Abstract
Parameters, Summer 2005, U.S. Army War College.
It was the summer of discontent. For the first time since U.S. troops entered Iraq, public opinion polls taken in June revealed that a majority of Americans did not believe the war had made them safer. What's more, two-thirds of the public said the U.S. military had become bogged down in the conflict, and nearly six in ten said the war was not worth fighting.
True to form, fingers of blame were pointed at the media for sapping the nation's morale. At a contentious Senate hearing that same month, Democratic Sen. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut warned Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, “I fear that American public opinion is tipping away from this effort.” Rumsfeld retorted, “I have a feeling they're getting pushed.”
But in the summer issue of the quarterly journal Parameters, published by the U.S. Army War College, a skeptical view of the “blame the media” argument emerges from within the ranks of the military itself. In a survey of public opinion research since the end of the Vietnam War, Col. William M. Darley, a public affairs officer serving as army director of strategic communications, sees no direct causal link between media coverage and public opinion. Instead, in his article, “War Policy, Public Support, and the Media,” he poses the question: “How does one account for a rise in public support for some military actions even in the face of losses and mistakes, and a decline in public support for others experiencing similar shortcomings, with both types of crises being subject to all manner of critical news coverage?”
“Do you think we've been dumbed down to the point of no return?”
Darley notes that research on this topic tends to gravitate toward two extreme views: One side argues that casualties and setbacks during wartime provoke increasing demands for immediate withdrawal, while the other says that such events cause a “rally around the flag” effect that seeks escalation of the conflict. Darley believes the truth lies somewhere in between, and argues that the presence of a bold political leadership is what ultimately tilts the scale of public opinion. Even after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, he observes, negative media coverage did not immediately erode popular opinion. But, he suggests, President Lyndon B. Johnson's own words and actions–such as his decision not to seek a second term in office and his announced intent to halt the strategic bombings of the north–resulted in “a loss of faith and an irrevocable, permanent downturn in support for the war among elements that were formerly holding firm.” In that respect, however, Darley believes the media can play an indirect role in undermining public support, since a continuous onslaught of gloomy news coverage may reinforce doubts already circulating within the White House.
Tactfully (or perhaps tactically), Darley makes no attempt to apply his conclusions to the current situation in Iraq, offering only the vague observation that the public needs “decisive national policy as reflected in bold actions to achieve clear, specific political and military objectives.” Yet, it's not clear what sort of “bold actions” remain available to the United States, as it goes about the deadly, daily grind of pacifying Iraq and fighting an entrenched insurgency that–even Rumsfeld now admits–may last as long as 12 years.