Abstract
Return to incineration island
The report about Johnston Island (Monica Casper's “Incineration Island,” March/April 2002) reminded me of a blockade action a group of German citizens undertook near Pirmasens, Germany. In 1987, we were told that a large number of barrels of poison gas, relics of World War I, were stored at a depot in the hills in that area. With hundreds of friends, I sat down in front of the depot, and very soon the police cleared the place. Our trials soon followed.
A few days after our action, the news was spread by the government: “There was no poison gas. You sat in front of empty depots.”
But a few weeks later, the government announced, “The poison gas stored in Germany is to be brought to Johnston Island and is to be burned there.”
Schortens, Germany
“Incineration Island” was a disappointing report. Author Monica Casper accurately captured some of the unique ambience and sociology of Johnston Island, but her piece was misleading on both journalistic and technical grounds.
Because her account was presented as current, readers were misled about the status of chemical weapons destruction. In fact, the army destroyed the last remaining chemical weapons on the island in November 2000. Thus the statement that “approximately 55,000 munitions, almost all containing VX, remain to be incinerated” is in error. The chemical demilitarization plant is currently a significant way through its closure phase.
Casper also mischaracterizes Agent Orange. From her description, one would likely assume that dioxin is part of the defoliant's planned formulation, not byproduct impurity. Correcting that misrepresentation would have required knowledge of some chemistry, but simple common sense should have prevented publishing her statement in the next sentence that “not before several drums had leaked 250,000 pounds of Agent Orange into the soil.” Those must be pretty big drums.
Finally, Casper's parenthetical comment that “I learn that the emission of nerve gas is ‘counted’ by the army only if it is measured by each of two monitoring systems on the island” could be interpreted as implying laxity in monitoring for airborne emissions, when in fact monitoring instruments are set to alarm at such exceedingly low levels that they are subject to a relatively high rate of false positives, which must be checked by analyzing samples from passive collectors with more sensitive laboratory instruments.
Better reporting would have improved an otherwise interesting article, and more aggressive editing to ensure accurate technical content and timely publication would have served Bulletin readers better.
Aerodyne Research, Inc.
Billerica, Massachusetts
Kolb is correct in stating that the stockpile has now been incinerated and closure activities are under way. But he fails to mention that these activities include the cleanup of tons of liquid and solid waste stored in bunkers formerly housing munitions. Ecological risks abound, costs have escalated, and the ultimate fate of the atoll is yet to be determined.
As for the “pretty big drums” Kolb alludes to, approximately 1.37 million gallons of Agent Orange [more than 10 million pounds] was originally stored on the island. A total of 250,000 pounds [about 2.5 percent] leaked into the soil over a five-year period. Whether dioxin was part of the agent's planned formulation or a byproduct impurity, the fact remains that a very large amount remains on the island.
Finally, concerns about the safety of the air monitoring system came from the incinerator employees I interviewed who worked with the air monitoring system on a daily basis. While the alarms are set at very low levels, there is disagreement about what level of exposure to chemical agents poses a health risk.
Nuclear terrorism
“Bin Laden and the Bomb,” an interesting article by David Albright et al. (January/February Bulletin), is much welcome for focusing on an issue the importance of which seems to be badly underestimated.
The article correctly points out that the main barrier against nuclear terrorism is the difficulty of acquiring the basic fissile materials, but it does not explain that the most dangerous material is highly enriched uranium. It is much easier to manufacture a primitive nuclear explosive device with uranium than with plutonium.
Contrary to what the article seems to imply, such a device need not be transportable: An easier option would be to build it in a rented garage or apartment near the center of the target city, to be set off by a timer allowing ample time for the perpetrators to get away. It would be easy to smuggle to such a destination a half dozen or so half-liter parcels of highly enriched uranium. A Hiroshima-type nuclear explosive device weapon could then be manufactured rather easily, using openly available information. All the other materials necessary to complete the project could be bought in place without difficulty, presumably without any need to use black market suppliers (except, possibly, to purchase some conventional explosives).
It is also important to emphasize that the most effective preventive measure against this terrible danger is to eliminate highly enriched uranium altogether, by blending it down, say, to below 20 percent uranium 235, so that while it could no longer be easily used to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, it would still be valuable as fuel for nuclear reactors. This is easy to do, both technologically and politically, as demonstrated by the 1993 U.S.-Russian “Megatons to Megawatts” deal. In this arrangement, Russia–where there are more than a million kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough to build tens of thousands of nuclear explosive devices–is blending down half a million kilograms of weapons uranium and selling the resulting low-enriched uranium to the United States.
Unfortunately, the overextended time scale of this arrangement (20 years!), and the even slower pace of its implementation, are more consistent with the desire not to affect the market price of low-enriched uranium, and to provide some profit for the (just privatized) U.S. Enrichment Corporation, now known as USEC, than by the concern to avoid an impending nuclear catastrophe.
That this reversal of priorities continues to dominate, even after September 11, 2001, is a scandal that should be called to the attention of both the body politic and the public.
Chairman, Pugwash Council
Rome, Italy
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Update
Now, a region in northeastern Alabama is set to be the first populated U.S. area where chemical weapons will be incinerated. (Munitions have previously been destroyed on Johnston Island and in the remote Utah desert.) In February, Alabama Gov. Don Siegelman sued to block the army from burning nerve agents at its Anniston Depot, about 60 miles east of Birmingham. But on March 27, the federal government said it would pledge $7 million for the state to buy as many as 35,000 protective hoods for residents living near the depot, as well as to train people to use them. In response, the governor's office said it would withdraw opposition to the incinerator (Associated Press, March 28).
The money, which the Federal Emergency Management Agency won't release until Alabama submits a plan for its handling, would also buy safety gear for emergency workers who would respond to any accident at the incinerator.
Things may be different for residents near Arkansas's Pine Bluff Arsenal, where the army stores thousands of chemical agents and another incinerator is proposed. Wesley Sites, chemistry professor and member of the arsenal's Citizen's Advisory Committee, said that gas masks would likely be a waste of money and possibly “a serious mistake” because they would lend a false sense of security. He added that chemical agents need not be inhaled to be deadly (AP, March 30).