Missile Defense: Wrong in Too Many Ways

American defense planners paused only briefly after the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11 before resuming their call to build an extensive missile defense system. The view from Europe is very different.

First, from the point of view of the 180-plus states like Belgium, which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with a promise not to acquire nuclear weapons, the idea that one or more of the nuclear weapon states should be allowed to combine their powerful nuclear deterrents with missile defenses stretches logic too far:

In the short and medium term, these nuclear weapon states might start to feel invulnerable in ways that encourage dangerous, risk-prone behavior on their part. Moreover, deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals could become impossible. China would be likely to build more nuclear weapons.

In the long term, the elimination of nuclear weapons–the “unequivocal” goal since the NPT Review Conference in 2000–will become even more difficult to realize.

Second, most states still regard the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as crucial. At the U.N. First Committee in November 1999, only the United States, Israel, Latvia, and Micronesia voted against a resolution in favor of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. At the NPT Review Conference in 2000, South Africa called the idea of amending the ABM Treaty a betrayal of what was promised at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. If U.S. national missile defense (NMD) goes forward, it remains to be seen what effects it will have on the NPT Review Conference in 2005.

Third, U.S. missile defenses seem destined to complicate ad hoc diplomatic initiatives aimed at managing proliferation in specific regions. Putting boost-phase systems near a proliferator is hardly a confidence-building measure.

Arguing the necessity of missile defenses undermines existing nuclear deterrence policy. By arguing that nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient, the United States may well stimulate other states to acquire weapons of mass destruction to threaten the United States.

But even if nuclear deterrence were inadequate, why add to the problem by deploying another uncertain technology like missile defense? It will only provide incentives for nuclear proliferators.

Fourth, state and non-state actors that do not yet possess missiles will certainly notice how to unsettle the most powerful state in the world.

Fifth, the U.S. idea of sharing missile defense with others means exporting missile technology that may well serve as a stimulus for missile proliferation. And the United States will not be the only nation sharing such technology–Russia and China are likely to do so as well, but they may well share technology with states the United States categorizes as “rogues.”

In other words, there is a very good chance that weapons of mass destruction will spread as a direct result of NMD. Missile defense is not a solution, but a reaction that fails to address the underlying causes of proliferation, and does nothing to reduce current numbers of offensive missiles.

A more radical alternative would be a ban on ballistic missiles for military purposes, which might be more feasible from a technical point of view, more effective, and less costly than missile defense. 1 Even Ronald Reagan toyed with this concept.

Combined with treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, in 1972 and 1993 respectively, and a ban on nuclear weapons (as foreseen in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), it stands as a realistic alternative to missile defense for managing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. (Politically, of course, this idea does not seem feasible in the foreseeable future. It is still taboo.)

Europe should make demands

The only alternative in the short term is for entities like the European Union (EU), whose presidency is currently held by Belgium, to set conditions on NMD. A European “Plan B” should have three features:

First, the United States and Russia must agree on an amended ABM Treaty, with new openness toward China. As the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine has said, “If the United States does go ahead in spite of a Russian refusal, challenging the policy of negotiated arms control, then France and the other EU countries will have to have a strong response. The reaction will be different if the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, agrees [to amend the treaty].” 2

Second, the final NMD architecture should be limited, capable of defending against only a few long-range missiles (20 at most). From a technical point of view, this means that the ability to “break out”–to quickly build an extensive system capable of neutralizing the Russian and Chinese nuclear deterrent–would be legally forbidden. This would include barring Navy Theater-Wide defensive systems as well as space-based sensors such as SBIRS-Low (Space-Based Infrared System) satellites (let alone space-based weapons), and permitting no more than one X-band radar.

Third, a serious commitment to a radical package of new arms control and disarmament measures is needed in order to save and strengthen the existing nonprolifer-ation regime. This should include:

• • a newly negotiated bilateral arms reduction treaty (START III) calling for deployment of a maximum of 1,000 strategic nuclear weapons, most not on high alert; a maximum overall level of 1,500 nuclear warheads; and a ban on substrategic nuclear weapons;

• • further strategic nuclear arms reduction negotiations (with or without the other nuclear weapon states), leading to START IV;

• • a no-first-use declaration, not restricted to responses to attacks with conventional weapons;

• • a treaty banning space-based weapons;

• • a cut-off treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes;

• • ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

A more active Europe

Europe, in turn, should approach strategic issues such as deterrence, arms control, disarmament, missile defense, and nonproliferation more seriously. The European Union, for example, would be well advised to take more responsibility, including financial responsibility, to help make sure that the deteriorating Russian nuclear weapons infrastructure is made less threatening to international security.

Europe also needs to devise credible strategies for dealing with existing and future weapons of mass destruction programs in countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, which has been left to the United States in the past. Concerted European action, in contrast to the development of a U.S. national missile defense, could help to reinforce the U.S.-European relationship.

Some Americans may believe that “our European allies may be nervous about these developments [like NMD], but they are always nervous and will ultimately go along,” as Michael Nacht framed it. 3 There are historical grounds for this view, and history may repeat itself. However, as Europe creates its political niche in a world that is more and more economically oriented and interdependent, it will become more difficult for Europe to ignore unilateral U.S. policy decisions in the field of international security, especially if those options are vehemently opposed by other important powers, in this case Russia and China.

Public disgust

In the eyes of European public opinion, NMD suffers from two additional problems: It is perceived as a Bush initiative, and it concerns nuclear weapons, two things that are generally disliked in Europe.

With Bush's rejection of the Kyoto accord, his insistence on NMD, and his position on the death penalty, the antipathy toward the new American president is alive, as the demonstrations during his first visit to Europe and a recent opinion poll conducted by the Council on Foreign Relations show. 4 “Multilateralism à la carte” is only tenable in the short term.

The unexpected public reaction in Europe against the resumption of French nuclear tests in the Pacific in summer 1995, the continued protests against the presence of nuclear weapons in countries like Britain and Belgium, and the massive protests against the transport of nuclear waste in Germany are all warning signs against underestimating the power of European public opinion with regard to nuclear matters. 5

If Bush unilaterally walks away from the ABM Treaty in November–as hinted by Under Secretary of State John Bolton in Moscow–the number of protesters at the December EU summit in Brussels will swell from the expected 20,000 to 200,000.