Abstract
In 1939, Albert Einstein wrote an urgent letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning that a single atomic bomb “carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory.” Nearly 70 years later, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of deadly technologies, and the exponential growth of cargo container traffic among the world's major seaports have edged this nightmare scenario closer to reality. A catastrophic event involving a large conventional explosion or the release of nuclear, chemical, or biological material would have serious consequences far beyond the damage to the shipping port itself. World trade, now at $10 trillion per year, would be severely disrupted. The Brookings Institution has estimated that the cost associated with closing U.S. ports due to the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction in a harbor could alone amount to $1 trillion.
Such concerns have prompted the United States, the European Union, the shipping industry, and international organizations, such as the World Customs Organization and the International Maritime Organization, to institute new measures aimed at enhancing shipping security. Yet, despite this progress, fewer than 2 percent of the 48 million containers that transit the globe each year are subject to in-depth inspection.
At present, no single authority or industry has the full responsibility for security of the shipping container transport chain from beginning to end. Bills of lading, which identify the contents of a container, are rarely verified, and container seals, which ensure that those contents are not tampered with, are not difficult to remove and can be reproduced or forged. Large shipping companies have information on the containers they transport and where they are at any given time; smaller companies are usually less organized. Road transportation, where a container is in the hands of a single person for a long time moving over large distances, likewise poses a high risk of interference. The driver could reload a container or exchange it for another.
International organizations and private companies are working to develop new technologies to target some of these deficiencies. Researchers, for example, are developing advanced systems to screen containers as they enter a port, as well as “smart containers” with sensors capable of detecting radiological materials or specific chemical and biological agents. Low-cost radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) could be embedded into seals to make them more difficult to forge. RFIDs might also be fitted with transponders that store information on the container's location and history.
However proactive, these initiatives alone will not resolve the end-to-end container security problem. And bilateral solutions are not the ultimate answer. Consider, for instance, the Container Security Initiative–a series of important agreements that allows for U.S. customs officers to be permanently placed at 25 ports worldwide. The United States has offered reciprocity to the participating ports' countries. But if they all took up the offer, an overabundance of officials would be stationed among the containers, creating chaos.
These bilateral agreements need to develop into an overarching, multilateral framework, such as a treaty or code of conduct, that establishes container security norms, procedures, and cooperative verification measures, with the goal of supporting national authorities and industry. These measures should create global standards for: verifying shipping documents; inspecting containers using radiation detectors, air sampling, and thermal or X-ray imaging; monitoring container movements; designing tamper-indicating seals; certifying security equipment; and training personnel.
The costs of implementing such measures on a global scale would be considerable. Yet, a more secure container regime could easily pay for itself, as it would significantly reduce theft and revenue losses due to smuggling. Governments could provide additional incentives to encourage compliance. Participating shipping companies could benefit from fast “green lane” procedures that would expedite their transit through borders and checkpoints. By working together to develop their technical abilities and implement uniform standards for container traffic, the world's seafaring nations can minimize global risk without hampering global trade.