Abstract
Another Dover pro
John Prados, in “The Pros from Dover” (January/February 2004), does an outstanding job of showing us how Bush's “crack team” of national security experts failed their country. I would have liked to see Secretary of State Colin Powell included in his band of ideological misfits.
Of all those in the Bush administration who argued for war with Iraq, Powell is the most disgraceful. By all accounts, in the early days of the ramp-up to war, Powell was the voice of moderation and reason. But his presentation to the United Nations in February 2003, although more artful, was no less duplicitous than Bush's Niger uranium hoax.
Powell no longer has credibility among foreign governments. He has lost their respect. Instead of resigning if Bush is reelected, he should do it now. It is his last chance to taste honor in public service.
Santa Ana, California
Success, not hypocrisy
It is clear in “Bush's Nuclear Hypocrisy” (January/February 2004) that Ronald Powaski believes that current U.S. nuclear policies are completely wrong. His argument is that if the United States would just play nice, observe the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and get rid of all its nuclear weapons then everyone else in the world would, too. I couldn't disagree more.
The history of the world is full of examples where countries have signed treaties and agreed to policies only to later go back on their word.
Meanwhile, President George W. Bush has decided to deal with adversaries in a language they all understand, force.
Invading Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in progress in both Iran and Libya.
“What's ‘leftist tripe,’ Grandpa?”
The president did this without signing any treaties or giving up anything. Maybe our current policies aren't as insane as Powaski would have us believe.
Los Alamos, New Mexico
Ronald Powaski responds:
Diplomacy without military force to support it is often ineffective. However, military force without meaningful international support, which is a product of diplomatic effort, also is usually ineffective, as the Bush administration has discovered in Iraq. It helps to explain why Paul Bremer has gone to the United Nations seeking its assistance in legitimizing the U.S. plan for Iraqi elections.
And while Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program was probably influenced by U.S. military action against Iraq, it was primarily a product of protracted American and British diplomacy. By contrast, the U.S. approach to North Korea, which has been characterized by an all-too-obvious reluctance to engage the North Koreans diplomatically, has been ineffective in dissuading the North Koreans from going ahead with their nuclear program.
The United States certainly does not have to rely on nuclear weapons to flex its military might. The United States has overwhelming technological and conventional force superiority to defend America and its worldwide interests.
More than fire
I agree with Lynn Eden's “City on Fire” (January/February 2004) in that emphasizing blast effects and minimizing fire damage from nuclear weapons is, to say the least, misguided.
While working in a salvage unit as part of Operation Crossroads in 1946, our first job when we returned to a test site was to put out fires on the target vessels. The combined threat of blast, fire, and radiation from nuclear weapons is particularly devastating.
I fervently wish that our leaders could appreciate the need to eliminate such diabolical devices.
St. Louis, Missouri
Clock change?
I have heard speculation that, were there to be another major terrorist attack in the United States, the government could impose martial law. Wouldn't the suspension of democracy be comparable to mass physical destruction? Is seven minutes to midnight close enough?
Kenwood, California
Not Bulletin material
I am a bit disturbed by a derogatory term used in the “Editor's Note” of the January/February 2004 issue. I treat the Bulletin as if it is a scientific journal where I can find informative articles based upon fact or at the very least scholarly conjecture. I do not believe that the term “Bushies” has a place in the Bulletin. Name calling does not bolster the argument set forth, can make a compelling argument look specious, and does not belong in a publication with the storied history of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Argonne, Illinois
Correction
The correct name of the president's education bill, referenced in John Isaacs's “Congress: Democrats Speak Up” (September/October 2003), is No Child Left Behind. The words Leave No Child Behind are a trademark of the Children's Defense Fund (CDF). Thanks to Donna A. Lawrence, executive director of CDF in New York, for bringing this to our attention.
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Update
The Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced January 28 that its final environmental impact statement for the planned $4 billion Modern Pit Facility (MPF) would be indefinitely delayed. The statement, originally due by April and expected to name a site for the facility, was postponed because of congressional concerns, according to the NNSA.
As Chris Paine reported in the September/October 2003 Bulletin, the MPF would be able to make 250-900 plutonium weapons cores per year. Yet “Energy could easily maintain a sufficient deterrent without the MPF,” Paine reported. He added, “Such bomb-making abilities don't just knock the moral-political props out from under efforts to stem bomb programs in North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan. They're a felonious frontal assault” on nonproliferation itself.
Despite criticism from Congress and elsewhere, Energy is unlikely to give up its drive for new weapons cores. “Restoring our capability to manufacture plutonium pits is an essential element of America's nuclear defense policy,” said NNSA head Linton Brooks.
On January 20, India inked a $1.5 billion deal with Russia for the transfer of a refurbished Soviet-era aircraft carrier and 28 MiG-29 fighter jets.
In a 1999 draft nuclear doctrine, India's National Security Council “called for the creation of a ‘credible minimum deterrent’ to be based ‘on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles, and sea-based assets,’ but the board's recommendations had no official standing,” reported the March/April 2002 Nuclear Notebook.