Abstract
There were several key quantitative and qualitative developments with regard to Russian nuclear forces during the past year. Russia continued to reduce its nuclear forces, and officials were unusually candid in describing the likely composition of forces for the coming decade. We estimate that as of early 2005, Russia has approximately 7,200 operational nuclear warheads in its active arsenal. This includes about 3,800 strategic warheads, a decrease of some 400 from 2004 due to the withdrawal of approximately 60 ballistic missiles from operational service. Our estimate of operational non-strategic nuclear weapons remains unchanged from last year at 3,400.
At the end of the Cold War in 1991, the Soviet Union may have had as many as 35,000 nuclear weapons–though not all of them were fielded. Estimates of the dismantlement rate vary widely, from hundreds to 1,000-2,000 per year. We estimate that the total current arsenal of intact warheads is around 16,000. Of those, we consider some 7,200 active and operational; the balance occupy an indeterminate status. Some may be officially retired and awaiting disassembly; others may be in short- or long-term storage, categories similar to the U.S. categories “responsive force” and “inactive reserve.”
Russian nuclear forces conducted 15 ballistic missile test launches in 2004, a significant increase from previous years. Two tests failed and a third was an ejection test with no engine ignition. Eight of the tests involved submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); seven were of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Each test involved a single missile launch, except for the March 17 launch of two missiles from a Delta IV nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
Russian defense officials lifted the veil of nuclear secrecy slightly in late 2004 and announced what amounts to an abbreviated nuclear posture review. Their announcements suggested a plan for future strategic forces based on unilateral decisions and implementation of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which set a limit of 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads for 2012. The officials described significant changes in the size and composition of the future ICBM force, lesser changes for the submarine force, and few changes to the bomber force. The table “Projected Strategic Warheads, 2005-2015” (see p. 71) contains estimates of Russia's strategic forces based on several assumptions: that annual deployment of SS-27 ICBMs continues at about six single-warhead missiles per year; that Russia commissions two new third-generation strategic subs and maintains five operational Delta IIIs; and that Tu-160 Blackjack bomber production remains low.
Russia's new plan indicates it will reduce its emphasis on ICBMs, traditionally the backbone of its strategic forces, by withdrawing most of the multiple-warhead SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. This will decrease the number of ICBM warheads by nearly 70 percent, from 2,270 to roughly 750 during the next five years. By 2010, ICBMs and SLBMs will carry approximately the same number of warheads.
Throughout 2004 President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the importance of Russia's nuclear weapons to its security. “We will continue … to build up the armed forces in general and its nuclear component,” Putin reportedly told the military high command. With perhaps some exaggeration he said, “These are projects which do not exist elsewhere and which other nuclear states will not have in the next few years.”
Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Sciences, said in October 2004 that the long-term program involves “primarily qualitative improvements to the Russian nuclear arsenal and development of delivery vehicles capable of getting past phased arrays of antimissile defense systems.” The new chief of the general staff, Col. Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, spoke of a new maneuverable warhead that will be able to overcome “foreign [anti-ballistic missile] systems.” Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said in late 2004 that Russia would be able to sustain qualitative nuclear parity with the United States.
Under the new plan, Russia will reduce the types of active ICBMs from five to two: the silo-based Topol-M (SS-27) and a mobile version of the Topol-M, which has not yet been deployed. According to Solovtsov, the goal is to have “several divisions” of Topol-Ms deployed. If “several” means two divisions (each composed of 10-12 regiments of 10 missiles), this would require producing at least another 160 Topol-Ms to add to the present total of 40. The current production rate varies between three and nine missiles annually, or a new regiment about every two years. At this modest pace it will take until 2023, at the earliest, to field two divisions.
Russian strategic forces, 2005
Deployment of the Topol-M began at Tatishchevo in 1997. Russia added 10 silo-based Topol-Ms (one regiment) in 2004, and a fifth regiment is scheduled for deployment in 2005. The mobile version will replace the road-mobile SS-25, and Russia expects to begin deployment in 2006.
Since the Topol-M carries a single warhead, a future force of two divisions, or 200 missiles, would dramatically reduce the total of ICBM warheads from the current level. Rumors suggest that the mobile Topol-M might carry between three and six warheads in the future. The START I treaty prohibits increasing the number of warheads attributed to a specific ICBM type, but after the treaty expires in 2009, Russia would be free to put multiple warheads on the Topol-M. The Topol-M has a throw weight of 1.2 tons, similar to the U.S. Minuteman III, which can carry up to three warheads.
As the SS-27 Topol-M is introduced, the number of SS-25 Topols will continue to decline. Approximately 300 are deployed at nine locations. The solid-fueled missile seems unaffected by the plan to withdraw older liquid-fueled missiles from service by 2009, but the transition to an all-Topol-M force suggests that the SS-25 will be completely retired. Russia will withdraw the last 15 rail-based SS-24 M1s, the division at Kostroma, this year.
The number of SS-19s continues to decline; 130 remain in service. The six-warhead missile was scheduled for elimination under START II, but after the treaty's demise in 2002, Putin declared that deployment of “tens” of additional SS-19s with “hundreds of warheads” would begin in 2010. Any new deployments are likely to include the approximately 30 SS-19s in storage. Russia will likely retire the older versions of the SS-19 by 2009.
Projected strategic warheads, 2005–2015
During the peak years from 1981 to 1992, Russia maintained more than 300 SS-18s. Now there are about 100, and Russia will withdraw about 50 in the next five years. With a service life extension program, the remaining newer variant of the SS-18, referred to as RS-20V, could last until 2016-2020. As part of that program, Russia successfully flight-tested a 16-year-old RS-20V from an operational silo on December 22, 2004. The launch occurred at the Dombarovsky missile base in Russia rather than at the Baikonur test range in Kazakhstan. Solovtsov has said that Dombarovsky will support five to seven launches a year.
Development of a new generation ICBM, possibly with liquid-fuel propellant, appears under way. According to several news reports, the new ICBM will possess a throw weight of 4.4 tons (similar to the SS-19) and be able to carry up to 10 warheads.
Of the Delta III submarines, the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Svyatoy Giorgiy Pobedonosets, Zelenograd, and Podolsk are based at Rybachi on the Kamchatka Peninsula; the Ryazan and Borisoglebsk are based at Gadzhiyevo. The military uses a seventh nonoperational Delta III, located at Rybachi, as a test platform. Though rumors suggest that Russia might retire the Delta III class during the next few years, to achieve the stated goal of 208 SLBMs in 2010 at least five must remain in service.
Two Borey-class SSBNs remain under construction and behind schedule at the Severodvinsk shipyard. Russia plans on commissioning the Yuri Dolgoruki in 2005, according to Ivanov, but it has not flight-tested the Bulava SLBM that it is to carry. The Borey might wait to enter service for several years until the missile is ready. The Borey will carry 12 Bulavas (possible designation SS-N-27), though it is unclear how many warheads the missile will carry.
The keel of the second boat, the Alexander Nevsky, was laid down at Severodvinsk in March 2004 with delivery scheduled for 2008. Russia plans on completing a third boat in 2012. The navy would like to build three more Borey SSBNs, but if construction continues at the current pace, the final sub would not be ready until 2026. The Russian Navy chief, Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, told ITAR-TASS in May 2004 that the Russian Navy should have 12-15 operational SSBNs. The future fleet will likely be smaller.
The 25,000-ton Typhoon-class SSBN was decommissioned at the end of April 2004. The withdrawal also signals the retirement of the SS-N-20 SLBM, which carried 10 warheads. Russia modified one of the Typhoons, the Dmitri Donskoi, to be a test platform for the Bulava SLBM. The navy conducted December 2003 and September 2004 Bulava ejection tests (with no engine ignition) from the Dmitri Donskoi in the Barents Sea.
Russia may deploy a nuclear variant of a new cruise missile (Kh-102), similar to the U.S. advanced cruise missile but with a prop engine, for the Blackjack and Bear bombers in 2005. Like the United States, Russia has begun to convert a portion of its air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to non-nuclear versions (Kh-555s). In December 2004, a senior Russian Air Force official said that the first conventional ALCMs had been delivered.
Small-scale production of the Tu-160 Blackjack resumed in 2004 with two aircraft planned for delivery this year. In early 2004 air force commander-in-chief Col. Gen. Vladimir Mikhailov announced plans to upgrade Tu-160 avionics and communications equipment and to modify the bomber to carry new types of missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads. Russia's new defense plan envisions a force of 75 bombers in 2010. If Blackjack production continues after 2006, the bombers will likely replace Bears on a one-to-one basis. The development of conventional ALCMs seems to indicate that Russia envisions a more active bomber force.
During an October 2004 Moscow visit, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker accused Russia of not fully honoring its 1991 pledge to reduce its tactical nuclear force. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded by recounting its May 2004 announcement: “More than 50 percent of the total nuclear ammunition for sea-based tactical missiles and naval aviation, anti-aircraft missiles, and nuclear aviation bombs has been liquidated.” The ministry added, “The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons is continuing.” Officials had previously committed to the elimination of “nuclear weapons of the army” by 2004.
Russia conducted a series of exercises in August in the Murmansk region to practice safely protecting nuclear weapons in storage facilities and during transport by road and rail. Participants in the “Avariya [Accident] 2004” exercises included specialists from the 12th Main Directorate, which oversees Russia's nuclear arsenal, officials from relevant federal ministries, and units from the Moscow and Leningrad military districts. Russia also invited some 50 representatives from 18 NATO member states to observe. Russia accepted an invitation to send six observers from the 12th Main Directorate to a U.S. nuclear weapons security exercise in Wyoming scheduled for April 2005.