Abstract
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty was considered by many the cornerstone of nuclear arms control. But to the Bush administration it is an outmoded relic of the Cold War, and on December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the treaty after six months to pursue plans for a national missile defense. Bush justified the abrogation by redefining the U.S.-Russian relationship:
“Russia is not an enemy of the United States and yet we still go to a treaty that assumes Russia is the enemy, a treaty that says the whole concept of peace is based on us blowing each other up. I don't think that makes sense anymore.”
Is he right?
I believe his argument ignores a series of critical problems.
There were two important ideas behind the ABM Treaty: minimizing strategic instability during the Cold War and saving money. Both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized that any defensive system could be overcome by increasing the number of attacking missiles or by deploying decoys and other countermeasures. The ABM Treaty sought to severely limit each country's buildup of defenses so that its offensive nuclear forces would no longer need to grow.
Without the ABM Treaty, each time one country deployed some sort of defense, the other would in theory be forced to counter offensively. Each defensive deployment would set off a costly arms race. But after a period of instability, the strategic balance would be back to the status quo ante. This was true 30 years ago and holds true today.
The ABM Treaty did not seek to limit the absolute number of missiles a country could have–that was covered by the SALT and START treaties. The level of armaments agreed to in those treaties was based on the limits imposed by the ABM Treaty. ABM, SALT, and START were a single package.
Today, the U.S.-Russian relationship has outgrown this logic. In November 2001, when President Vladimir Putin visited the Bush ranch in Texas, speculation was rampant that Russia would agree to limited testing and deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system if Russia and the United States could come to an agreement to reduce the number of strategic missiles and warheads on each side.
That deal would have been contrary to the reasoning behind the ABM Treaty–to overwhelm defenses one needs more warheads, not fewer. That Putin would even consider deep reductions shows that he no longer considers the United States a serious threat. Consequently, there is no need for either country to maintain large numbers of offensive missiles whose purpose can be achieved at dramatically lower levels.
Administration officials argue that abrogating the ABM Treaty will make the United States safer because Russia won't waste money increasing its nuclear arsenal once it realizes that the proposed U.S. defense system will not threaten its deterrent. This could be taken to mean that Russia can be confident its old offense will be able to defeat a new U.S. defense.
There is an element of the ridiculous in this argument. National missile defense doesn't even need to work to make the United States safer. Rogue states, so in awe of U.S. technological prowess, will be deterred even if the system is defective–because they won't believe Bush would deploy a multi-billion dollar dud.
The Bush administration doesn't seem to care that its plans to withdraw from the treaty may have unintended consequences for Russia's evolution. The post-Cold War U.S.-Russian relationship is still crystallizing, and it is a delicate procedure. The ABM Treaty has helped stabilize U.S.-Russian ties, and (for the time being) continues to do so, while a complex transition is taking place within Russia. A dramatic change in the nuclear arms control regime, like the proposed U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty, may destabilize these processes. Russia's senior military and intelligence officers in particular could take advantage of the situation for their own political purposes, pressuring Putin on issues ranging from defense structure and spending to NATO expansion.
Collaboration where Russian and U.S. security interests converge, such as in the fight against terrorism, may be weakened by a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. A measure of the budding U.S.-Russian relationship, for example, was demonstrated when Russia shared valuable intelligence on Afghanistan.
But a more powerful common interest is oil.
The old venture between the United States and Saudi Arabia, in which the West got oil to run its economy in return for protecting Saudi Arabia with U.S. military might while ignoring Saudi support of terrorism, is now on shaky ground. When the Saudis withheld oil from the market in 1974, the U.S. strategic oil reserve and the development of North Sea oil served as a shield against the “oil weapon.”
“We've cut out the middleman.”
Today, the growing instability of the Gulf region and the vulnerability of the Saudi oil fields to terrorist attacks make access to Russia's vast oil reserves a very attractive hedge. Russian reserves are nearly as large as those in the United States, Mexico, and Canada combined. Already Exxon, Shell, and Total have entered into agreements with the Russians to develop reserves at Sakhalin and in Kharayhiaga in northwest Russia. Strengthening the common U.S.-Russian oil interest would aid the development of the Russian economy and assure Western access to adequate energy supplies. But the Bush administration's unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty may be seen by some in Russia as a vote of no confidence, weakening the potential of this partnership.
By announcing that it will withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the United States has chosen a unilateral path, rankling European allies who fear a decoupling of their security arrangements from those of the United States. The abrogation will open doors for Russia to gain political influence in Europe–something that European governments view with trepidation. And while many Europeans are optimistic about Russia's future, its less-than-stable evolution is still a concern.
For the United States, the importance of the ABM Treaty went beyond the bilateral relation with Russia. Withdrawal may endanger other treaties of far greater value to the United States, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime. It could also lead to an arms race in South Asia.
The Bush administration argues that the ABM Treaty has no value as far as China is concerned, because China intends to modernize its nuclear forces no matter what the United States does. There is some truth in that, but China has opposed abrogation, and whether it builds a modern force of 20–or 200–missiles depends on whether the United States deploys a missile defense.
On the other hand, it could be argued (although certainly not by the Bush administration) that Chinese scientists will tell their leaders that the U.S. system will fail against tested countermeasures. But China's leaders cannot be sure. In making their calculations, they will rely on old ABM logic. And if China does deploy 200 missiles, India will respond, which means Pakistan will follow. Not a good scenario.
The Bush administration maintains that most treaties constrain U.S. power and should therefore be dismantled. Officials say the United States should support only those laws and arrangements that are U.S.-defined or approved, or that serve U.S. national interests, benefiting other nations only incidentally.
This worldview harks back to a time before the nineteenth century, when populations and economies, protected by national armies, were self-contained. This is not today's world, with its globalized manufacturing, financing, and marketing, with its multiple jurisdictions that transcend national authority. It is a world where multilateralism–not unilateralism–holds the true key to national security. Announcing the intention to abrogate the ABM Treaty has sent a clear message to the rest of the world: The United States has chosen unilateralism and is decoupling its security interests, even from those of its allies.
The Bush administration responded to September 11 by building coalitions–an approach that acknowledged the need for international legitimation and support. It succeeded admirably. But the coalition is fragile, and continued support is tenuous. Domestic ideologues who see the coalition as only an opportunistic arrangement, not a policy change, must learn quickly the advantages of multilateralism. Who needs the ABM Treaty? We all do.