Planning to Deceive

Abstract

How the Defense Department practices the fine art of making friends and influencing people.

The early years of the George W. Bush administration, with the war on terrorism, the face-off with Iraq, and the confrontation with North Korea, have required it to be concerned with the perceptions of foreign leaders and publics.

Last years attempt to organize efforts to influence those perceptions–the Pentagons Office of Strategic Influence–came to an abrupt end due to unfavorable publicity. But perception management efforts have continued–not surprisingly, since such efforts have a long history.

An earlier office of

On February 4, 1983, a short cancellation notice was sent to a number of Defense Department officials at the request of Richard G. Stilwell, the deputy undersecretary for policy. The memo asked recipients to remove and destroy immediately any copies of two Defense Department directives in their possession–the top secret and confidential versions of a directive titled The Defense Special Plans Office. As Stilwell explained in a memo two days earlier, The directives were charter documents establishing a DoD activity whose establishment subsequently was not authorized by Congress. 1

While Stilwells instructions suggested the directives dealt with highly sensitive matters, the notice provided no explanation of what the term special plans actually meant–making it another in a long line of intelligence and military euphemisms used to obscure the nature of a secret activity. But other documents reveal that special plans referred to perception management, which has two key components. One is deception–inducing an adversary to believe something that is not true, as Allied deception planners persuaded Hitler to believe that the primary assault on D-Day would take place at the Pas-de-Calais, not Normandy. The other is truth projection–insuring that an adversary believes certain true statements, including those threatening military action in response to some provocation.

These activities raise a number of important questions about whose perceptions are being targeted, either intentionally or inadvertently, and to whom and how communications are to be conveyed–through intelligence or diplomatic channels to selected targets, or to the public through the media.

The case of Iran

Examples of what actually constitute special plans concern the hostage situation in Iran in 19791980.

A Special Plans Branch had existed within the Joint Chief of Staffs (JCS) Special Operations Division for several years, according to one former officer, when he joined it in 1978. The unit, which drew up electronic and visual deception plans, he said, had been largely ignored by military planners. 2

But after the American embassy in Tehran was seized and its staff taken hostage in November 1979, the situation changed. Perception management became one of the tools the military used in its effort to obtain the release of the hostages.

Several declassified documents reveal some aspects of planning. One JCS paper, prepared shortly before the aborted April 1980 hostage rescue mission, is titled Perception Management: Iran. It begins with a statement of purpose (the resolution of the crisis on terms favorable to the United States), summarizes the situation (the seizure of U.S. citizens and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and specifies three assumptions crucial to the planning effort–that Ayatollah Khomeini and/or the terrorists holding the prisoners could authorize their release, that Khomeinis advisers screened the information he received, and that those holding the hostages have access to and use significant world public media. 3

The document goes on to identify as the primary targets those holding the hostages, groups that can influence Ayatollah Khomeini, and Khomeini. Secondary targets included the Soviet Union, the nations of the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and other nations–in other words, the entire world.

The heart of the paper, though, consists of three sections, which specify objectives, perceptions to be fostered, and possible means to be employed.

Convincing the primary targets that Iran was more threatened by the Soviet Union than by the United States was one objective (the Soviets had just invaded Afghanistan, on Irans eastern border), while reducing support within Iran for the militants was another. Also on the list was persuading Khomeinis advisers that Iran could not defend itself against U.S. forces, and that failure to free the hostages would probably result in U.S. military action. Finally, the proposal concluded, any special plans should seek to preserve operational security and the element of surprise in case a rescue mission was attempted–while fostering understanding of the need to use force.

Six specific perceptions were to be fostered. The top two were that terrorists holding U.S. citizens have objectives that serve their own self-interest, and that the United States is united in seeking release of U.S. citizens. Also on the list were the U.S. desire for peaceful relations with other nations, the Soviet threat to Iran, the death and destruction associated with civil war, and the deterioration of Irans military posture. Each perception was to be generated through a number of subsidiary points.

November 4, 1979: The Iranian captors parade hostages taken from the U.S. embassy in Tehran.

To create the belief that those holding the hostages were serving their own interests, a perception management campaign would stress their links to non-Iranian terrorist groups, their links to communist elements, their desire for personal power, and the hardships created in Iran by their acts.

The list of measures to be examined for possible inclusion in the perception management campaign illustrates the variety of channels of communication and techniques that were considered. Radio broadcasts might include those produced by the U.S. government (for example, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service), clandestine radio, and military psychological operations radios. Transmissions or intrusions on Iranian radio frequencies might be used to deliver specific messages, while the United States might transmit communications designed to be intercepted by Iranian intelligence facilities. Leaflets, delivered by hand, mailed to individuals in Iran, or dropped from aircraft, might also be employed. Audio cassettes carrying messages by opposition religious and political figures could be produced and disseminated.

Letters might be sent to selected Iranians, and an assorted variety of individuals–attachs, diplomatic contacts, intelligence liaison personnel, and businessmen–could be used to disseminate controlled leaks or rumor campaigns. Sympathetic expatriate Iranians might be persuaded to organize groups that would convey rumors or issue press releases. In addition to such groups, foreign nations, both allies and adversaries, might be coaxed into making statements in support of the United States.

The paper also listed the use of double agents (if available) and covert actions (if feasible) among the measures to be considered, although it provided no further detail. Yet another option was a demonstration of military capabilities, perhaps including flyovers, electronic interference or jamming of radios and radar, simulated operations using communications deception to illustrate Iranian vulnerabilities, or operations using flares, chaff, and multiple aircraft.

In a March 1980 proposal, an anonymous lieutenant colonel in the Special Operations Divisions unconventional warfare branch (his name was redacted from the declassified document), submitted a strategic [deception] proposal designed to enhance the execution of a rescue option.

In April 1981, the new CIA director, William Casey, allotted 65 minutes for a briefing on the U.S. strategic deception program.

The anonymous drafter proposed that in the first phase of the deception operation, non-attributable statements by State Department spokesmen and other government officials would indicate the hopelessness of the situation by reviewing the measures taken and the options not available. These would be timed to coincide with the decision to execute a rescue mission. What message was to be conveyed in the second phase as well as the objectives of the proposed operation, are not clear. 4 However, he may have had in mind a series of statements that would convince the Iranians that the United States was not going to attempt military action, and then, after the rescue mission, a series of statements justifying that action and any deception operations conducted to enhance the chances of success.

The failure of the April rescue mission could only serve to put a greater premium on perception management, either to facilitate a second mission or help facilitate another solution. In early June, a lieutenant colonel (possibly the same person who produced the March proposal) sent a two-and-a-half page, single-spaced memo to Maj. Gen. James B. Vaught, head of the Pentagon task force responsible for rescue planning.

The author recommended approval of an umbrella perception management plan calling for an unconventional strategic PSYOP campaign of great subtlety, using mutually reinforcing channels of communication and actions to produce the desired Iranian government behavior. It would be necessary, however, to proceed very slowly and carefully, because any indication to the Iranian government that the United States was attempting to manipulate its behavior would trigger an immediate reaction which could result in irreparable damage, and preclude the possibility of future successful military action. 5

The plan called for a series of small actions and communications that would suggest the United States was having second thoughts about using military force to liberate the hostages. The actions would be indirect and mutually supporting. Intensive analysis would follow to determine if these seeds were reaching the Iranian hierarchy. The process would be repeated, involving a slightly different message, to identify other channels by which Khomeini could be influenced.

Once multiple channels have been identified and are understood, wrote the author, a series of larger, mutually supportive actions and communications could be initiated. Those actions would be intended to raise the perception of Soviet activity in the region and trigger some response from the Iranian government. That response would then be analyzed to identify the relationships among the channels used, the Iranian motivation for the response, and the impact on the Iranian public. Finally, once the channels of influence had been identified, the response analyzed, and the effect of the response determined, the operation [could] begin to increase in momentum, proceeding toward the objectives. The memo provided no further details of the proposed operation.

The Reagan years

General Stilwells dream in 1983 of a Defense Special Plans Office may have been dashed by a reluctant Congress, but perception management was not neglected during Ronald Reagans tenure as president.

The JCS special plans branch continued to operate from its offices at 2C841 in the Pentagon. Residing right next door, in 2C840, was another group of perception managers–those of the Special Plans Branch of the Defense Intelligence Agencys human resources division (a component of the agencys directorate for collection management). Other special plans units existed in the military services and combatant commands, including the U.S. Air Force, the Tactical Air Command, and the Pacific Air Forces.

The interest of senior officials in the program can be seen in William Caseys schedule for April 8, 1981. Casey, the new director of central intelligence, allotted 65 minutes to Stilwell and the director of operations for the joint staff, Lt. Gen. Philip Gast, so they could brief him on the U.S. strategic deception program. 6

A draft of a Reagan-era defense guidance document, issued by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, recommended that the United States should exploit and demonstrate the enduring economic advantages of the West to develop a variety of systems that are difficult for the Soviets to counter, impose disproportionate costs, open up new areas of major military competition, and obsolesce previous Soviet investment or employ sophisticated strategic deception options to achieve this end. (Emphasis added.)

Accordingly, in August 1985 the special planners produced the Report by the J-3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Special Plans Overview Guidance, and in April 1987, a report titled Special Plans Guidance–Strategic Defense. 7

The first document emerged from a security review with little more than 25 blacked-out pages, although the redacted version describes the memo as establishing a monitoring and assessment system and tasking the military services, the unified commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the office of the joint chiefs to carry out activities related to special plans.

The sanitized version of the second document is somewhat more informative. A number of components of strategic defense that could benefit from perception management support are identified–including recovery and reconstitution, surveillance and detection, mobility, hardening and survivability, defensive weapon systems capabilities, and Strategic Defense Initiative resources.

While these declassified documents offer only a small peek at perception management activities during the Reagan years, media accounts provide more detail and highlight some of the issues attached to those activities. Two areas that attracted intense scrutiny were U.S. weapons systems and Libya.

In March 1986, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported that the Defense Dept., in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, has initiated a disinformation program that it is applying to a number of its aircraft and weapons development programs to impede the transfer of accurate technological information to the Soviet Union. The trade journal went on to identify the CIA as serving as the chief coordinator for the release of deliberately false, incomplete, and misleading information through a number of channels. The effort was reported to cover 1520 programs, including what would become the B-2 bomber, the Navys A-12 Avenger (which was ultimately canceled), other aircraft being developed at the super-secret Area 51, and SDI. 8

A six-inch-thick document was reported to have been circulated among all levels of the Defense Department, requesting comments on the possible use of a variety of disinformation techniques–including false requests for proposals, the provision of false or misleading information at press interviews, inaccurate performance figures for aircraft and weapons systems, and other altered technical information. A department official also noted that deception might involve the creation of a fictional weapon system, with the money appropriated for it being spent elsewhere. 9

As President Ronald Reagan's defense secretary, Caspar Weinberger (left), actively advocated strategic deception.

The article drew an immediate reaction from four members of the Senate Appropriations Committee, including Democrats William Prox-mire of Wisconsin and Dale Bumpers of Arkansas. They asked the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate the disinformation program, and the possibility that Congress was one of the channels to be used to disseminate misleading data. 10

A greater controversy over perception management occurred later that year, the result of a front-page Washington Post story written by Bob Woodward in early October. The story stated that in August the Reagan administration launched a secret and unusual campaign of deception designed to convince Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi that he was about to be attacked again by U.S. bombers and perhaps be ousted in a coup. Woodward went on to quote from an August 14 memo from John Poindexter (then national security adviser and now director of the Pentagons new Total Information Awareness program) which noted that a key element of the strategy was the combination of real and illusory events–which would involve covert, diplomatic, military, and public actions. This basic plan became part of a presidential decision document–the still-classified National Security Decision Directive 234, Libya Policy. 11

The object of the plan was to increase Gadhafis anxiety about his internal strength and American military power, with the expectation that he would be less likely to undertake acts of terrorism and more likely to be toppled from power. In an attempt to attain these goals, the CIA undertook to place false information in the foreign media while operations involving communications, aircraft, and submarines were planned. One document suggested that the false information should include articles indicating the Soviet Union was planning a coup in Libya. At the same time, Libyan intelligence would be provided with photographs of Libyan dissidents meeting with Soviet officials in Paris, Baghdad, and elsewhere. 12

But what caused the most concern was the charge that beginning with an Aug. 25 report in the Wall Street Journal, the American news media … reported as fact much of the false information generated by the new plan, including renewed Libyan backing for terrorism and a looming confrontation between the United States and Libya. The following day, the New York Times carried three follow-up stories, two of which included administration assertions that while the United States had undertaken a strategic deception campaign targeted against the Libyan dictator, planting false information in the U.S. media was not part of that campaign. Administration spokesman Larry Speakes suggested that the original stories in the Journal and elsewhere might simply have represented journalistic excess. 13

A precarious balance

In its report on the Pentagons creation of the Office of Strategic Influence in February 2002, the New York Times reported that the office would manage overseas propaganda efforts. However, according to the paper, some of the classified proposals circulating within the office also called for aggressive campaigns not only to disseminate information in the foreign media and the Internet, but to engage in covert operations–distributing false news items to foreign media organizations. 14

The article produced sharp criticism, including newspaper editorials and political cartoons ridiculing the effort. The Pentagon and its senior officials found it necessary to provide disclaimers–noting that the exact functions of the new office had not been determined, but denying that they would include disinformation efforts employing the U.S. or foreign media.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld offered reassurances from Salt Lake City, where he was attending the Winter Olympics, telling reporters that the Department of Defense, this secretary, and the people that work with me tell the American people and the people of the world the truth.

The same day, the Pentagon issued a statement that the new office would under no circumstances … knowingly or deliberately disseminate false information to the American or foreign media or publics. 15

But these reassurances did not eliminate substantial concerns both in the media and within the Pentagon. Five days after the first Times story, Rumsfeld said that the reporting about the new offices possible activities might have destroyed its credibility and he might abolish the office. When asked the following day whether he had ordered Rumsfeld to shut down the office, President Bush said: I didnt even need to tell him…. He knows how I feel. And at a Pentagon press conference the next day, the defense secretary announced the formal dissolution of the office. In response to one question he asserted that, while much of the thrust of the criticism and the cartoons and editorial comment has been off the mark, the office has been so damaged … that it could not function effectively. 16 Thus, the Office of Strategic Influence met the same fate as the Defense Special Plans Office–terminated in its infancy.

Last years plan called for distributing false news items to foreign media organizations.

But the demise of the Office of Strategic Influence has not resulted in a lack of high-level attention to perception management. The current head of the Defense Departments effort is William J. Luti, the deputy undersecretary of Defense for Special Plans and Near East and South Asian Affairs. Rumsfeld created the special plans component of the job last fall–at which time he promoted Luti from his position as an assistant secretary. A Naval War College graduate, Luti served as commander of the U.S.S. Guam from 1997 to 1998 and has served as an adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney.

But while personnel may change, there is no reason to believe that the difficulties associated with defining limits to perception management activities have disappeared.

In December, another New York Times story reported that the Defense Department was considering revisions to a secret directive, S-3600.1, Information Operations. The revision would authorize the military to conduct covert operations to influence public opinion in friendly and neutral countries. The original policy focused only on adversary decision-makers and the publics of adversary countries. 17

Once again disclaimers followed. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer told reporters that they should not assume that the Pentagons idea had advanced very far. Furthermore, he cautioned that the White House would not approve of lying, that the president has the expectation that any program that is created in his administration will be based on facts. 18

The experience with perception management and information operations during the Carter and current administrations demonstrate that careful balancing is required when undertaking to manage foreign perceptions. If adversary decision-makers can be deceived about U.S. capabilities or intentions, U.S. objectives, possibly military ones, may be accomplished at a sharply reduced cost in terms of both money and lives. On other occasions, convincing adversaries that U.S. leaders do mean what they say, and will do what they threaten, may produce a desired objective. In the first case, deception through covert (intelligence) or diplomatic channels is not in conflict with the requirement of not seeking to deceive either the U.S. or foreign press. In the second case, both covert and public channels can be used to transmit the message.

However, as the record indicates, when there is not a clear delineation about which types of information operations or perception management techniques are permissible and which are not, one can expect proposals to be generated that threaten to undermine U.S. credibility and the executive branchs adherence to the law. Thus, in his June 1980 memo to Major General Vaught concerning Iran, the unknown lieutenant colonel noted that certain of the actions proposed in the implementation [of the perception management program] are on very tenuous legal ground.

And whoever authored the suggestion that appeared in a May 1980 list of interim non-violent options submitted to Vaught for the initiation of a rumor campaign that some hostages have been killed, kidnapped by dissident elements to force greater Iranian accountability through the International Red Cross (IRC) did not appear to appreciate the consequences to U.S. credibility, at home and abroad, had the origins of the campaign been revealed–nor the impact on the families of the hostages. And given the poor relations between the Iranians and the IRC, Its hard to imagine what such a rumor campaign would have accomplished, according to William J. Daugherty, a former CIA officer who was among the hostages. 19 Similarly, the proposals circulated in the early, and only, days of last years Office of Strategic Influence indicated a willingness to go beyond the bounds of covert deception and public honesty. Their disclosure, even in the absence of higher-level approval, doomed the office and damaged the Pentagons credibility.

Perhaps the best solution is for those involved in special plans and information operations efforts to have a complete understanding of U.S. policy before they put pen to paper. Thus, a 1990 Central Command regulation on military deception policy included the guidance that U.S. military deceptions shall not be designed to influence the actions of U.S. citizens or agencies, and they will not violate U.S. law, nor intentionally mislead the American public, U.S. Congress, or the media. 20