Let's Go No-LOW

Abstract

Launch-on-warning policies in the United States and Russia are vestiges of the Cold War. They need to be replaced–the sooner the better.

As long as the United States and Russia retain their arsenals of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, some on high alert, the danger remains of an accidental nuclear war between the two countries. Neither side wants nuclear war. And if it should happen, it would be an utter disaster for both countries and for the entire world–no matter which adversary caused it.

The most likely cause of accidental nuclear war is “launch on warning”–the policy of launching a retaliatory nuclear strike if the opponent's missiles or warheads are believed to be in flight, but before any detonation from the perceived attack has occurred. 1 Launch-on-warning has exposed the world, for at least 30 years, to the danger of a nuclear war caused by nothing but a coincidence of radar, satellite sensor, or computer glitch, and a temporary human failure to appreciate that the message signaling attack is false.

Although it is true that no accidental nuclear war has yet occurred, there have been many false warnings, of which at least a few have had very dangerous features. That a war has not happened is a credit to the care and alertness of the militaries of both Russia and the United States.

But no one should feel reassured. A single launch of nuclear weapons on false warning would result in nuclear war and the end of civilization just as surely as would a nuclear war started by a planned attack. There would be no second chance to review the system to make it safer.

Although the Cold War is considered over, both Russia and the United States have chosen to retain their launch-on-warning capabilities–and they are generally believed to be continuing their launch-on-warning policies. This is inexcusably dangerous.

Due to a lack of funds, Russia has to rely on warnings from only one system for much of the time. The Russian satellite fleet is incomplete and there are periods when segments of the country's periphery are not properly monitored. 2 Decaying Russian technical systems surely increase the likelihood of false alerts, as well as the possibility of overreaction in a confused situation.

The “threat conference”

When warning systems detect a possible attack, there is at most a total of 20 minutes for human operators and commanders to call and conduct what the United States calls a “threat conference.” (Russian officers also have to evaluate warning data and pass it up the chain of command.) If the warning were to be assessed as a nuclear attack, top U.S. and Russian military commanders would contact their respective presidents to advise them, and each president would have only a few minutes to decide whether to retaliate.

Although the United States and Russia keep data about false alerts classified, it is clear that these have not been rare events. 3 Most alerts are routine and it is easy to exclude the possibility of a real attack; others have been serious enough that missile silo lids were rolled back. During the January 1995 “Black Brant” incident, Russian leaders opened their nuclear suitcases in preparation to launch a nuclear strike against the United States. 4

High rates of nuclear false warnings also create a significant probability that such events will overlap and corroborate each other, thus leading to disastrous actions. 5 No design can completely protect against multiple errors and malfunctions involving human behavior because the number of possible reactions is enormous. In times of increased military activity, when forces are placed on alert, the complexity of warning systems may not only cease to provide redundancy–it may amplify mistakes. 6

Launch-on-warning can be compared with Russian roulette–every false warning carries with it the tiny possibility of final disaster. While the chance of disaster is small with each event, why would anyone want to continue pulling the trigger?

No-LOW and no verification needed

Replacing launch-on-warning with a policy of “Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation” (RLOAD) by both parties would, at a stroke, remove the danger of an accidental war caused by a false warning.

Such a change would not require symmetry, or verification, or an agreement, or treaty; nor would it undermine “deterrence.” RLOAD or “No launch-on-warning” (No-LOW) could be adopted quickly and unilaterally. If one side adopted it, the risk of accidental war would be immediately reduced by half. When the other side followed suit, the risk of war caused by false warning would fall to zero.

From the point of view of preserving deterrence, verification of no-launch-on-warning is actually undesirable. An adversary planning a preemptive attack would want to be absolutely certain that its opponent had changed to and remained under a policy of No-LOW. Verification might contribute to a degree of certainty, and so impair deterrence.

“De-alerting” is the term often mistakenly used when what is meant is that nuclear weapons should be taken off “hair-trigger alert” by physically changing weapons systems to impose an unavoidable delay in the launch protocol. Although No-LOW requires a slight delay in response, it is not de-alerting or anything like it. De-alerting would be a far more radical step on the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons. No-LOW is an important measure needed to reduce immediately the risk of accidental war until more permanent and less easily reversible measures–such as de-alerting–can be put in place.

The United States and Russia seem bent on maintaining their nuclear deterrents for the immediate future, whatever changes need to be made to reduce the danger of accidental war. If de-alerting were chosen, it would be regarded as essential that both countries' enforced delay be equal, that the delay be verifiable, and that it be verified either by international observers or by observers from the opposite side. These conditions would be difficult to achieve, requiring extensive study by experts, followed by a formal agreement or treaty. The process could take several years and perhaps end in failure. All that time, the world would still be at risk.

In contrast, the elimination of launch-on-warning would not eliminate any other retaliatory options nor reduce the alert status. No-LOW would merely ensure that retaliation not take place unless there had been a nuclear detonation. It would delay a retaliatory strike by only a few minutes. A false warning would be revealed when the predicted time had passed for the first missiles to arrive and no detonation had been detected.

No-LOW is achievable

The purpose of deterrence is to prevent nuclear attack. This is theoretically achieved by each side convincing the other that a first strike will inevitably bring unacceptable retaliation. The theory of deterrence relies on the idea that the ultimate decision makers on both sides will rationally conclude that it would be folly to launch an attack resulting in one's own certain destruction. Deterrence only fails if one side believes it can launch such a rapid and massive surprise nuclear strike that it will render the other side incapable of retaliating.

How an accident might happen

“In 1979 there were 1,544 routine missile display conferences that were necessary to deal with events other than threatening or ambiguous launches. There were 78 missile display conferences called to evaluate detections that were possibly threatening to the North American continent. In 1980 through June 30 there were 2,159 routine missile display conferences and 69 called to evaluate possible threats to North America….

“If the NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense] Commander determines the possibility of a threat, the next step is to convene a threat assessment conference. This brings in more senior people than the duty officers at the various command posts into the evaluation, such as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A threat assessment conference is convened to determine the nature of the threat to North America and to direct preliminary steps to enhance force survivability. In 1979 and 1980 there were four threat assessment conferences.”

–Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Report on Recent False Alerts From the Nation's Missile Attack Warning System,” October 9, 1980, Statement by Sen. Barry Goldwater and Sen. Gary Hart, pp. 4-5.

The president's imaginary powers

Every new president is given a misleading briefing on the nuclear “football,” writes Bruce G. Blair, a former nuclear launch control officer. “From the time of this highly classified orientation briefing given immediately upon his assumption of the presidency through the end of his tenure, a president is made to believe that he is the nuclear quarterback in control of the nuclear football and would call the shots in the event of a nuclear showdown or enemy missile attack….

“What is misleading about the briefing is that the president's supporting command system is not actually geared to withhold retaliation in the event of enemy missile attack, real or apparent….

“The bias in favor of launch on electronic warning is so powerful that it would take enormously more presidential will to withhold an attack than to authorize it. The option to ‘ride out’ the onslaught and then take stock of the proper course of action exists only on paper.”

–Bruce G. Blair, president, Center for Defense Information, February 16, 2004

Launch-on-warning is a response to the fear that a massive first salvo, or a devastating electromagnetic pulse (EMP), might prevent a retaliatory strike. It is not the risk of retaliation that deters attack, it is the certainty (or very near certainty) on the part of the potential attacker that retaliation will not fail.

As for EMP, we know that great efforts have been made to screen military electrical equipment from the pulse, so it is not possible to know how effective EMP might be against land-based missiles. Submarines and the missiles they carry are believed to be completely protected by sea water.

The United States uses the space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection System (NUDET) to detect, locate, and report nuclear explosions in the earth's atmosphere and near space. NUDET either supplements or replaces the hundreds of ground-based “bomb-alarms” that were installed near military bases and big cities in 1974. 7 Russia currently employs optical and seismic sensors to detect nuclear explosions; positive signals from these devices are a prerequisite to the launch of Russian strategic nuclear weapons by the Strategic Rocket Forces' “Perimetr” backup system. 8 A change from launch-on-warning to No-LOW would require that any positive signals from detection systems be fed directly to the launch silos as well as to command centers, so that the destruction of command centers would not prevent a retaliatory strike.

Retaliation upon detonation could be ensured by having launch silos carry out all steps toward launch, except the final one, during the flight of incoming missiles, just as under launch-on-warning. On receipt of a bomb signal at the predicted time of arrival of attack, retaliation (if authorized) would be launched immediately from silos not already destroyed by the attack.

It is believed that both Russia and the United States retain more than 2,000 warheads on high alert, available for launch-on-warning. If 5 percent reached their targets, the retaliatory strike would destroy the other country. No rational head of state or commander-in-chief could be certain that an initial salvo could put more than 95 percent of these weapons out of action within half a minute of the first detonation. A massive disarming first strike could not in fact be relied upon to prevent retaliation.

If, despite these arguments, the military establishment on either side cannot be persuaded to abandon launch-on-warning, the heads of state must balance the elimination of the very definite risk of accidental war due to a false warning against the hypothetical possibility of weakened deterrence resulting in war.

There is no logical reason to maintain launch-on-warning. It is to the equal advantage of both sides even if only one changes its policy to No-LOW, and if both adopt No-LOW then the most likely cause of a U.S. Russian nuclear war–an accidental war due to a false warning–will be eliminated.