Europe,Carry Your Weight

Abstract

If Europe would help Russia get rid of more weapons uranium, it would go a long way in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Forty-thousand people dead. Three hundred thousand injured. And more casualties to come as radiation clouds spread. This was the terrifying outcome of “Black Dawn,” a terrorism prevention exercise held by European leaders in May 2004. 1 The exercise simulated an attack in which terrorists detonated a crude nuclear device at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. In the scenario, the terrorists had acquired their nuclear material–highly enriched uranium (HEU)–from a poorly protected civilian research reactor in or near Europe.

Unfortunately, such a scenario seems well within the realm of possibility. Europe's proximity to areas of potential nuclear “leakage” leaves it particularly vulnerable as a target of nuclear terrorism. A terrorist nuclear strike against U.S. or European interests could be consistent with Al Qaeda's aims, and individuals affiliated with the network are known to have actively pursued nuclear material. 2

The best way to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is to deny potential terrorists or proliferators access to fissile materials–plutonium and highly enriched uranium. And the best way to do this is to eliminate as much HEU as possible, as quickly as possible, through a new partnership between Russia and Europe.

Danger of diversion

During the Cold War, the amount of highly enriched uranium produced far exceeded stocks of weapons plutonium. Nuclear weapon states produced a majority of their uranium stocks for military purposes, so only a small amount (roughly 1 percent) came under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). There have been several cases of theft of kilogram quantities of weapon-grade uranium from states with extensive military stockpiles. For example, in December 1998, the Russian Federal Security Services intercepted an attempt to divert 18.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium–enough material for a bomb. 3

The major barrier for potential nuclear terrorists is access to fissile material. And the place where such material is perhaps least secure is Russia. Russia holds the world's largest supply of unirradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU that has not been burned in a reactor), but the exact size of its stockpile is unknown. Unofficial estimates range from 1,000 to 1,500 tons, enough material to make tens of thousands of weapons. U.S.-funded facility upgrades have secured less than 40 percent of the material vulnerable to theft, and less than one-sixth of Russia's total highly enriched uranium stockpile has been downblended under the 1993 U.S.-Russian agreement to eliminate 500 tons of Russian HEU. If any of the remaining material were to go missing, it would be difficult–if not impossible–to interdict.

If they could obtain HEU, terrorists would face few obstacles to building a crude nuclear device capable of delivering a multiple-kiloton yield; a sophisticated implosion design would be unnecessary. Depending on the degree of enrichment and the design of the device, tens of kilograms of weapon-grade uranium are sufficient for one nuclear warhead. Highly enriched uranium is a particularly attractive target for theft because it emits low levels of radiation, which makes it difficult to detect at border crossings and checkpoints and less dangerous to handle than plutonium, qualities that make it easier to divert.

A Russian-European partnership

In April 2004, a group of experts under the auspices of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate published a report titled “Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium, Options for an Action Agenda in Cooperation with the Russian Federation.” 4 (The proposals outlined here are drawn directly from the report, which we co-authored with seven others.)

The report recommends that European governments urgently initiate the elimination of additional Russian stockpiles by downblending at existing Russian facilities. After a decade of cooperation, functional and transparent procedures for this are already in place as part of the 1993 U.S.-Russian agreement. A Russian-European partnership would build on and supplement these ongoing elimination activities with the goal of doubling the elimination speed.

In the proposed scheme, Russian highly enriched uranium would be downblended to a “proliferation safe” level of less than 20 percent uranium 235. Uranium enriched below this level is unlikely to sustain a chain reaction that results in a nuclear explosion. Only if down-blended uranium is re-enriched–a process that only resourceful states are equipped to accomplish, not terrorist groups–would it be feasible to use it in a nuclear bomb.

Instead of establishing an international system to market and sell the downblended uranium, Russia should keep the low-enriched uranium. The European Union should pay for the downblending in return for a Russian pledge to commit downblending revenues to securing its additional fissile material stocks and restructuring its nuclear weapons complex for peaceful purposes.

A European effort to eliminate Russia's unirradiated highly enriched uranium should:

• consider security–not economy–as the first objective;

• be permanent and irreversible in that it converts HEU into a form that cannot be directly used for nuclear weapons;

• incorporate sound environmental standards and practices; and

• limit unnecessary risks relating to the transport, handling, and management of the material.

The primary incentive for Europe should stem from its long-standing promotion of nonproliferation, as well as its concern about nuclear terrorism. In particular, Europeans are interested in making Russian nuclear disarmament irreversible and nonproliferation efforts more effective and faster. Yet most of the multilateral agendas and declarations on the elimination of highly enriched uranium stockpiles remain at a declaratory level. The practical implementation of these pledges, including those discussed below, is essential.

International pledges

In April 2002, the Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under the chairmanship of Amb. Henrik Salander of Sweden, stated that international commitment is needed to secure fissile materials and reduce the risk of terrorism. In June 2002, the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Kananaskis, Canada, launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Member nations pledged $20 billion over 10 years to support cooperative projects, primarily in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear safety issues. Among the priorities of the G-8 is the safe and secure disposition of fissile materials.

Russia, the United States, and nine European nations signed the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation in Stockholm in May 2003. The agreement paves the way for projects to manage the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from Russia's Northern Fleet nuclear submarines (see “Russia: Kola Cleanup Coming?” March/April 2003 Bulletin). This is likely to be a major step forward for Russia and its European partners in tackling nuclear safety and security problems, including the safe, secure handling and storage of the Russian navy's highly enriched uranium.

In July 2003, the Swedish government made public its initiative for establishing an independent international commission on weapons of mass destruction and appointed Hans Blix, the former director general of the IAEA and former chairman of the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, as chairman. The purpose of the “WMD Commission” is to provide new impetus to international disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Reducing security risks associated with excessive stocks of highly enriched uranium could form an integral part of the commission's work.

All of these agreements and commissions will accomplish nothing unless additional stocks of weapon-grade uranium are declared in excess of national security needs and made available for downblending. Here, Russia has made little movement. The existing U.S.-Russian agreement covers all presently declared excess stocks, but there is a growing realization in Russia that large stocks of highly enriched uranium are unnecessary and constitute a significant risk.

If successfully completed by 2013, the existing U.S. Russian agreement would secure less than half of Russia's estimated HEU stockpile. This leaves plenty of room for additional and accelerated reductions, such as those proposed by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate's report. Financial incentives, if combined with broader economic cooperation from the European Union, could improve Russia's progress toward nuclear disarmament and secure remaining nuclear materials. Before 1993, when the United States said it was willing to buy and eliminate its surplus, Russia had not declared any of its highly enriched uranium as excess. European interest and funding may not only make Russia's handling of its stockpile more accountable, but may actually motivate Russia to identify additional excess uranium and slate it for elimination.

To repeat a point often stressed by former Sen. Sam Nunn, we cannot win the race against proliferation without a global partnership. A new level of cooperation is needed, and Europe needs to more vigorously engage in cooperative threat reduction. The United States has carried the burden for more than a decade, but it cannot do it alone. Europe has a responsibility to help lessen the threat of nuclear terrorism before it is too late.