Abstract
RRW could increase pressure on Beijing to improve and enlarge its nuclear capability.
Claims by the U.S. government that the warheads in its current nuclear arsenal aren't reliable enough cast doubt on previous statements Washington has made. For instance, the United States launched the Stockpile Stewardship Program 14 years ago to supposedly maintain the reliability and proficiency of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and its associated human resources. The United States now claims Stockpile Stewardship is no longer sufficient, and it needs a better system to ensure the quality of its warheads. How then can we believe Washington's promises that the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) won't need to be tested or that RRW will allow the United States to condense its nuclear arsenal?
Worse yet, RRW sends the wrong message to the other nuclear weapon states. If the United States is questioning the reliability of its arsenal, Russia, France, Britain, and China might also begin to ask similar questions about their warheads, providing the justification and impetus to “improve” their nuclear weapons. In particular, RRW could alter the way Beijing views its nuclear arsenal.
Thanks in part to careful diplomacy by the leadership in both Beijing and Washington, U.S.-Chinese relations have remained stable in recent years–especially given the Taiwan situation, long a point of disagreement between the two countries. But some of the credit for this balanced relationship also belongs to the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Although much smaller than the U.S. arsenal–according to public reports, China retains around 200 warheads, while the United States possesses about 10,000–Beijing's nuclear capability has served as an effective deterrent to any potential U.S. military aggression.
RRW, along with other U.S. initiatives such as a renewed interest in the militarization of space, could force Beijing to reevaluate its security policies and nuclear posture, increasing pressure on China to either improve and/or enlarge its nuclear capability. And in Asia's strategic landscape, an enhanced and/or expanded Chinese nuclear deterrent could have a ripple effect on India and Pakistan, China's nuclear neighbors–an outcome the United States certainly doesn't want.
Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai
The message RRW sends to North Korea is similarly absurd. Pyongyang feels threatened by the United States, and Kim Jong II sought nuclear weapons in response to this perceived threat. The decision to strong-arm its way to the negotiating table paid off, as Washington has moderated its stance toward Pyongyang since North Korea tested its nuclear capability.
As part of the deal it struck with the United States, in mid-February, Pyongyang promised to close and seal its nuclear facilities at Yong-byon within 60 days. However, more than 60 days have passed, and North Korea still hasn't fulfilled its promise. Pyongyang maintains that it needs more time to transfer $25 million the United States unfroze from a North Korean account at Banco Delta Asia as part of the agreement. But the delay also gives North Korea time to abandon some of its nuclear capability while keeping other parts in case Pyongyang needs to quickly achieve nuclear status in the future. After all, RRW teaches North Korea that strength matters and nuclear weapons are a useful tool.
By encouraging and legitimizing such proliferation, RRW is actually counterproductive to U.S. security, as a world filled with more nuclear states possessing more sophisticated nuclear arsenals only endangers the United States. RRW also represents a missed opportunity. Instead of introducing new nuclear weapons programs and revamping its nuclear arsenal, the United States could lead the way to a nuclear-weapon-free world by devoting its energies to devaluing nuclear weapons and moving toward disarmament.