Abstract
Many Russians believe that U.S. nuclear initiatives are capitalizing on Moscow's weakness.
> GLOBAL DEBATE < RUSSIA
The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program has prompted a mixed reaction in Russia. It would be hypocritical to criticize another nuclear power for maintaining its nuclear capability–especially given that a majority of Russia's defense establishment remains committed to nuclear weapons as a guarantor of national security. But when considered in combination with U.S. maneuvering in other strategic offensive and defensive areas, some observers are concerned about how RRW will affect the combat stability of the Russian strategic deterrent.
For some Russians, RRW presents a technological opportunity to negate the disparity between the U.S. and Russian nuclear warhead reserves, which the United States can rapidly redeploy on its delivery vehicles. Under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia accepts that unless the United States decides otherwise, Washington will possess several thousand more reserve warheads than Moscow. These reserves are maintained in part because of U.S. concerns about its existing arsenal's unreliability. With its potentially higher performance, RRW could alleviate U.S. reluctance to reduce its nuclear stockpile.
At the same time, Moscow views RRW through the prism of other U.S. modernization efforts. Initially, some Russians were receptive to the U.S. argument that the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was a Cold War relic. But recently, they've started to worry that the Bush administration also considers the relative nuclear self-restraint demonstrated by the United States throughout the 1990s as a relic as well. Plans for building bunker-busters (a supposedly smaller nuclear weapon that could destroy underground targets) and Complex 2030 (which would produce nuclear weapons on an industrial scale for the foreseeable future) fuel these concerns.
Director, Department for Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, Institute of World Economy and International Relations Moscow
More seriously, Russia increasingly perceives RRW not as a means of deterrence, but as a war-fighting tool. RRW could increase a warhead's accuracy, and thus, reduce its yield. As a result, the warheads could more capably destroy hardened Russian strategic targets, while inflicting less collateral damage on civilian populations. The latter could increase the temptation to use nuclear weapons first, as the consequences of a first strike would be less disastrous than during the Cold War. This could also enhance intra-war deterrence: A disarming attack with a relatively small number of civilian casualties might deter the aggrieved nation from responding because doing so could trigger an all-out, devastating retaliation.
U.S. plans for an extensive missile defense system, including components that Washington intends to deploy near Russia's borders, further embitter Moscow. At present, technical limitations prevent the U.S. missile defense from threatening Russia's nuclear forces, and the deployment itself is relatively modest. But Moscow is concerned that the early deployment will allow the system to become more modern and sophisticated over time, eventually allowing it to intercept Russian strategic missiles.
At a time when Russian nuclear forces are at their lowest levels in 30 years, many Russians believe that such U.S. actions represent an attempt to capitalize on Moscow's weaknesses. Unfortunately, this increases determination in Russia not to repeat past disarmament “mistakes” and inspires discussions of countermeasures to strengthen the credibility of its strategic nuclear forces.
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