India's Nuclear Forces,2007

As India's nuclear ca-pabilities and ambitions continue to progress, the country's nuclear policy seems to be having growing pains attempting to keep up. Indian Defense Minister Shri A. K. Antony pledged in February 2007 to take all steps to provide a “minimum deterrence capability to the armed forces commensurate with the size and geostrategic position of India in the world.” 1 He provided no details on how many nuclear warheads will be required or when India will achieve a deterrent capability. The “geostrategic position” had been alluded to in the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) 2006 Annual Report, which stated that “nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan continue to elicit concern.” The report reaffirmed that India's “nuclear policy is characterized by a commitment to no first use, moratorium of nuclear testing, minimum credible nuclear deterrent, and rejection of entering into an arms race.” 2 The 2006 report, perhaps significantly, did not repeat an important statement from the 2005 report that rejected “doctrines or postures of launch-on-warning.” Indian forces and doctrine require “a mix of land-based, maritime, and air capabilities, and a minimum credible deterrent to thwart the threat of use of nuclear weapons against it.” 3

The omission of the rejection of a posture of launch-on-warning is important because India is developing a missile defense system that requires a significant missile warning capability. On November 27, 2006, a modified missile intercepted a Prithvi missile that had been launched from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur-on-Sea, outside the city of Balasore, to simulate a hostile attack against India. According to the Indian government announcement, the “trajectory of the target missile was continuously tracked and the information was compiled in the Mission Control Centre and transmitted to [the] Launch Control Centre for launching the interceptor missile.” 4 Whether India would ignore warnings about an incoming attack when operating its offensive missile force in the future is highly questionable, and the warning capabilities developed under the missile defense program will likely improve its ability to respond. Operating procedures for India's offensive nuclear forces already include “various states of alert and launch,” according to the MOD. 5

Another sign that India's nuclear policy is under strain from doctrinal and operational developments involves its no-first-use policy. Guidance issued by India in 2003 limited the no-first-use policy to covering nuclear attack scenarios only; it does not cover responses to a chemical or biological attack against India or Indian forces. 6

The number of nuclear weapons that India requires for a minimum deterrent has not been made public by the Indian government, and estimating the size of the current stockpile is difficult. A MOD official (who may have been “talking out of school”) told Defense News in late 2004 that India in the next five to seven years would have 300-400 fission and thermonuclear weapons distributed to air, sea, and land forces. 7 That large an arsenal seems unlikely, given that India so far has produced enough weapon-grade plutonium for only about 100 warheads. 8

We estimate that India currently has a stockpile of approximately 50-60 assembled nuclear warheads. The size of the arsenal is related to the number of operational nuclear delivery platforms available, which currently includes only aircraft (Mirage and Jaguar) and one short-range ballistic missile (Prithvi I). As the Agni I, Agni II, and Dhanush ballistic missiles become operational in the next few years, the number of warheads will increase.

India's need to control its rapidly developing nuclear forces led it to establish a Nuclear Command Authority and tri-service Strategic Forces Command in 2003. Over the next decade, according to MOD sources cited in Defense News, India expects to spend $2 billion a year to create a Strategic Forces Command infrastructure. 9

Aircraft. India's nuclear deterrent is still predominantly aircraft-based. Several types of aircraft could be used to deliver a nuclear weapon. Considering range, payload, and speed, the most likely candidates are the Mirage 2000H and the Jaguar IS. Other potential candidates include the MiG-27 and the new Su-30MKI. There is no official, publicly available information that identifies which of these aircraft has a nuclear role. 10 Rumors range from one to all of them.

The Mirage 2000H is a single-seat multi-role aircraft deployed with two squadrons at Gwalior Air Force Station. It is a strong contender for a nuclear role; in the French Air Force, the Mirage 2000 has a nuclear strike mission. Gwalior Air Force Station's infrastructure includes a unique double-fenced weapon storage area, two SA-3 air-defense sites, and what appears to be a twin-disk communication facility pointing in the direction of New Delhi. The Indian Air Force radar station at Gurgaon Haryana in New Delhi, in turn, features a similar twin-disk pointing at Gwalior. The air force may have used a Mirage 2000H in May 1994 to test-drop a dummy nuclear bomb, but this has not been officially confirmed. India first acquired 40 Mirage 2000H fighter jets in 1985 in response to Pakistan's purchase of F-16s from the United States. There are approximately 48 Mirage 2000H aircraft in India's inventory.

The Jaguar IS/IB, which first became operational with the Indian Air Force in 1981, was nuclear-capable when deployed by both the British and French air forces. Four operational squadrons man approximately 70 Jaguar IS variants, with additional IB dual-seat trainer aircraft attached. One maritime attack squadron operates the Jaguar IM variant. One or two IB squadrons may have a nuclear mission. Likely basing locations include Ambala Air Force Station and Sirsa Air Force Station. Ambala seems to have an older ammunition storage area, however, than Sirsa to its southwest, which appears to have a more modern infrastructure, including a double-fenced weapon storage area. The two bases are 512 and 495 kilometers (320 and 310 miles), respectively, from Islamabad, Pakistan. A few Jaguars may be specially modified to carry one or more nuclear bombs. In the Indian Air Force infrastructure, Ambala and Sirsa are part of Western Air Command, reporting to headquarters in New Delhi. Other candidates include squadrons at Gorakh-pur Air Force Station, 640 kilometers (400 miles) east of New Delhi.

It is possible that the MiG-27 Flog-ger, a nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft produced in the 1970s and 1980s, may also be assigned nuclear strike missions, although evidence is scarce. Hindustan Aeronautics assembled, under license, 165 of the aircraft, which India calls the Bahadhur. The last aircraft was delivered in March 1997. A small number of MiG-27s may be specially modified to carry one or more nuclear bombs.

Whether the nuclear bombs are stored at the air bases with the aircraft tasked with the nuclear strike mission is unknown. It is also possible that the weapons are stored at central storage facilities further from potential adversaries. One such possible location is the weapons depot 12 kilometers (7 miles) north of Pune in the western part of central India. The depot is only 8 kilometers (5 miles) northwest of Lohegaon Air Force Station, the home of the squadrons with the new Su-30MKI.

Land-based missiles. On April 12, 2007, the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully launched the Agni III medium-range ballistic missile for the first time, bringing India a significant step closer to developing an intercontinental nuclear strike capability. The two-stage, solid-fuel Agni III flew from Launch Complex No. 4 of Wheeler Island, a new ITR launch site, to almost its full rage of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles), becoming “the first Indian missile to have crossed the equator,” according to DRDO Director Avinash Chander. 11 The Agni III was launched from a rail-mobile launcher and flew a 15-minute trajectory into the Indian Ocean. The flight marked many firsts, including the use of Flex Nozzle Controls on the rocket motor, a new composite propellant, and guidance and control with built-in “fault tolerant avionics.” 12 A launch attempt on July 6, 2006 failed when the second stage did not separate, causing it to crash into the sea.

Although we reported in our last estimate of India's nuclear forces (see September/October 2005 Bulletin) that India had deployed the Agni I and Agni II, that seems to have been premature. The MOD declared twice in 2006 that the Agni variants had “been inducted in the Indian Armed Forces,” but the jury is still out on whether that means Agni I and II are yet fully operational. 13

Both missiles have been test-launched three times, most recently in 2004. After the last Agni I flight-test in July 2004, the MOD declared that the missile was “in production of induction in [the] army,” apparently with the 334 Missile Group. 14 Yet in March 2006, the U.S. Air Force reported that Agni I was “not yet deployed.” 15 Also in 2006, India's MOD reported that “induction of Agni I into the Services is under progress.” 16

The status of Agni II has been no less confusing. The Indian government announced in July 2001 that Agni II had “entered limited series production phase” and was scheduled to be “inducted into the armed forces during 2001-2002.” 17 That did not happen. The government stated in May 2002 that it had “approved ‘in principle’ the raising of an Agni [II] missile group for [the] Army,” apparently with the 335 Missile Group. 18 Four years later, in March 2006, the U.S. Air Force reported that Agni II was “not yet deployed,” but the MOD's 2006 Annual Report stated that “induction of Agni II is under progress.” 19

The Indian government is no doubt concerned about the slow introduction. In March 2007 it was reported that it had reorganized the DRDO and established a high-level committee to speed up strategic weapons development. 20

Once the two Agni missile systems become fully operational, presumably over the next two years, they will add significantly to India's strike capability. The two-stage Agni I intermediate-range ballistic missile has been tested to a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles) or more. Its first stage uses solid propellant taken from a satellite launch vehicle based on the U.S. Scout missile, and the second stage is a shortened version of India's Prithvi liquid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile. Its warhead section separates from the second stage during flight. The Agni I can be launched from a road- or rail-mobile launcher and was last test-fired on July 4, 2004. It was apparently developed to bridge the range gap between the Prithvi and Agni II missiles.

India's Nuclear Forces, 2007

TYPE/DESIGNATION	RANGE (KILOMETERS)	PAYLOAD (KILOGRAMS)	COMMENTS
AIRCRAFT
Jaguar IS/IB/Shamsher	1,600	4,775	At Ambala Air Force Station
Mirage 2000H/Vajra	1,8503,000	6,300	At Gwalior Air Force Station
MISSILES
Prithvi I	150	1,000	Army version. Deployed with 333 and 355 Missile Groups. Will be converted from liquid fuel to solid fuel
Agni I	700	1,000	Last test-launched July 4, 2004. Inducted into Armys new 334 Missile Group, but operational status uncertain
Agni II	2,000+	1,000	Last test-launched August 29, 2004. Inducted into Armys 335 Missile Group, but operational status uncertain
Agni III	3,000+	1,500	Under development. Last test-launched April 12, 2007
Dhanush	∼350	∼1,000	Under development. Naval version of Prithvi II. Last test-launched March 30, 2007
Prithvi III (Sagarika)	300+	∼1,000	Under development. Last test-launched May 12, 2005

The Agni II has a range of more than 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles), is 20 meters long (65 feet), weighs about 16 tons, carries a 1,000-kilogram pay-load, and can be deployed on a road or rail launcher. It was first test-launched in April 1999, flying 2,000 kilometers in 11 minutes and possibly carrying a mock nuclear warhead assembly without the plutonium core. A third test took place on August 29, 2004.

Somewhat exultant reports have claimed that the Agni II reentry vehicle is superior to Western designs in terms of maneuverability and gliding, with an accuracy of 40 meters (130 feet). These claims are probably exaggerated, given the lengthy and considerable technical difficulties and command and control requirements that Western nuclear powers encountered when trying to develop such capabilities.

India still maintains a small inventory of the nuclear-capable, short-range Prithvi missile, which was developed starting in 1983 and first tested in 1988. Since then, India has conducted 28 tests of all Prithvi types, most recently on May 12, 2005. Prithvi exists in three versions, of which only the Prithvi I (the army version) is believed by the CIA to have a nuclear role.

The successful launch of the Agni III apparently has given DRDO officials new hopes of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Shortly after the flight-test, DRDO officials declared: “We have achieved the capability to make missiles with a range of 3,500 to 5,500 kilometers,” but added that a decision to do so has to be taken by the political leadership. 21

Naval weapons. India is developing at least two naval missile systems, Dhanush and Prithvi III, for the third leg of its nuclear triad. The navy successfully test-fired the Dhanush surface-launched ballistic missile on March 30, 2007 from the Subhadra, a converted patrol vessel. In 2004, the MOD declared the Dhanush capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. If the Dhanush were deployed with a nuclear warhead, it would provide the Indian Navy with its first nuclear strike capability. With a range of only 350 kilometers (220 miles), however, the ship carrying the missile would need to be close to enemy shores to reach land targets, making the ship highly vulnerable to detection and counterstrike. Because the Dhanush is dual-capable, launch of the conventional version in a crisis would be inherently dangerous.

The Dhanush, a modified Prithvi II, could be an interim step toward a more capable submarine-based nuclear strike capability. India began a program known as the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile in 1989. The December 2001 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate identified it, and reports from the U.S. Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center in March 2003 and March 2006 described the missile as having a range of more than 290 kilometers (180 miles). 22 The program took an interesting turn in 2006, when the Indian government declared that it did not have any missile program by the name of Sagarika. 23 Defense officials stated in 1998 that Sagarika and Prithvi III were synonyms for the same weapons program, so it seems New Delhi has decided to drop that name. 24 The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency announced in 2006 that “India flight-tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile for the first time in spring 2005,” probably referring to the launch of a Prithvi III from Chandipur-on-Sea in May 2005. 25

India is completing an advanced technology vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered submarine project that has been under way since at least 1985 and is expected to carry the Prithvi III. Rumors circulated in the Indian media that the ATV would finally be launched in 2007. In building the ATV, India is applying design and operational experience it gained from operating Chakra, a Charlie I-class cruise missile submarine that it leased from the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991. The vessel's reactor is reported to be of Indian design. Full-scale work on the ATV began in 1991, shortly after India returned Chakra, and construction started in 1997.

If technical delays continue with the ATV, the navy could add a Prithvi III launch capability to existing or new diesel submarines. India has decided to buy six French Scorpene submarines, and there are rumors that it is also attempting to lease one or two nuclear submarines from Russia.

Supplementary Material

Annual Report 2006-2007