Abstract
U.S. officials say they have Al Qaeda on the run. Maybe they shouldn't be too sure about that.
On June 24, President George W. Bush and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf jointly announced at Camp David that the Al Qaeda network had been dismantled and that many of its chief operatives were in prison–after all, both presidents had been told by their respective security agencies that more than 500 Al Qaeda suspects had been arrested in Pakistan alone, with more captured in the Gulf States.
But neither president bothered to mention that Osama bin Laden and the other founders of Al Qaeda are still at large, operating the organization as readily as when there were no massive operations against it by the FBI and the CIA.
Of course, it is possible that the conflict with Al Qaeda may end. Some believe that if the road map to peace in the Middle East succeeds, it could reduce Al Qaeda's enmity toward the United States. Others believe that a new U.S. administration might revise current policies, which could help to end the struggle. But all that is speculation. Meanwhile, a chain of destruction continues.
In the shadows
In contrast to the presidents' claims, Al Qaeda sources say that since September 11 they have lost only four actual members. Mohammed Atef (also known as Abu Hafez) was killed during the U.S. bombing of Kabul, and the only person known to have been captured is Abu Yasir, also known as Yasir al-Jazeeri. Al Qaeda will not name the two others who have been lost.
The group merely hires the services of non-members, whom they motivate, pay, and train. Selection is made from among the most deeply ideologically committed. Al Qaeda members never undertake operations themselves.
Although the organization reflects bin Laden's personality, two other people, the late Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahri, have exerted great influence on his views.
July 29: Afghan women walk past destroyed houses in Kabul.
His close friends are of the opinion that bin Laden loved the life of a guerrilla commando and wanted nothing more than to destroy everything he came across. That was possible when he waged jihad against the communist forces in Afghanistan, but against the United States he has had to adopt an altogether different strategy. He has had to realize that financial resources and good management are important. After the “American betrayal” (abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviets left), he came to believe that knowing the real intentions of people around you, foreseeing events, and motivating others for the cause were pivotal factors in success. The way the Americans left Afghanistan and their support of the dynasties in the Gulf States, as well as of Israel's suppression of the Palestinians, were key factors that led him to turn his energies against what he terms American imperialism.
July 29: Afghan women walk past destroyed houses in Kabul.
Both the United States and Osama bin Laden came to the aid of the Mujahadeen as they fought the Soviet army in the 1980s.
Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian professor and intellectual who taught at the International Islamic University in Islamabad, was an early advocate of jihad against the Soviets. A senior journalist told me that while he was meeting with Azzam in 1987, two Arabs also came to see him. Azzam introduced one of these guests as Osama bin Laden, and they discussed establishing a hospital in one of the tunnels in the Tora Bora mountains.
Azzam, who spent most of his time working to oust the Russians from Afghanistan, was assassinated in 1988 in Peshawar by unknown assailants.
Ayman al-Zawahri, an Egyptian surgeon, was once the active leader of the Islamic Jihad Group. He too came to Afghanistan to fight the communists, but could not return to his country, where he had been tried in absentia and sentenced to death. Even when bin Laden was working with the United States against the Soviets, al-Zawahri was staunchly anti-American.
It was the U.S. attitude after the end of the Cold War, as well as the influence of Azzam and al-Zawahri, that turned bin Laden against the United States. Al-Zawahri's Islamic Jihad Group, as it struggled to establish Islamic rule in Egypt, had always opposed ties with the United States.
Abdullah Azzam merged his organization with Al Qaeda in 1987, but soon realized that despite their common cause, differences in aptitude and style made it impossible to operate jointly, and he broke with the group. In the meantime, al-Zawahri and bin Laden had become even closer to each other.
As bin Laden came to agree with al-Zawahri, he decided that the United States would use other Muslim nations and abandon them, just as it had done in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The result of this change in viewpoint has been a series of operations against U.S. interests, culminating in the tragedy of September 11.
Accounted for?
More than 500 Arab nationals have been arrested in different parts of Pakistan as suspected Al Qaeda operatives. Pakistani and U.S. authorities claim that some among them are top leaders. They include:
The FBI believes that Mohammed, 37, is a Kuwaiti national, but others say he is from Baluchistan, Pakistan's province bordering on Afghanistan and Iran. The lack of firm knowledge about him, they say, shows how poor the FBI's information is.
Al Qaeda sources have dismissed U.S. claims about Mohammed's significance, telling me that he was merely an imam at a mosque in Peshawar who had accepted, ideologically, bin Laden's struggle. Another source said his only role was to provide logistical assistance to escaping Arab nationals.
U.S. authorities claim that two senior Al Qaeda members have been killed:
U.S. authorities say they have arrested other important Al Qaeda members in other locations. They include:
If Al Qaeda's top hierarchy is still intact, credit must go to the farsightedness of al-Zawahri, who has successfully limited the organization to a handful of people, all Arabs; kept the organization a secret; and launched successful intelligence and operational activities.
Using rage
In the Muslim world, stable democracies are rare, and the Gulf States are governed by family dynasties. Political frustration, the rulers' perceived submission to the United States, and difficult economic conditions all gave rise to an angry generation that had no way to express its emotions. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave many Muslims a unique opportunity to serve an important cause–liberating a Muslim country.
Before the invasion, public opinion in the Muslim world was opposed to communism, and there was no significant opposition to the United States, or to the West on the whole. Apart from Egypt, most states had only a few small groups that opposed the United States on religious grounds and/or as a result of the U.S. tilt toward Israel.
But in the decade of the 1990s, frustrated youth, particularly in the Arab monarchies, began to support and join anti-American movements. Bin Laden gradually became a charismatic leader, attracting followers first through his writings, and later through operations against U.S. interests.
Meanwhile, neither the U.S. government nor American intellectuals accurately gauged the depth of anti-American hatred, its causes, or its manifestations. The state of affairs in the Gulf States led a great number of young men to join the struggle–a situation that still provides Al Qaeda with highly motivated volunteers.
Pakistan is different. Despite military interventions in the government, democracy has existed in Pakistan in one form or another. The religious parties represent the sentiment of conservative and religious segments of society. And through an opposition party alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), they have been able to stage million-man rallies in the cities and protest against U.S. policies both in and out of parliament. This sort of public expression is simply not possible in the Arab states. That is why, despite serious public opposition to the United States, Musharraf has been able to work closely with the United States in the war against terrorism.
Al Qaeda and the Taliban
The Taliban and Al Qaeda looked like inseparable allies, but it is important to remember that they are very different. The Taliban belong to an ultraconservative, medieval society. Their agenda is Afghan-specific. Before September 11, the United States was not their number-one enemy.
The Taliban, who belong to a single school of religious thought, are an amalgam of almost all the ethnic linguistic groups in Afghanistan, although they were most dominant in Kandahar.
Al Qaeda, on the other hand, has a wider agenda–its goal is to attack U.S. interests wherever possible, in countries ranging from the Gulf States to the Far East. Al Qaeda operatives are not necessarily orthodox religious people; the binding force among them is hatred of the United States.
Al Qaeda wages psychological warfare and displays tremendous ability in using modern media, including Arab and Western resources. It employs modern techniques and highly qualified operatives who are specialists in their respective fields. In contrast, the Taliban are trained only in religious teaching, Islamic jurisprudence, and the use of conventional weapons.
Both groups have been governed by single personalities, Mullah Omar and bin Laden. But if bin Laden were to die, Ayman al-Za-wahri could probably take over, and Al Qaeda has a cadre of trained commanders. The Taliban, on the other hand, appear to have no charismatic leader other than Mullah Omar.
Gul Agha, governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan, said to have hosted recent U.S.-Taliban negotiations
The groups' support for each other was based on their respective shortcomings. Bin Laden needed a safe place from which to operate, and the Taliban relied on Al Qaeda to maintain control. The Taliban may not have been as staunch an enemy of the United States as Al Qaeda, but they at least agreed that the United States sponsored antiMuslim activities.
Could it happen?
The nature of the groups' continuing relationship could be key to future developments. It may seem unlikely, but some are actually predicting that the Taliban could arrange a ceasefire between the United States and Al Qaeda.
This theory stems from the problems the United States is now encountering in Afghanistan, which is gradually slipping from its hands. Despite U.S. military power, the resistance movement is growing day by day. The Northern United Front, the de facto ruler of the country, does not enjoy the ideal relationship with the United States that it had earlier. Russia's influence has surpassed that of the United States, and U.S. military installations and soldiers are attacked daily by Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami guerrillas.
There have been several informal contacts between the Taliban and the United States, but the United States made the first-ever formal contact in early March, proposing an initial dialogue aimed at overcoming the present turmoil.
The Taliban say they laid out three preconditions for talks–that the United States declare they are not terrorists; that all Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo Bay be freed; and that a clear agenda be established. The Taliban and Americans met near Spin Boldak and were hosted by Kandahar governor Gul Agha. Mullah Abdur Razaq, former home minister, represented the Taliban side.
U.S. authorities can see that the Taliban is fast reorganizing. At a recent meeting in the southern province of Helmand, representatives came from all over the country to show confidence in Mullah Omar. Meanwhile, Hamid Karzai, interim president, is gradually becoming irrelevant.
Another former Jihadi leader, Mulvi Youin Khalis, visited Peshawar during the first week of June. There he met with a number of influential Afghans and Pakistanis. The chief of his own faction of Hezb-i-Islami, Khalis gave up jihad and political activities after the Taliban emerged, but is still widely respected among the resistance. His arrival in Peshawar is believed to have been part of an indirect contact between U.S. and Taliban representatives.
It would be wrong to assume, though, that any understanding the Taliban might reach with the United States would end up undermining Al Qaeda. Afghans believe bin Laden stood with them at their most difficult time, and they will not betray him.
Caught in the net
The demise of the Taliban meant that the almost 4,000 Arabs living in Afghanistan became vulnerable. Although a few families managed to escape as Kabul fell, most were caught by the Northern Alliance. Many men were killed, the children sold, and the women, including both Arab and Afghan wives, sold into slavery. Although a few individual cases were reported, this is a story that has been neglected by the press.
In 2000, I spent a few days in Wazeer Akbar Khan, a posh area of Kabul where I used to see a young Arab with his wife and two little kids. After the fall of Kabul, my host managed to come to Pakistan, and I asked him what had happened to the family. He hesitated for a while, but then reported that the young man, his wife, and children had all been taken away separately by Northern Alliance soldiers.
Many of the Arabs living in Afghanistan did not belong to Al Qaeda. They had come to Afghanistan to fight against the communist regime, or they had come into conflict with their own governments and sought safety. After the Taliban came to power, hundreds of Arabs migrated from their countries in order to live in a nation where Islamic order had been established. Many married local women and spoke fluent Dari (Afghan Persian) and the Pashto dialects, and considered Afghanistan their home. I met a number of Arabs who, while they had heard the name of bin Laden, had never met him and knew nothing about al-Zawahri or other Al Qaeda leaders. Nonetheless, the FBI and other U.S. agencies considered them all suspects, and very generously attributed positions in Al Qaeda to them. The U.S. agencies describe every Arab arrested in Afghanistan or Pakistan as an associate of bin Laden.
Mohammad Saghir, several days after his release from Guantanamo Bay.
There are many stories about how the Northern Alliance made money by arresting nearly anyone–Arabs or Afghans–labeling them Taliban or Al Qaeda, and handing them over for handsome fees. It was a very lucrative business, and Afghan warlords sent their agents all over the country–even into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Every Arab national, even Afghans resembling Arabs, was sold to U.S. officials as a “close friend of bin Laden.”
Many of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay were taken from Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taliban. U.S. authorities really have no way to distinguish between those who should have been taken and those who should not. The warlords' agents even traveled as far as Peshawar, Pakistan's nearest big city, in search of potentially valuable prisoners.
Mohammad Saghir's case is typical. The first Pakistani prisoner to be returned from Guantanamo, Saghir is preparing to sue U.S. authorities, calling his detention totally unlawful. Saghir lives in the tribal area adjacent to the Afghanistan border, and says he was on a routine preaching trip to Afghanistan when he was captured by a Northern Alliance commander. He told me, “I am innocent, and this is what I was told by the U.S. authorities at the time of my release.” He went on: “But they never said ‘sorry’ for my detention, nor showed any sign of compensation for trouble they had caused me.” He does not know how much his captor was paid for him.
Pakistan's new role
Since September 11, the Musharraf government has established a national crisis management cell, headed by an active-duty brigadier, which facilitates liaisons between FBI officials and their Pakistani counterparts in the exchange of intelligence information and the coordination of counterterrorism training courses for Pakistani officials. It prepares a comprehensive daily report on operations against Al Qaeda, a report that is circulated among all government higher-ups, including the president.
September 11 also led to radical changes in the ISI, Pakistan's elite intelligence agency. It now has a swift-acting internal antiterrorism department with specially trained personnel. The ISI had been responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, but this is an entirely different task–and the biggest operation in which it has taken part since the Afghan conflict in the 1980s. This time its partner is the FBI, not the CIA. The hundreds of Arab nationals it has arrested include some big names. The FBI had a presence in the region, but it had never before launched massive operations here. (Some in the local media have claimed that nearly 2,000 FBI agents have undertaken operations in Pakistan.)
Hunting Al Qaeda suspects could be considered Pakistan's largest collaborative effort ever, both in size and intensity. Law enforcement agencies, intelligence organizations, and armed forces all cooperate at different levels, with many high-level contacts. Musharraf's trip to Washington on June 24 was his fourth visit since September 11. The ISI director general, the home secretary, FBI director Robert Muller, and the chief of U.S. Central Command visit each other frequently.
Most of the Arab nationals who migrated over the years to Pakistan live in Peshawar, a southwestern city near the Afghan border. They had no problem until the demise of the Taliban administration. When the hunt for Al Qaeda began, almost all the Arabs in Afghanistan had to flee. Hundreds managed to escape to Pakistan, where they found refuge with sympathetic families who found them places to stay. Despite this cooperation, Arab nationals are easy victims for Pakistani intelligence, law enforcement agencies, and the FBI, ironically due to ordinary habits that draw attention.
For instance, their preference for olive oil sets them apart–dozens of Arabs have been arrested when going to market to purchase olive oil. Baked goods and sweets have been another cause of their arrests. They love to eat special sorts of bread and items like cream rolls, cakes, and so on.
At large
Although U.S. authorities say they have broken the Al Qaeda network, its recent operations show that its top leadership is still intact. In addition to Osama bin Laden, these leaders include:
But the most effective tool that has helped the FBI to detect Al Qaeda suspects has been the use of the Internet and the exchange of e-mail messages. Yasir al-Jazeeri's arrest in Lahore is a classic example. In many cases, the FBI or ISI intercepts an e-mail message, detects the destination and place from which the message has been sent, and quickly arrests the individual.
Continuing movement
Some people argue that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was a strategic mistake because before the attack Al Qaeda was mostly confined to Afghanistan, where it would have been relatively easy to negotiate with or curb its activities. Now it is spreading, as seen from the recent bombings in Riyadh and Morocco.
After the fall of Kabul, the manufacture of fake passports increased dramatically in Karachi, Pakistan's southern port city. When Ramzi Binalshibh was arrested in Karachi, Pakistani and U.S. officials recovered many false travel documents. Another alleged senior Al Qaeda member, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, arrested in Rawalpindi near the federal capital, is said to have had 70 passports in his possession. Smugglers transported various suspects from Karachi to the Gulf countries.
The tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan were the first choice for those fleeing to Pakistan, and densely populated cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Fasilabad in central Punjab were the second. Army operations in tribal areas and searches in urban areas have now thinned out the Arab presence. There are some reports indicating that as the Afghan resistance movement grows, some Arabs are now returning to Afghanistan. Karachi was once the favorite place for Arabs because it is densely populated and a port city. In the last year and a half, however, frequent raids by Pakistani and U.S. authorities have virtually cleansed the city of Arabs.
December 23, 2001: Soldiers of the Pakistan Army guard a hilltop in Parachinar, on the lookout for Al Qaeda or Taliban members fleeing Afghanistan.
Other countries have begun to exchange intelligence information, extradite suspects, and arrest wanted persons. Recently Faisal Salah Hayat, Pakistan's interior minister, paid a visit to four countries–Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco–and FBI Director Muller came to Pakistan in June to further strengthen this cooperation.
Iran, though, is different. The United States has accused Iran of providing refuge to Al Qaeda, and some reports claimed that bin Laden's son had also crossed the border into Iran. Iran has consistently rejected these allegations. On June 22, however, an Iranian government spokesman admitted that his country had arrested some Al Qaeda suspects, but said Iran would not hand them over to the United States, as Pakistan has been doing. This caused a diplomatic row between Pakistan and Iran, because Iranian authorities have alleged that Al Qaeda operatives try to enter Iran from Pakistan. Pakistan has argued that neighboring countries should patrol their borders. Pakistan's official news agency, Associated Press of Pakistan, even claimed in one item that widows of Al Qaeda operatives were being trained in Iran to hijack an unidentified official's airplane. This item's appearance further strained bilateral relations.
And so it goes …
In mid-June 2003, intelligence suggested that bin Laden might be hiding in Laghman or Kunduz, two northeastern Afghan provinces adjacent to Pakistan's tribal areas. U.S. troops immediately launched a campaign with the help of Afghan soldiers in both provinces, and the Pakistani army also carried out raids in the adjoining area. Meanwhile, the opposition MMA alliance threatened to launch a country-wide protest.
So far it has all been in vain. Bin Laden remains free. There are independent reports that he is very much alive, healthy, and highly motivated. He is expected to release new audio and video messages soon. Those close to him will not say whether he has undergone plastic surgery or changed in any other way. But they do confirm that his entire family, including his grandchildren, remains with him.