Abstract
“Missile Defense: The Current Debate,” Congressional Research Service, March 23, 2005; and “Findings and Recommendations,” Independent Review Team, March 31, 2005.
It's been nearly three years since the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has had a successful flight-test of its nascent ground-based mid-course missile defense (GMD). In a December 2002 test, the kill vehicle did not separate from the interceptor; in December 2004 and February 2005, the interceptors didn't even get off the ground. Three years, three tests, and three frankly pathetic failures seem to have inspired a search for answers. Two official reports, released in March, take a look at the beleaguered GMD, which is supposed to be the centerpiece of the Bush administration's effort to protect the United States against long-range missiles.
“Missile Defense: The Current Debate,” was prepared by the Congressional Research Service and neither assesses the program nor makes recommendations. Rather, it provides a solid, accessible background on issues relevant to the full range of U.S. missile defense programs, including the international response to these programs, and the ballistic missile programs of countries that might present threats to the United States, its troops, or allies.
The report presents the perspective of both proponents and critics, and also has an informative section on U.S. missile defense programs under development.
But the report has a major shortcoming. Although nominally updated as of March, the report does not cover beyond 2002. The minor exceptions are a few paragraphs in the introductory and ending sections about the fiscal 2003, 2004, and 2005 budgets. It still lists Iraq and Libya as potential missile threats; does not include Canada's significant refusal to join U.S. missile defense in 2004; and does not cover the period since President George W. Bush decided to deploy GMD. The problem is compounded by the fact that nowhere in the report does it mention that the text has not really been updated, leaving the reader initially confused. This is a shame because the report otherwise is of high quality, and a truly updated version to inform members of Congress would be useful.
By far the more interesting and illuminating report is the Independent Review Team's “Findings and Recommendations,” commissioned by MDA director Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering. The review team comprised three Williams: Willie Nance, who directed President Bill Clinton's national missile defense program (the predecessor to GMD); William Graham, who has had a long career in the aerospace and defense industries and was President Ronald Reagan's science adviser; and William Ballhaus Jr., president and CEO of the Aerospace Corporation, who previously held a variety of positions at NASA. They are a trio of missile defense proponents who are still capable of pointing out the program's flaws.
The review team's report is the latest in a long series of independent commissioned reports that point out the major problems resulting from the “deployment first, development second” approach. The first such study was the 1998 Welch report (“Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight-Test Programs”), which famously coined the phrase “rush to failure” but also made recommendations on how best to revamp the test program. The delicious irony is that Nance, who headed the national missile defense program from 1998 to 2001, was responsible for implementing the Welch report's recommendations. Apparently he failed to do so and is now making the same recommendations himself.
Perhaps to demonstrate its support for Bush and for missile defense, the review team starts out by congratulating the MDA for fulfilling the December 2002 Presidential Directive that called for initial deployment of GMD by the end of 2004. This is a meaningless political statement, but the authors then render a technical judgment that is patently absurd: “The rapid development and initial deployment of the GMD system was comparable to other milestones in major military system deployment,” citing as examples the Minuteman and Polaris ballistic missiles. Those missile systems were thoroughly tested before they were deployed to ensure they could accomplish their mission of targeting their warheads with high accuracy. In contrast, GMD is in the early stages of development, and its deployment consists of eight untested interceptors in silos in Alaska and California.
There is no evidence the GMD system would have any military utility, which is why it has not been declared operational. It is a little-known fact that the Pacific and Strategic military commands, which perform their own assessments separate from those of the MDA, have refused to make it operational.
But it doesn't matter that the U.S. military believes the system is useless, according to the authors. Even un-proven interceptors, they say, will give pause to a country that seeks to attack the United States. Curiously, they seem to assume the deterrence threat posed by the nuclear-armed Minuteman missiles–which are well-tested and clearly effective–would be inadequate.
“Mr. Shady Arms Dealer forgot to buy milk again! But the uranium, he always has time for the uranium.”
The review team then gets to the crux of the issue: “Successful test intercepts will send a strong message to adversaries of the U.S., who may be dissuaded by the effectiveness of the system from investing further in ballistic missile forces and/or be deterred from attacking the U.S., our deployed forces, our allies, and friends.” Moreover, the “dissuasion and deterrence value” of the system will be “decreased by unsuccessful flight-tests.”
Translation: Flight-tests are as much about PR as they are about development. This has long been clear to independent analysts, but it is gratifying to have it acknowledged so plainly in print. What the authors do not acknowledge is that the PR is also aimed at U.S. policy makers. Worse yet, the PR may be most effective at convincing these policy makers of the efficacy of the system. Before GMD was deployed, Pentagon officials and members of Congress made ludicrous assertions about how effective missile defense would be. For example, Edward “Pete” Aldridge, then undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics, declared the “effectiveness would be in the 90 percent range.” It is distressing to think that policy makers making decisions about the U.S. response to emerging missile states might be influenced by this rhetoric.
The report also ignores the fact that the tests so far have been softballs, and that conducting more realistic tests will likely result in more test failures. Although the artificial features of the current tests, such as knowing in advance the physical characteristics and trajectory of the mock warhead, are normal for early development testing, only realistic operational testing can provide meaningful data about an interceptor's anticipated performance. Such testing is no longer on the schedule–perhaps because the MDA believes convincing others that GMD is capable is more important than knowing whether it is ourselves.
And despite the softball tests, the MDA still saw failure after failure. A key factor in the failures, say the authors, was the decision to deploy on such short notice, along with the diversion of resources required to do so. One wonders if the authors believe that the net result of deployment so far has been less deterrence and dissuasion.
The review team also focuses on how the MDA can improve its flight-test record, making commonsense recommendations: perform a rigorous pre-test risk assessment; conduct increased ground testing; and hold defense contractors accountable for test failures. (It is hard to believe that these are not already part of the program.) The next flight-test should not be an intercept test, the review team suggests. Instead, it should be used to evaluate the basics of how the interceptor itself functions. That might be a less theatrical approach to evaluating missile defense, but it would likely yield fewer public embarrassments.