Abstract
The Bush administration wants weapons in orbit. What can be done to keep those weapons from threatening the civilian use of space?
The lack of public debate on plans to put weapons in space is giving the Pentagon–and its counterparts in certain other militaries abroad–free rein. The Bush administration is pursuing a number of systems largely outside of public scrutiny. What's not being discussed are the costs; environmental hazards in space, such as man-made radiation and debris from weapons; and alternate approaches, such as “non-offensive” defenses.
But can a vigorous U.S. debate be restarted, given the Republican victory in November? The war on terrorism, among other concerns, has drained attention away from what had been a highly controversial issue. The lost battle to preserve the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty has deflated critics. Despite earlier protests, Russia has taken the ABM decision largely in stride, using it as an excuse to abandon START II.
One difficulty in trying to arouse interest is that while “Star Wars” may not be popular, building some type of missile defense seems to be. Thus, the current missile defense test program is more or less accepted by the public and by Congress. Actual tests of space-based weapons–a major “hot button” issue for the public–will not happen any time soon.
Under these circumstances, refocusing attention on the importance of controlling weapons in space has become very difficult.
Yet the Bush team's sky's-the-limit approach to space weapons contains hidden pitfalls. It alienates moderates and therefore offers an opportunity to those opposed to space-based weapons to drive a wedge between the administration and members of Congress, and between the administration and the electorate.
Specifically, some of the Pentagon's plans to test and deploy space weapons are causing unexpected problems for the Bush administration, even among its supporters. The Defense Science Board's study on the possible use of low-yield nuclear weapons for ballistic missile defense in space has been sharply condemned, even by conservatives–Alaska Republican Sen. Ted Stevens has said that a plan to use nuclear weapons in space would threaten Congress's “fragile balance” on missile defense.
The use of weapons in space will threaten civilian projects like the International Space Station shown here.
Most observers believe that the use of nuclear weapons in space was discredited by findings in the mid-1970s that the nuclear-tipped Safeguard system would blind itself once the first defensive warhead exploded. (The electromagnetic pulse radiation would disable the space- and ground-based tracking radars necessary for its operation.) The public also feared that fallout would be spread over U.S. territory.
To back up his words, Stevens added language to the 2003 defense budget forbidding any funds from the Defense Science Board study from being spent on nuclear-related research and development for space weapons.
But if the arms control community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) want to reinvigorate the space weapons debate, they will first need to answer three critical questions: First, which elements of the debate are urgent and which are not? Second, in what areas should they be concentrating their actions? And finally, which strategy, actors, and forums might be most effective for achieving meaningful results?
What's urgent, what's not
With the demise of the ABM Treaty, the United States symbolically ended the era of restraint that had prevailed between the two main space powers since 1972, during which time both agreed not to test or deploy space-based missile defenses or components. Both sides tested non-nuclear, kinetic-kill, anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, but neither stationed them in space and capabilities remained limited.
Although the ABM Treaty has not yet been violated by the U.S. test program, space is being used as a point of interception for a variety of missile defense programs, including the Ground-Based Interceptor, which collides with target missiles at approximately 140 miles above the earth. Intercepts will occur at higher altitudes later in the Bush administration, as the Defense Department acquires faster and longer-range interceptors and test missiles.
The current tests create hundreds of particles of metallic debris, although it de-orbits within 20 minutes of the test due to its limited altitude and velocity. But the threat of longer-lasting debris will gradually increase as the altitude of interception increases, meaning it will become a greater problem as time goes on.
Anti-satellite weapons are nearer-term concerns. Although the Pentagon has not been a strong supporter of the Kinetic Energy ASAT (KE ASAT), a few conservative backers in Congress continue to fund it. Current plans contemplate a test in about two years, which would mark the first kinetic-kill ASAT test in space of any type since 1985.
While the system is not space-based, U.S. development of a robust ASAT capability poses a number of concerns, especially because it is likely to stimulate countries like China and India to pursue similar capabilities, and Russia to resume its program.
Even one test would set an unfortunate precedent, whether or not the U.S. test program is careful not to produce large amounts of debris. The United States has no legal means of affecting other test programs and there are no limitations on debris generation in existing space treaties. For this reason, many Pentagon officials are leery about testing, and any movement toward ASAT experiments will generate heated internal debate.
Laser weapons may also be tested in the near term. The United States is moving ahead with the air force's Airborne Laser, and may accelerate elements of the Space-Based Laser, depending on the former's success. In the past, U.S., and possibly Soviet, lasers have “illuminated” satellites in orbit and experiments have been conducted on the vulnerability of satellites to laser attack. But these tests have been few and far between. Now India is moving ahead with a laser program and may decide to test against space-based assets sometime in the next decade. Again, there are no current rules–but possible damage to other countries' spacecraft would not be a trivial international problem.
Discussions on banning weapons in space remain frozen at the Conference on Disarmament due to a U.S.-Chinese dispute over whether a new space treaty should be the ultimate goal. It is unlikely there will be concrete results any time soon.
Current weapons tests are at limited altitudes. But the threat of longer-lasting space debris will gradually increase as the altitude at which missiles are intercepted increases.
International efforts for a new treaty governing space activities (and particularly weapons), or for an amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, remain almost exclusively at the proposal stage. There is very little evidence of consensus among actors and no discernable willingness among key players (such as the NATO states) to move forward with Russia and China (the main proponents of a new treaty) unless the United States is willing to go along. Several U.N. resolutions have been passed in recent years calling for the continuation of the ABM Treaty and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), but none have made much of an impact because the United States has simply shrugged these efforts off. No effort has moved the Bush administration (or the Clinton administration before it, for that matter) to support any form of arms control in space.
Possible action
Existing treaties on space have a number of loopholes. The Outer Space Treaty bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit, as well as weapons of any sort on celestial bodies. But with the demise of the ABM Treaty, there are virtually no other controls. Although critics correctly point out that, with the exception of Russia, no other space-faring country has a program that is well enough developed to pose a threat, they cannot point to agreements that limit such programs. In addition, there are no limits on non-nuclear testing of any sort, no limits on deployments in orbit, and no limits on testing against space targets from the ground, sea, or air. This lends an air of legitimacy to the U.S. military's and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's remarks that there could be “threats” to U.S. space assets.
Such conditions make military planners very nervous, particularly because the number of space-capable states–those with ballistic missiles capable of leaving the atmosphere–is increasing. The U.S. Air Force's Vision 2020 and the January 2001 Rumsfeld commission report on space capitalized on these fears, implying that the United States needs space weapons for self-defense. Treating space warfare as “inevitable,” these reports made the U.S. goal of becoming the first to deploy weapons in space seem both reasonable and desirable.
If, on the other hand, credible alternative options could be presented and explained to the public, the argument put forward by the air force and Rumsfeld would be considerably weaker.
Alternatives to weapons?
One real possibility is U.S. development of so-called “non-offensive” space defenses–or alternative means of reducing space vulnerabilities in the first place. These could include satellite decoys, spare satellites, maneuverable satellites, and the use of air- and ground-based substitutes for space-based reconnaissance and communications.
While not yet widely discussed, these options may offer attractive alternatives to active defenses from the perspectives of cost, reliability, and strategic stability. For example, hardening satellites and adding on-board fuel to make them maneuverable could make destroying them much more difficult, while adding only marginally to procurement costs. Given the savings and security these options offer, compared to the creation of costly space weapons, nonoffensive defenses need to be brought into the mainstream debate.
Agreeing on debris
Another issue that affects both the military and the civilian sectors is space debris, which results from all space activities. A failure to mitigate the accumulation of debris will have devastating effects on both communities. With more than 9,000 objects over 10 centimeters in size already being tracked in various orbits by U.S. Space Command, the debris problem is an increasing concern. The expected overall growth in space activity, and possible U.S. and foreign ASAT tests, will further heighten the danger of collisions that could be fatal to satellites or spacecraft. Even the United States lacks the capability to track “micro-debris”–particles that can do considerable damage but are less than 10 centimeters in length (and which may now number more than 100,000).
The arms control community needs to engage other key political and commercial actors–and to recognize that it will not be able to halt all forms of missile defense.
Arguably, the lack of enforceable international debris mitigation rules represents the most serious long-term threat in space. There are emerging domestic and international efforts to address this problem, which–in contrast to almost all other areas of proposed space regulation–are supported by the Bush administration and the Pentagon.
A domestic effort to create new rules governing license holders for commercial satellites would require them to de-orbit old satellites (or boost them into parking orbits) once their service lives have been completed, as well as practice other debris mitigation techniques as a condition of gaining a license to launch a commercial satellite. Given U.S. dominance in the satellite market, these rules would contribute significantly to minimizing debris from commercial satellites. A second effort is taking place in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). A draft convention is being crafted that may be available for approval within the next two years. This agreement would help to create international rules for debris mitigation, but would apply to peaceful activities only, leaving a potentially dangerous loophole for military programs.
International critics tend to focus on possible new treaties, but such efforts have not met with much success. Senior figures in the Bush administration are philosophically opposed to new treaties, particularly in areas viewed as critical to national security. By continuing to seek formal arms control treaties for space, the critics may be dooming themselves to failure, unless they are willing to conclude those treaties without the United States. Many are justifiably frustrated with current U.S. policies, but they might be more effective if they ceased beating their heads against this wall and instead searched for other ways of gaining the support of the Bush administration. (For more on the dangers of space debris, see “Pelted by Paint, Downed by Debris,” by Joel Primack, in the September/October 2002 Bulletin.)
Choosing the right strategy
A number of possible strategies could be followed in seeking to revive an active debate and alter the existing course of U.S. space policy. First, one could try to “convert” the administration.
This would involve a careful process of engaging key members of the administration, possibly in concert with influential public figures (and/or experts), who might try to get them to agree to slow down or back off existing policies. Such efforts, unfortunately, are likely to fail, given the strong commitment of key members of the Bush team (particularly Rumsfeld) to the development of space weapons.
A second approach would be to try to “steamroll” the Bush administration. This strategy would involve building a large domestic and international coalition that would highlight the threats posed by space weapons and make it clear, both to President Bush and the U.S. voting public, that U.S. plans are simply ill-conceived, self-defeating, and ultimately unacceptable.
The Hubble telescope, being repaired on board a space shuttle.
While the international atmosphere could be ripe for such an effort–given the widespread opposition to existing U.S. plans in space–domestic conditions are not, particularly after the November elections. Many members of Congress have made strong statements in support of missile defenses, and the possibility of a second Bush term makes adoption of this strategy by domestic opponents highly risky–it could mean enduring a hostile relationship with the administration, the U.S. defense establishment, and Congress until 2008, and possibly beyond.
A third and currently untried option might be described as “building a new consensus”–a strategy designed to seek out allies and explore new approaches for reaching a broader-based understanding of security priorities among current users of space. This strategy rests on the notion that while the Bush administration has enunciated a particular policy and seems to be sticking to it, that policy has not been carefully constructed and lacks critical supporters.
To date, the Bush policy has failed to convince the American public of the need for a new “Star Wars,” and Bush's mounting budget deficit makes congressional support for expensive space defenses uncertain. The arms control community needs to engage other key political and commercial actors, even if it involves certain levels of compromise. It also needs to recognize that it will not achieve the goal of halting all forms of missile defense. This is simply not defensible politically for many members of Congress. But it may be able to halt some of its more threatening forms, including space-based weapons, if the argument can be made that these developments are ultimately self-defeating. This case could attract allies among most Democrats in the Congress as well as among moderate Republicans, in addition to the scientific and commercial space communities.
But a successful strategy requires the separation of the space issue from missile defense requirements. This would probably mean accepting the Ground-Based Interceptor and certain mobile land- and sea-based systems. But a line could be drawn against space-based systems and opposition could be voiced against ASAT weapons if it is clearly articulated how the testing and multilateral proliferation of these systems will threaten long-term U.S. interests in space.
Other countries would need to be convinced to accept limitations, test bans, and possibly intrusive verification mechanisms, as well. This would challenge the Chinese, Indians, and the Russians to make good on their existing (but vague) pledges opposing the weaponization of space. None of these countries has yet adopted a unilateral pledge not to deploy or test space weapons.
Of course, the campaign would need to build on a solid scientific framework, drawing out issues like space debris and radiation threats, with high-profile statements by former senior officials and experts, particularly from the defense establishment.
Fortunately, the time is right: Space weapons do not yet have an overwhelming constituency; they are neither deployed in the thousands nor widely accepted in theory; and they lack a history of success as a military deterrent.
The Bush administration should not be allowed to get away with the argument that because (in their view) treaties don't work, there is nothing else to consider.
These points do not guarantee success for an anti-space weapons policy. But several linked efforts are worth trying. Opponents of space weapons need to test the ability of a consensus-building strategy to gain allies and to begin changing the nature of the space debate to a more probing analysis of questions that remain unanswered thus far by the Bush administration.
What it would take
In a time of budget deficits, the cost argument is likely to have added weight with both Congress and the public. The NGO community should also enunciate two “Nitze criteria”: First, the cost of building space defenses must be cheaper than the cost of overcoming them, or they will be ultimately overwhelmed; and second, space defenses must be cheaper than the cost of other means of self-protection–spares, decoy satellites, satellite maneuverability, and so on. Unfortunately, though, such sensible standards and options have not been enunciated effectively to the public, the media, or Congress.
This list is by no means exhaustive and should be viewed as merely initial steps which, if supported by others, could revive the space weapons debate and move it in a direction more favorable to restraint.