Abstract
The Bush administration promises that its ambitious plan for missile defense is purely benign, but it looks a lot like a shield-and-spear strategy.
The U.S. strategy to deal with weapons of mass destruction is based partly on the construction of a missile defense shield. The construction of six missile interceptors in Alaska and four in California by October 2004 simply represents the first stage of a far more ambitious project. The Bush administration envisions the shield's eventual form as covering not just the United States but also parts of its allies' territory. A broad variety of anti-missile systems–ranging from shorter-range theater missile defense systems, to airborne lasers, to space-based weapons–would ultimately be tied together in a single protective umbrella.
Such a system would have to function perfectly. If a single weapon of mass destruction (WMD)-armed missile were to get through, the missile defense shield would be a failure. But many experts say that the various systems involved are far from operational. If that's true, why does this huge and extremely expensive national missile defense (NMD) program keep moving forward?
The threat and the rationale
A weapon's effectiveness must be measured against the threat it is meant to counter. In a presentation about the missile threat given at The Hague in June 2001, Lt. Col. Cornelis Wolterbeek of NATO's WMD Center concluded that no “‘country of concern’ besides India will possess a viable multistage missile within the near future, unless ‘countries of concern’ get substantial outside help from India, China, or Russia.” The number of countries that have weapons systems capable of delivering chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads (besides the five recognized and three de facto nuclear weapons states) is very small, perhaps no more than a dozen.
The political implications of the “threat concept,” which implies a presumptive definition of which country is a threat and which is being threatened, is a complicating factor. The term itself implies a vantage point. It can, of course, be argued that the missile arsenals and nuclear systems deployed by the nuclear weapon states are themselves a threat to other countries. This is certainly a basic assumption for any multilateral approach to arms control.
NMD and its related programs constitute a high expenditure for very little return–if seen in only defensive terms.
By any commonsense criteria, the missile defense plan is an extremely ineffective means of defending the continental United States and, by extension, its allies. Even if one accepts the idea that the systems can be made to work, one must make further assumptions that are just as hard to swallow.
First, one must assume that there is a country that wants to attack the United States or its allies. (One might also assume that, if such an enemy were identifiable, its leaders would have to have taken leave of their senses, since retaliation would be swift and massive.) Additionally, using missiles for an attack seems completely irrational, in view of the many other means available. This was tragically illustrated by the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, both of which involved nonstate actors.
Shield and spear
One can only conclude that NMD and its related programs constitute a high expenditure for very little return, if seen in purely defensive terms. But perhaps there is a broader line of strategic reasoning under which missile defense makes more sense.
Consider a phalanx, made up of hundreds of Greek hoplites–soldiers armed with both a shield and a spear. The shield performed a vital function during the offensive operations of the phalanx, which would have been impossible without the simultaneous use of the spear. Only by looking at military strategy as the extension of political policy can the role of defensive shield along with offensive arms be explained. The key is the interaction of military systems within a political context.
In the context of U.S. foreign policy, for example, a certain freedom of action has been secured, which follows from the U.S. position as sole superpower. This freedom of action can be applied in the diplomatic sphere or elsewhere. U.S. foreign policy dominates in the international framework, although it is necessarily bound by certain limits.
Two basic U.S. principles underlie this. The first is that no enemy power be allowed to place the U.S. population under direct military threat. The second is that the United States will not countenance the existence of a power or combination of powers capable of competing with it at a global level. This second principle is often explained in American political circles as necessary to guarantee the first, but it is also closely intertwined with various foreign policy goals such as control over vital resources like oil; control over the world's vital waterways; and maintenance of a system of strategic bases from which U.S. forces can operate in peace or war.
Since the end of the Cold War, the direct dangers of a nuclear missile attack on the continental United States have declined, to some extent, along with the capabilities of Russian nuclear strike forces. The possibility of accidental nuclear war remains a risk, although agreements between Russia and the United States provide for the “enhancement of strategic stability” through a number of confidence- and security-building measures, including pre-launch notification of ballistic missile launches.
The “rogues”
During the 1990s, some U.S. strategists perceived a new military threat: the development of WMD-armed missiles by a number of smaller states, including those hostile to U.S. interests (commonly referred to as “rogue states” or “countries of concern”). This assumption formed the basis for the 1998 Rumsfeld report on the ballistic missile threat.
The focus on this type of delivery system is somewhat puzzling. After all, there are many methods of getting warheads into U.S. territory. One might carry them by ship, on foot, or nearly any other imaginable way. Besides the warhead, the only other requirement for launching an attack is to have an infrastructure capable of assembling and detonating the warhead. Yet the NMD lobby does not concern itself with these alternative methods of attack.
The operational goal of the shield is to stop a certain number of missiles. The political context of a potential attack situation is all-important, but rarely discussed. Most of the public relations campaigns surrounding NMD suggest a situation in which the United States is attacked suddenly. The pretext for such an attack is hardly ever presented, other than that the leader of one of the “rogue states” would, for some unknown reason, have decided to launch WMD against the United States–knowing full well that retaliation would be swift and massive.
The simplistic and ideological picture is that of a ruler who takes leave of his senses. It presupposes that there is no coherent policy aim, except a desire to strike at the U.S. population whatever the cost. Such an explanation crosses the bounds of common sense and reality. For a rational explanation of U.S. missile defense plans, one must explore political logic in order to elucidate military policy.
Deterrence and policy
A missile attack on the United States is conceivable as a retaliatory measure, in a situation in which the opposing state's vital interests are at stake and under attack by U.S. armed forces. Even in such circumstances, launching an attack on the United States would be suicidal, hence, only the logic of deterrence is applicable. The reasoning: If the United States were threatening the vital interests of country X, then X's leadership would want to have the capability to threaten a WMD strike on the United States. This capability would effectively deter a U.S. attack on X's vital interests and would limit the military options available to U.S. war planners. Such a threat would not be brought into play at a low level of confrontation, or even the initial stages of a major one. The key principle would be to impress upon U.S. leaders the possibility of a WMD strike on their territory should U.S. forces or allies directly threaten the vital interests of country X. Of course, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of “vital interests” is an inherent part of deterrence logic.
Assuming that U.S. strategists and policy makers partly or wholly accept deterrence logic, it stands to reason that they would try to counter the threat of a WMD-armed missile force. In this context, an NMD program makes sense, especially given the limited numbers of missiles available to smaller states of concern. If a situation can be created in which the WMD deterrent is effectively neutralized, U.S. planners might reason, then total freedom of action for U.S. forces–conventional or nuclear–would be restored.
The key technical premise here is that the proponents of the shield can credibly create the impression that it would actually stop a limited missile attack. This is where the technical argument assumes a more important role–if the system is seen as a failure, which seems to be the case so far, then the military logic collapses.
Russia and China
This reasoning does not apply just to the so-called countries of concern. Of the five recognized nuclear weapon states, Russia and China would also be directly affected by the deployment of NMD. China, with its small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, could be viewed according to the scenario sketched earlier. The possibility of a Chinese nuclear counterattack (in the event its vital interests were threatened by the United States) could be neutralized if NMD were in place.
By the same token, the political interaction between the United States and Russia could be influenced by the balance of nuclear forces between the countries and the extent of the NMD shield. The most extreme scenario would be a situation in which Russian forces have reached such a low level that a first strike on Russia becomes a possibility–supposing an effective shield can be built to defend North America against retaliation.
A more likely scenario, which played a role in the last stages of the Cold War, is one that involves a kind of economic warfare, one in which Russia would engage in a debilitating arms race. Building a U.S. missile defense might trigger an explosion of Russian missile manufacturing to deploy the extra missiles required to overcome the shield. The threat of such an expensive arms race could then be used to gain a better U.S. position in other negotiations.
The extent to which Russian strategic forces have already deteriorated became evident during President Vladimir Putin's last election campaign, when two missile tests failed. Such problems symbolize the competing demands of the nuclear and conventional branches of the armed services (the Russian economy can no longer support both) and therefore the huge burden that Russia would encounter if it chose to respond to U.S. missile defense. China faces the same problem.
A dangerous defense
Viewed in this light, a missile shield is a defensive system only in a narrow, technical sense. Because it creates room for offensive strategic maneuvering, NMD can be compared to the hoplite's shield, which was wielded in conjunction with a spear–an effective combination of defense and offense.
Any discussion of U.S. nuclear policy should study the existing political framework in which NMD would play a role. The combination of offensive, even reduced, nuclear forces combined with a preemptive doctrine and an extended NMD deployment essentially indicates an aggressive foreign policy.
Such developments, turned into operational reality, will nullify painstaking diplomatic efforts to create a stable system of international arms control.