Abstract
If the next administration wants to be seen as serious about nonproliferation, it'll have to undo a lot of Bush administration practices.
It is ironic and hypocritical that the Bush administration has condemned both North Korea and Iran for their apparent efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The Bush administration itself is undermining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
The heart of the regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One of its main provisions is the promise by the nuclear weapon states, including the United States, to move toward nuclear disarmament. In return for that promise, the non-nuclear weapon states have pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons.
Last year, however, the Bush administration scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, one of the pillars of the international nonproliferation regime, in order to free the United States from the treaty's restraints on the construction of a national missile defense system. In doing so, the administration argued that the ABM Treaty no longer served America's national interest–the same “national interest” language North Korea used to justify its withdrawal from the NPT last January.
But the Bush administration has been no friend of the NPT either. It has approved a strategic doctrine that calls for the possible use of nuclear weapons against so-called rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The new doctrine threatens to overturn a U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are still a party to the NPT, such as Iran.
A particularly biting editorial in the Parisian newspaper Le Monde pointed out the ironic position in which the administration's nuclear strategy places the non-nuclear states. “Why,” the paper asked, “sign, or remain signatory to, a treaty [the NPT] which, in exchange for your absolute renunciation of nuclear arms, does not guarantee that they will not be used against you?”
Nevertheless, the Bush administration's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review calls for rebuilding key parts of the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex to permit the modification, upgrading, or replacement of portions of the existing nuclear force. It further proposes the development of new, low-yield, and presumably more usable nuclear weapons, such as a new nuclear earth-penetrating weapon. The alleged purpose of this weapon is to give the United States the capability to destroy hardened and/or deeply buried targets, such as the cave complex used by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Although the Bush administration has stated that it has no intention of testing nuclear weapons, it is hard to believe that the military would deploy any new nuclear weapons without trying them out first–and a resumption of nuclear weapon tests by the United States would further undermine the NPT.
In 1995, many nations approved the indefinite extension of the NPT on the explicit condition that the nuclear powers would cease all nuclear-yield testing and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Many regard the CTBT as one of the most effective ways of ending the nuclear arms race. It is based on the assumption that if nations are prohibited from testing nuclear weapons, they are less likely to develop them.
As of June 2003, 167 nations had signed the CTBT and 101 had ratified it, including 31 of the 44 nuclear-capable states that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force. Although the United States has adhered to a self-imposed testing moratorium for more than a decade, the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999, and the Bush administration has refused to resubmit it.
As a clear indication of why the administration opposes ratification of the CTBT, the Nuclear Posture Review calls for shortening the preparation time required to resume U.S. nuclear testing from two to three years to as little as three months, making possible a much more rapid resumption of tests. The administration's intent is obvious: to test a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons for possible use against terrorists holed up deep in mountain caves or against so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea.
In September, the Senate approved an administration request for funds for continued research on the controversial nuclear earth penetrator, accelerated nuclear testing readiness, exploration of new weapons technologies, and preliminary studies on building a plant to produce plutonium cores for nuclear weapons. However, the Senate's action had to be reconciled with a measure passed by the House in May that eliminated all money for such purposes. Democrats, most of whom oppose the administration's “reckless” pursuit of new nuclear weapons, hoped to overturn the Senate's action in a conference committee in the fall.
But the Democrats were only partially successful. In early November, congressional appropriators cut half of the administration's $15 million 2004 funding request for studying bunker busters and barred the Energy Department from spending $4 million of an approved $6 million for new weapons concepts until it submits a report on U.S. nuclear stockpile requirements.
In so doing, however, the House and Senate complied with a White House request to repeal a 10-year-old ban on research leading to the development of new nuclear weapons with yields of less than five kilotons and the proposed nuclear bunker busters. They also agreed to shorten the time required to prepare for a full-scale nuclear test from 24 to 18 months.
Nevertheless, lawmakers also demonstrated their unease over the administration's plans to reinvigorate U.S. nuclear weapons research and test preparations. While they approved research into new low-yield weapons, they refused to authorize the development and testing of new or modified designs.
Clearly, if the Bush administration were serious about halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would accept the same standards of behavior that it is attempting to impose on non-nuclear weapon states. Needless to say, this administration is unlikely to reverse its decision mandating continued U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons or to abandon its program to develop new nuclear weapons.
Yet it still is not too late to reverse the damage to the international nonproliferation regime produced by the Bush administration's reckless nuclear policies. In all likelihood, though, it will require the election of a new president before there can be a return to a sane U.S. nuclear weapon policy.
A new president will have to lead the international community by setting a good example–that is, by acting to preserve and strengthen, rather than undermine, the nonproliferation regime.
To discourage current non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring nuclear weapons, the next administration will have to pledge that the United States itself will refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons first.
The next administration will also have to announce that it is abandoning the Bush administration's effort to develop low-yield nuclear weapons. Instead, the next president will need to declare that his administration is prepared to resume nuclear arms reduction talks with the Russians and to resubmit the CTBT to the Senate for its reconsideration.
A package of initiatives such as these would demonstrate to the world community that the United States is serious about ending its reliance on nuclear weapons. Only then will America be in a position to expect the non-nuclear weapon states to refrain from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.