Arab Nuclear Envy

Abstract

Iran's newfound stature is compelling Arab leaders to seek nuclear power on their own terms.

Egypt's announcement last September that it will revive its dormant nuclear program–coupled with similar statements from Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab governments–is a direct consequence of Iran's budding nuclear program and the international community's inability to stop it. Although Iran currently does not possess nuclear weapons, for the better part of two decades, it has secretly pursued the ability to master technologies that could be used to develop such an arsenal. And while Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it has openly flouted its obligations and responsibilities to that agreement. As the nuclear standoff continues, moderate Arab leaders worry that a “Persian nuclear program will empower Shiite Iran to become the prominent military power in the region next to Israel.

Recent events in the Middle East, including the conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, have portrayed Arab leadership in the eyes of their constituents as weak, incompetent, and mere followers of U.S. policy. This perception has provoked unprecedented criticism of Arab governments from their citizens, media, and prominent intellectuals–and has motivated some Arab leaders to publicly discuss plans of acquiring nuclear power to restore the appearance of strength and independence. Equally important, Arab leaders wish to emulate unbendable Iranian behavior, which, thus far, has enhanced the Iranian government's popularity at home, increased its influence in the region, and compelled international concessions and tacit recognition of Iran's “inalienable rights” to nuclear technology.

Dance, dance revolution: Iranian performers hold up alleged samples of enriched uranium on April 11, 2006.

Many countries in the Middle East have developed a growing sense of insecurity due to Iran's persistent quest for nuclear technology. Historic rivalries and a legacy of distrust between Arabs and Persians still exist throughout the region.

Those feelings have been heightened by Iran's growing influence in post-war Iraq and concerns about a subsequent rise in Shiite power in the predominantly Sunni Middle East. It's hardly surprising, therefore, that Arab governments view current events with trepidation. “Iran's nuclear program has become worrisome for the region and a fundamental concern for all countries of the world,” declared Abdul-Rahman al-Atiya, secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), whose members include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 1 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal was even more blunt during a February 2006 speech delivered in Washington, D.C.: “Where is Iran going to use these weapons?” he asked. “If their intention is to bomb Israel, they will kill Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, and Saudis as well.” 2

Other key countries in the region–which have forsworn acquiring nuclear weapons as active members of the NPT–are more inclined to rethink their non-nuclear status as Iran edges closer to becoming a threshold state. A noticeable turning point was the eighteenth annual Arab Summit, held in Khartoum, Sudan, on March 28, 2006. Amr Musa, secretary-general of the 22-nation Arab League and former foreign minister of Egypt, stated, “It is important for me to use this forum to call on the Arab world to quickly and powerfully enter the world of using nuclear power.” 3 His remarks may have been intended as an implicit appeal for Arab governments to develop nuclear energy programs as a means for obtaining the capability to manufacture nuclear arms in the future.

Among the countries most amenable to that appeal is Egypt, where views of Iran's nuclear program are complex. The Egyptian government and its security communities are largely critical of Iran's lack of transparency and oppose its potential acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Insofar as Egypt has supported Iran's right to build a peaceful nuclear program, it has stressed Cairo's long-held goal to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWZ) in the Middle East. As such, Egypt joined with the United States and the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) in favor of referring the Iranian nuclear file to the U.N. Security Council on February 4, 2006.

Egypt certainly does not favor preemptive actions against Iran's nuclear i program because it fears that such g an attack would further destabilize the region and incite terrorism. Indeed, the Egyptian government has remained resolute in dealing with Iran not as a stand-alone issue but concurrent with the region as a whole. Egyptian opposition groups, on the other hand, have taken a much different stance. The Muslim Brotherhood, which, after recent Egyptian parliamentary elections, now holds 76 seats in the 454-member lower house of Parliament (Majlis al-Sha'ab), has stated that a nuclear-armed Iran would be helpful in establishing a balance between Israel and the Islamic world. 4 At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood has vociferously advocated an Egyptian nuclear weapons program as a sovereign right and as a way to safeguard Egyptian national interests.

Unofficial polls conducted by Arab news sources indicate that, similar to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a large majority of Arab citizens throughout the Middle East are not opposed to a nuclear Iran, which they view as a counterbalance to Israeli and U.S. hegemony in the region. 5 In that same vein, many Egyptian citizens and intellectuals are against what they see as illegitimate Western pressure against Iran–a country they believe has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology as a member of the NPT And while many Arab intellectuals and citizens in Egypt and elsewhere believe that the West is exaggerating Iran's potential threat to the region, Arab envy of Iran's technological progress has increased, along with overt calls for Arab governments to achieve technological and nuclear parity with Iran and Israel as a matter of Arab nationalism and pride.

In June 2006, the EU-3, Russia, China, and the United States offered Iran an incentive package to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and other sensitive parts of its nuclear program in return for economic and technological assistance. This offer irked some Arab observers who saw it as a reward for Iranian stubbornness. Many in the Arab world were also discouraged at the exclusion of Arab governments, who were seen as passive spectators while the West was nearing a grand bargain with Iran. Arab media outlets articulated suspicions that Iran might reach an agreement with the United States at the expense of Arab interests. Some analysts feared that such a rapprochement between Iran and the West might bring the region back to the days of the shah and Iranian military hegemony in the Persian Gulf, a time when Iran portrayed itself as the policeman of the region.

Moderate Arab leaders see an unprecedented opportunity to pursue their nuclear ambitions while simultaneously keeping in good standing with the international community and their own constituencies.

Similarly, intellectuals in the region called on Arab governments to adopt a unified and assertive stance against Iran's reemergence in the region and to transcend narrow national interests and old rivalries so that Arabs might master their own destiny. The Pan-Arab periodical Al-Quds Al-Arabi argued that there was much to learn from Iran's example. It emphasized that Arab governments should see the “West's generous incentives as a victory for Tehran's unwavering approach, which “forced the United States to give up its former aggressive attitude. This was the result of the Iranian leadership's perseverance and the fact that Iran has gained the largest possible number of cards that it can use to put pressure on the United States, especially in Iraq.” 6

Pan-Arab sentiments would surface again in the summer of 2006. Following Hezbollah's abduction of Israeli soldiers, Israel bombed Lebanese infrastructure, including the Beirut airport, oil depots, bridges, roads, and entire neighborhoods in various cities and towns. While the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other moderate Arab states initially blamed Hezbollah for provoking the war with Israel, they soon had to backpedal due to perceived Israeli overreaction, U.S. acquiescence to the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure, and the U.S. refusal (for more than three weeks) to allow a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.

The general Arab perception of the inability of their governments to stop the renewed invasion and destruction of Lebanon–coupled with Arab envy of Iranian nuclear progress, the ongoing U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the long-standing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories–prompted Arab intellectual criticism and popular anger to reach an apex.

At the height of the war between Israel and Hezbollah, Egyptian security analyst Salamah Ahmad Salamah gave voice to these sentiments, arguing that Arab countries, especially Egypt, should emulate Iran's resolute behavior, focusing specifically on the nuclear sector. In a commentary in the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly [a similar piece was written in the Arabic Al-Ahram, Egypt's leading newspaper], Salamah asserted that the contemporary Arab sense of humiliation was a direct result of abandoned nuclear aspirations:

“We should compare our conditions and actions with those of Tehran. Iran has doggedly pushed on with its nuclear program in the face of fierce U.S. and European opposition. Iran has been cajoled and threatened, offered carrots and sticks, and it refused to listen. Iran refused to trade its nuclear program for a bag of poisoned sweets. We, on the other hand, buckled at the first temptation. Egypt and other Arab countries gave up their nuclear programs in the 1970s and 1980s because we were told to do so or else were frightened in the wake of Chernobyl. Whatever the motives, Arab populations were duped and now have to pay homage to a scientifically and militarily superior Israel…. Had one Arab country, say Egypt, refused to bow to threats and listen to temptations, we would have had nuclear weapons, just as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea do. And things would have been different in this region. We would not have been watching the rape of Lebanon. We would not have seen the United States throwing its weight around the region. We would have had nuclear parity, and with it some respect. The humiliation and helplessness that we now feel could have been avoided had we acted in a timely manner, had we had more foresight, and had the strength to stand up for our rights.” 7

Public outcry: Egyptians protest the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon during the summer of 2006.

On August 14, 2006, the day the cease-fire ended the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, Mustafa Al-labad, editor of the Arabic magazine East Kama, underscored Arab concerns: “If ‘god forbid’ a battle erupts between Washington and Iran … the losers and those who will pay the price are the Arab countries, which will be caught in the crossfire in this confrontation. I think the time has come to formulate a united Arab political stance, not necessarily with Iran or against it, but to protect Arab interests.” 8

It was during this political climate that, in the following month, Jamal Mubarak, the son of Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, asked delegates of the country's ruling Egyptian Democratic Party to consider a proposal to revive Egypt's civilian nuclear power program. He spoke of Egypt's “responsibility to offer a new vision for the Middle East based on our Arab identity” and explicitly rejected the “New Middle East” (a term used by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the war in Lebanon). 9 Mubarak insisted that a revived nuclear program was crucial to Egypt's increasing energy needs and reiterated Egypt's right as a member of the NPT to engage in peaceful nuclear activities. A few days later, the minister of electricity and energy announced plans to construct a $1.5 billion, 1,100-megawatt power plant on the Mediterranean coast at El-Dabaa. (By 2020, Egypt plans to build three additional plants, generating a total of 1,800 megawatts.) Moreover, the Egyptian media reported that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman promised to contribute financial aid to reviving the nation's long-dormant nuclear program. 10

Similarly, at the end of a GCC summit in December 2006, an official statement affirmed the organization's decision to commission a study on pursuing a joint nuclear program among its six members. Prince Saud al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, supported the rationale behind a shared nuclear development initiative: “Gulf states are not known for seeking hegemony or threatening power.

They seek stability and peace.” 11 The members of the GCC offered assurances that any nuclear program would be pursued in a transparent manner in compliance with international law. Meanwhile, the GCC reemphasized its hope for a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East and called on Israel to open its nuclear arsenal to international inspectors and eventually eliminate its weapons. 12

This about-face comes as the GCC, Egypt, and other countries fret over the failure of the United Nations to stop Iran from enriching uranium. They are troubled by the idea that they might be left behind should Iran one day develop nuclear weapons. Like the GCC, Egypt has publicly assured the international community that it will abide by the rules of the NPT, and that its nuclear program is not a covert attempt to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capability. Yet, it is probable that Egypt will pursue a dual-pronged nuclear posture. It will likely continue to advocate and call for a NWZ in the Middle East as a prerequisite for increased stability while aggressively pursuing a robust peaceful nuclear program that can be converted into a military program if, in the next decade, Iran withdraws from the NPT, or if a serious external challenge to Egyptian security emerges.

Morocco is another country that has declared its intentions to embark on a nuclear power program. It first made the announcement in April 2006, and its plans were given more weight in early September during Russian President Vladimir Putin's state visit to Rabat, when a spokesman for Russia's nuclear export agency, Atomstroiexport, declared that Russia would bid on a contract to build Morocco's first nuclear power station. 13

Morocco sees nuclear power as an efficient means for reducing energy costs and further diversifying its energy supplies. Moroccan domestic electricity production has not been able to keep pace with increasing domestic demand that is growing at an annual rate of 8 percent, which forced Morocco to import electricity from Algeria and Spain. Moreover, extensive oil-exploration efforts have not uncovered any major resources, forcing Morocco to import oil from the Persian Gulf and Russia. As a result, the use of nuclear energy to produce electricity is attractive. 14

The general Arab perception of the inability of their governments to stop the renewed invasion and destruction of Lebanon prompted Arab intellectual criticism and popular anger to reach an apex.

While Morocco's new pursuit of nuclear technology may not be directly related to a security calculus vis-avis Iran, it is obvious by the timing of the new announcement that Morocco, like Egypt, is emboldened by Iran's defiance and subsequent success. Egypt, the GCC, and Morocco's statements of upcoming nuclear ventures all come at a time when Arabs observe Iran receiving generous offers of cooperation from the West despite Tehran's lack of transparency and its acquisition of advanced technology with the help of Pakistani physicist A. Q. Khan's illicit nuclear network.

As such, moderate Arab leaders see an unprecedented opportunity to pursue their nuclear ambitions while simultaneously keeping in good standing with the international community and their own constituencies. They have maintained a largely favorable record with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which alleviates suspicion of their nuclear ambitions, and they enjoy strong relations with the West, which they wish to exploit to acquire costly and sensitive nuclear technology. In the face of Iran's stubborn nuclear policy, and increasing nuclear advancements, Arab governments (especially Egypt) feel justified in pursuing nuclear technology to maintain their leadership in the region. At the same time, their nuclear endeavors are popular among citizens who feel Arab states have an unalienable right to acquire nuclear technology, as did Israel and Iran. As best described by Egyptian Electricity and Energy Minister Hassan Younis, “The people are searching for a dream, a national project that proves to us that we are strong and capable of doing something fitting of the grandeur of a country that some have begun to doubt.” 15

It is also worth noting that current regional dynamics are very conducive to Egyptian nuclear ambitions. In the post-Saddam era, the moderate Arab nations–notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan–all share similar interests and orientation, unlike in the tumultuous 1960s, when Egypt and Saudi Arabia were at odds politically in their foreign alliances and regional orientation (Cairo leaned toward the Soviet Union, Riyadh toward the United States). Now, these notable Arab nations enjoy improved political relations, share an alliance with the United States, view Iran's increasing regional clout with suspicion, favor peace with Israel, and express a genuine hostility toward Al Qaeda's terrorism in the region.

This unique political climate provides Egypt with unprecedented regional legitimacy to pursue a robust nuclear program on behalf of the greater Arab world with the blessing and financial support of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which are likely in the future to look to Egypt for help in containing the emerging Persian influence in the region and safeguarding Arab interests. No matter how the current nuclear standoff with Iran is resolved, its legacy will be seen for many decades in the form of a nuclear-powered Middle East.

Supplementary Material

5612^th Meeting of the Security Council

Supplementary Material

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons