringing over the threat posed to coalition troops by Saddam Hussein's unconventional weapons. Now we know that the real weapons of concern were not VX nerve gas or smallpox, but the millions of garden-variety rifles, grenades, explosives, and artillery shells that littered the country. These weapons–part of an estimated 600,000-3,000,000 tons of locally produced and imported weapons accumulated over several decades–were stored at more than 18,000 sites. In the anarchy that followed the collapse of the Iraqi regime in March 2003, looters carted off thousands of weapons that later formed the core of the insurgents' arsenals. Since then, the United States has spent billions of dollars collecting and destroying munitions, improving the armor on military vehicles, and struggling to defeat the ubiquitous improvised explosive devices that are responsible for most U.S. casualties in Iraq.
While Iraq is an extreme case, there are other examples of massive political upheavals that led to the widespread dispersal of government weapons stocks. In Somalia, thousands of weapons were looted from the arsenals of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre after he was deposed in 1991. Warring militias used these arms to kill one another and plunge the country into years of lawlessness. Six years later and on another continent, economic instability led to the collapse of the Albanian government and the dispersal of 500,000 small arms. These weapons reportedly contributed to high rates of violent crime in Albania and to the outbreak of armed conflict in neighboring Kosovo.
What can be done to prevent similar disasters in the future? The first step is to secure and destroy surplus weapons caches in countries that are willing to part with them. Foreign aid programs that help dispose of such stocks are an effective way of preventing these weapons from ending up in the wrong hands. Yet despite their obvious value, such programs are often small and underfunded. Expanding them should be a top priority of donor governments.
The international community also needs to do more to prevent the accumulation of large weapons stockpiles by unstable, aggressive, and irresponsible regimes. During the 1980s, Iraq imported approximately $61 billion in arms from the Soviet Union, France, China, and other countries, with disastrous results. One way to potentially reduce such transactions is for arms exporting countries to establish a common set of arms transfer criteria. This is the goal of a British-backed global arms trade treaty that has won initial support from 153 countries. But negotiating an effective set of transfer criteria–and getting buy-in from most arms exporters–is a Herculean undertaking that will take years to accomplish. In the meantime, individual governments need to bring more economic and diplomatic pressure to bear on irresponsible arms exporters.
According to the GAO, the U.S. military knew about many of the stockpiles in Iraq but was too short-staffed and preoccupied with other matters to secure them.
Simply halting the export of arms to regimes of concern is often not sufficient to prevent stockpiling, as many countries have domestic weapons-manufacturing capabilities. Particularly widespread is the ability to manufacture small arms, light weapons, and artillery shells–the weapons of choice for the insurgents and criminals that often wreak havoc after regimes collapse. Therefore, militaries that operate in conflict situations need to be prepared to quickly and effectively secure munitions storage sites. In this regard, the U.S. Government Accountability Office recently recommended that the Defense Department “incorporate consideration of conventional munitions storage sites security into all levels of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and other directives.” Yet doctrinal changes alone do not guarantee that future military campaigns will be staffed and resourced to secure conventional weapons stockpiles. According to the GAO, the U.S. military knew about many of the stockpiles in Iraq but was too short-staffed and preoccupied with other matters to secure them. Senior military and administration officials must prioritize this mission, and Congress and the press must ensure that the lessons of Iraq are not forgotten.