Abstract
Is it possible to stem the spread of nuclear weapons technology? Now is the time to find out.
In mid-February, the State Department announced an agreement with Liberia that will allow U.S. sailors to board commercial ships registered with the West African nation and search for weapons of mass destruction-related materials.
Instead of having to negotiate access to commercial ships flying the Liberian flag, one of the most-used “flags of convenience,” the United States now has the ability to act undeterred.
The agreement fits snuggly in line with the State Department's Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict the illicit trade of weapons technologies. Together with a series of proposals–criminalizing proliferation, restricting the number of states with the capability to enrich and reprocess uranium, and ensuring the enforcement of strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) restrictions–it's the Bush administration's answer to proliferation.
But is it enough? To some, the proposals are just another example of U.S. arrogance and highlight the administration's unilateralist tendencies. Critics point to the general hypocrisy of an administration that discourages proliferation while moving to expand its own arsenal of nuclear weapons.
By failing to fully support the processes outlined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the proposals also potentially undercut the treaty and the IAEA, the one international body responsible for policing proliferation.
In one sense, the invasion of Iraq has laid the groundwork for an assault on proliferation, as well as monumental change in the Middle East. The threat of a “rogue” regime in Iraq holding neighboring countries hostage with weapons of mass destruction has faded.
But at the same time, other threats have intensified. Iran has built up its infrastructure to develop nuclear weapons, and it has also proved willing to deceive inspectors and hide its capabilities. Terrorist attacks in the Middle East and throughout the world continue to take the lives of hundreds of innocent people and contribute to political instability. Despite the superiority of its conventional military force in the region, Israel continues to maintain its own nuclear arsenal behind a veil of ambiguity. Further east, both Pakistan and India continue to develop their nuclear weapons programs and, in the case of Pakistan, disseminate its wealth of nuclear technologies. As Leonard Weiss writes (page 52), we've seen this kind of behavior before with Pakistan.
If nonproliferation efforts are to prove successful, they need to address the failures of the NPT during its 30-plus years and build on its successes. Two articles that follow approach the deficiencies of present efforts and suggest courses of action that would contribute to a long-lasting nonproliferation regime.
In the first, Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr. detail the potential benefits to world security if Israel were to acknowledge its nuclear capabilities and join India and Pakistan in supporting the NPT from outside its current structure. In the second, Bennett Ramberg argues for the creation of a Mideast nuclear-free zone, and eventual NATO membership for Israel, in an attempt to limit the nuclear aspirations of other regional powers.